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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
On May 12, 2008—in the last months of the Bush administration—the U.S. Immigration 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) raided a meatpacking plant, Agriprocessors, Inc., in Postville, Iowa 
(population 2200).  Three days later, an ICE news release proclaimed it “the largest criminal 
worksite operation in U.S. history” (ICE 2008). For over a year, ICE strategized for this raid 
(Camayd-Freixas 2008). A total of 16 local, state, and federal agencies—including the U.S. 
Marshalls Service, the Iowa Department of Public Safety, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U. S. Department of Justice, and the federal Drug 
Enforcement Agency—participated in the investigation that led to the raid (Duara, Petroski, and 
Elbert 2008).  
ICE’s enforcement actions at the meatpacking plant were well coordinated. On the day 
of the raid, 900 agents descended in Postville with 737 arrest warrants, which accounted for 
75% of the workforce. Because the raid occurred during the morning shift, only 390 
undocumented immigrants (4 Russians, 3 Israelis, 93 Mexicans, and 290 Guatemalans) were 
arrested. Part of the plan aimed at processing all undocumented immigrants at once. To that 
end, ICE set its command operations at the National Cattle Congress, a cattle fairground in 
neighboring Waterloo, Iowa. They brought in 23 trailers that served as courtrooms, where U.S. 
District Court judges would pass sentence. Other buildings, where hundreds of cots were 
2 
 
placed, were used to house the detainees. Federal court interpreters flew in from other parts of 
the country and court-appointed criminal defense attorneys were briefed and instructed on 
how to handle the cases. Additionally, the media was not allowed access on the day of the raid, 
but thereafter, and no cameras and any type of recording devices were permitted (Camayd-
Freixas 2008). 
A crucial aspect of this raid is ICE use of prosecutorial discretion. The U.S. Department of 
Justice put together not only the charges under which undocumented immigrants would be 
arrested, but also the plea agreement that would allow sole discretionary power to ICE and tie 
the hands of the judiciary. First, two charges were leveled against undocumented immigrants: 
1) “aggravated identity theft” and 2) “Social Security fraud.” The first charge carries a 
mandatory 2-year sentence while the second carries a discretionary sentence, ranging from no 
time in jail to confinement of up to six months. Second, the plea agreement, an offer good for 
seven days, provided three options: 1) enter a guilty plea to the lesser charge of “Social Security 
fraud” and the government would drop the most serious charge of “aggravated identity theft,” 
serve five months in jail, and agree to be deported without a hearing before an immigration 
judge; 2) enter a no-guilty plea and spend from six to eight months in jail awaiting trial;1 and 3) 
fighting the criminal charges and prevailing in court does not entitle anyone to stay in the 
country.  And after winning the case, deportation would follow. Lose the case and the 2-year 
mandatory sentence goes into effect immediately. To keep a tight lid on the charges and on the 
plea agreement, ICE did not allow immigration attorneys to access the premises. Meanwhile, 
                                                          
1 Once undocumented immigrants are arrested, ICE puts an immigration hold on them. It means that they cannot 
be released from custody, posting bail is not an option available to them 
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U.S. Court District judges were to accept the plea and render sentence. Under these 
circumstances, the process “reduced the judges to mere bureaucrats” (Camayd-Freixas 2008, 
9).  
This raid, with all its display of force, raises some puzzling questions, which are pertinent 
to this dissertation. If the goal of enforcing immigration policy is to rid communities and the 
country of undocumented immigrants, then why did the federal agency, ICE, target a 
meatpacking plant in a small town in Iowa? Why not target states such as California, where 2.5 
millions of undocumented people reside? Was it politically motivated? What role, if any, did the 
partisanship of the president—along with his policy preferences—play in the decision to focus 
on Iowa? Was it the partisanship of the state governor that mattered the most? Chet Culver, a 
Democrat, had been elected state governor the previous year and was not politically aligned 
with President Bush, a Republican. Additionally, in the previous two presidential elections (i.e., 
2000 and 2004), both the Democratic and Republican Party won by a fraction of one percent.  
And in the presidential election of 2008, Barack Obama was elected president and won with a 
comfortable margin. A quick perusal of both citizen and institutional ideology scores (Berry 
2006; 2015) show that those scores were steadily climbing. They show that since 2002, the 
ideological views of Iowa residents and of state government institutions were becoming more 
liberal. In fact, those views started changing towards the end of the 1990s—the decade that 
saw the largest wave of Latino and Asian immigrants landing in towns such as Postville. That 
decade culminated with a shift in political power in the state government, and after three 
decades of Republican control of the governorship, the citizens of Iowa elected a Democratic 
governor. 
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Turning the focus to social issues in Iowa, and in Postville in particular, I zero in on the 
unemployment rate. Between the years 2005 and 2008, the unemployment rate fluctuated 
from a low of 4.1 percent to a high of 10.3 percent. By the time of the raid, the unemployment 
rate was 7 percent, well above both the state (4%) and the national average (5.4%). By August 
2008, three months after the raid, it had dropped to 4.2 percent. Some would argue that by 
removing the undocumented immigrant population from the town, job vacancies were filled by 
the local residents. However, Agriprocessors, Inc. experienced a labor shortage as it could not 
find local residents willing to take those jobs. To restore levels of production, the meatpacking 
plant recruited out of state workers—authorized to work in the United States—and  introduced 
Somali refugees and Palauans to Postville, Iowa. 
Although neither the city of Postville nor the state of Iowa were or are participating in 
the 287(g) program—a federal immigration enforcement program and focus of this study—I 
draw attention to this raid for two reasons. First, the immigration raid was the impetus for this 
dissertation. The events in this Midwestern small town, a new destination for immigrants, raise 
valid questions about political parties and their concomitant policy preferences driving 
enforcement actions. Additionally, and equally crucial is the volatility of the immigration issue 
that makes congressional representatives key players on how immigration policy is enforced 
and how they shape it through oversight committees. Therefore, immigration policy 
enforcement ought to be examined through the lens of the legislative and executive branches 
of the federal government. Moreover, given that the enforcement occurs in communities 
where immigrants reside, studying the issue of immigration enforcement ought to include state 
government political actors: the state governor and state legislators. Second, the raid illustrates 
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the main points—discretionary power, political and social forces, and labor dependence on 
immigrants—surrounding debates over immigration policy enforcement and states’ decisions 
to adopt state-level immigration policies.  
Overall, this raid provides a glimpse of variation in the enforcement of immigration 
policy and on labor dependence on immigrant labor. First, ICE could have targeted more 
populous cities and towns where immigrants reside. For instance, in the Central Coast and 
Central Valley of California, over 230 crops are grown (Bittman 2012). Primarily, undocumented 
immigrants labor in the fields tending to these crops that would supply markets across the 
United States. Given the high concentration of undocumented immigrants in those two areas, it 
would not be difficult for ICE to round them up and remove them from the country. Yet, it 
chose a small town, whose population decreased by 40% overnight and whose economy 
collapsed shortly thereafter, to conduct a raid of such magnitude. Second, the raid sent 
shockwaves to markets across the United States as Agriprocessors, Inc. supplied 60 percent and 
40 percent of kosher meat and poultry, respectively. In fact, this meatpacking plant is the 
largest in the country (Bobo 2009). The amplitude of reach of these waves demonstrates the 
importance of and dependence on immigrant labor in particular industries. 
 
In this dissertation, I focus on two areas of immigration policy and address two 
questions: 
 
• What explains variation in the enforcement of immigration policy through the 287(g) 
program across participating localities? 
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• Why do some states tend to adopt state-level accommodating immigration policies 
while others tend to adopt restrictive ones? 
 
The results of this study underscore the interrelationship of political and social forces 
that determine policy enforcement actions and the tone of state-level immigration policies. The 
theory emphasizes both the amplifying and attenuating effect that social issues—
unemployment and crime rates and population growth—have on elected political leaders and 
how their position of power along with their partisanship—with its concomitant policy 
preferences—influence the discretionary decisions of local law enforcement officers and 
federal agents in the enforcement of immigration policy. Additionally, I apply this theory to 
state governments’ decisions to adopt particular immigration policies and introduce an 
additional factor to the equation: the economic importance of key industries to the state 
economy. Lastly, using data from the U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement and the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, I test the enforcement and policymaking hypotheses with 
negative binomial and OLS analyses, spanning two presidential administrations. 
 
Key Argument 
Studies on the enforcement of public policy tend to treat partisanship as just a 
characteristic of the environment. Seldom is it viewed as a crucial element in the crafting of 
legislation and shaping enforcement actions. The adoption of state-level immigration policies 
and the collaboration between local and federal agencies in the enforcement of immigration 
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policy present an opportunity to explore how the partisanship of political elected leaders 
determines the tone of the policies and enforcement activities.   
The theory that I present anchors partisanship on the state governor and the 
president—two elected leaders who represent a political party that upholds a particular set of 
values. Given their executive powers—budgetary, appointment, oversight, and veto—they can 
directly and indirectly influence the discretionary enforcement actions of street-level 
bureaucrats and the legislative agenda. Put differently, the state governor and the president 
have powers that can either facilitate or hinder the actions of bureaucrats and can shape the 
legislative agenda. Instead of focusing on how they used their powers to obtain their preferred 
outcomes, I focus on their partisanship and how it defines public policy, in particular, 
immigration policy. Moreover, I set the powers of the governor and the president in the 
background and bring to the forefront their partisan values as a compass that guides their 
actions in the pursuit of their preferred policies. Thus, I argue that partisanship is vital to the 
enforcement of immigration policy and to the direction that state-level immigration policy 
takes. 
Although the argument sets partisanship of elected leaders front and center, it does not 
suggest that on its own can shape legislation and enforcement. The partisanship effect, I argue, 
is much more complicated than the simple designation of Republican versus Democratic. 
Therefore, I add an additional layer to the argument by including socio-economic-demographic 
(SED) issues that are of concern to the political parties and the constituencies they represent. 
Importantly, the argument I set forth is that these SED issues activate partisan values, which 
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determine policy preferences. And, because of the powers that elected political leaders 
possess, their preferred public policies prevail.  
All in all, a conglomerate of social issues related to a specific public policy helps 
determine whether partisanship has an effect on the tone of state-level policy and on street-
level bureaucrats’ enforcement activities. The president and the state governor do not have to 
even mention the powers they possess. Their position as chief executives implicitly signals their 
power and their partisanship explicitly indicates the public policies they envision and expect to 
realize. In this dissertation, I plan to test this theory of the relationship of partisan influence and 
social factors in relation to enforcement actions and state-level legislation (Chapters 3 and 4).  
 
Contributions 
The findings from these analyses contribute to the study of partisan politics and policy advocacy 
in a number of ways. First, it furthers our understanding of key political leaders’ partisan values 
and their influence on state and federal agencies policy enforcement activities. While this view 
may not be a novelty, the core values from which public policy preferences emanate are hardly 
ever discussed in studies of policy enforcement and policymaking. Although this study is not 
about uncovering the set of core values that political parties uphold, they deserve mention 
because by knowing the values, we will better understand policy preferences and their effect 
on policy enforcement and policymaking. 
Second, it links issues such as unemployment, crime, and demographic growth to 
partisanship values of key political leaders. By linking these two sets of factors, it highlights the 
amplifying and attenuating effect of these social issues on the policy preferences of elected 
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party leaders thus determining the approach to policy enforcement and direction of state-level 
immigration policy. This is important because by understanding how social issues provoke a 
particular partisan response, immigration policy advocates can better design their advocacy 
agenda.   
 
Plan for the Dissertation 
 In this dissertation, I explore the two fundamental elements of immigration policy: 
social issues and partisan politics factors. The goal is to demonstrate the activating effect of 
social issues on partisan values that, in turn, determine the approach to immigration policy 
enforcement and the direction of state-level immigration policy.  
In Chapter 2, “Theoretical Underpinnings,” I dive into the immigration policy 
enforcement program known as 287(g) and demystify it. I explain in detail its inner workings, its 
design, and the cooperative relationship between local and federal agencies. Additionally, I 
reveal the junctures at which opportunities for discretion occur and the enforcement actions 
that proceed. More importantly, I explore how the 287(g) program functions under both the 
Bush and Obama administrations to get an insight on how their policy enforcement preferences 
explain the variation in the number of immigrants arrested and removed from the country.  
Chapter 3, “The Enforcement of Immigration Policy through the 287(g) Program,” 
presents a theory of immigration policy enforcement by bringing together and combining social 
issues and political factors. I empirically test the predictions underpinning the theory using a 
new dataset of enforcement actions generated by the U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement 
in coordination with local law enforcement agencies. I show that the partisan identification of 
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key political leaders, in particular the governor and the president, does determine the policy 
enforcement activities of the agencies. Additionally, I show that social issues are key influencing 
factors on the partisan identification of those political actors.  
In Chapter 4, I adjust the lens and focus on state governments and the type of state-
level immigration policies they adopt. I make use of the theory of policy enforcement 
(presented in Chapter 3), and after adding another layer of complexity to the model, I apply it 
to the study of state policymaking as it relates to immigration policy. Using data from the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, I then empirically test the predictions that emanate 
from the theory. Again, I show that some social issues have activating effects by turning on and 
off the policy preferences of the state governor.  
Chapter 5 brings together key findings from the empirical tests in Chapter 3 (policy 
enforcement) and Chapter 4 (state-level immigration policies) and explores their applicability to 
the field of policy advocacy. Additionally, I situate this analysis within the context of non-profit 
organizations and the federal regulations that delimit their level of involvement and restrict 
their advocacy activities. More importantly, I present a picture of the political and social 
landscapes and point out the areas where political landmines may be buried.  
In Chapter 6, I conclude that social issues, of concern to key constituencies, play a 
crucial role in activating the core values of the political parties and consequently determining a 
policy preference that shapes the enforcement of immigration policy. Additionally, those same 
social issues—given the political party controlling the governorship—determine the 
predisposition of state governments to adopt state-level immigration policies that either seek 
to restrict or accommodate the residence of immigrants in the states. I further discuss the 
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overall findings of the analyses and their implications for policy enforcement, policymaking, and 
policy advocacy.  
The dissertation concludes that partisanship is not the sole determinant of immigration 
policy enforcement outcomes and whether states adopt either accommodating or restrictive 
immigration policies. It also highlights the effect that socio-economic-demographic issues have 
on partisanship and how this relationship provides more nuanced results in terms of 
enforcement and legislation. Additionally, it shows that even when SED issues are present, they 
may not have an activating effect on the partisan values of the political parties despite the 
political rhetoric of elected leaders.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
 
The enforcement of immigration policy is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government. However, in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), allowing local and state governments to collaborate with the 
Department of Homeland Security (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Services) to 
enforce immigration law. This window of opportunity facilitated the participation of local law 
enforcement agencies in federal enforcement programs to deal with undocumented 
immigrants in their communities. Thus, at the local level, the participating agency can identify 
and arrest removable immigrants, while the federal agency decides who is removed from the 
country. The structure of the collaboration ensures that immigration enforcement actions 
remain an exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.  
Although both local and federal agencies are on the frontlines of enforcement actions, 
their discretion is influenced by key political leaders—the state governor and the president. 
These key leaders have constitutional and other powers that they can use to influence the 
discretion of local and federal agencies in the enforcement of immigration policy. Moreover, 
because these elected political leaders uphold a set of values that characterize the political 
party they represent, they have particular policy preferences, emanating from those values. 
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Thus, it may be the case that while one political party favors stringent enforcement, the other 
favors an approach that provides opportunities for certain undocumented immigrants to stay. 
Furthermore, the position on immigration enforcement they take would depend not only on a 
set of values, but also on socio-economic-demographic concerns of the constituencies they 
represent.  
Despite a sizable literature on the effect of partisanship in many areas of governance, 
little is known of its effect on immigration policy enforcement. To understand that effect, a 
better understanding of partisanship is needed. To that end, I take a step back from common 
descriptions of both Republican and Democratic political parties—for example, red versus blue, 
diverging views on the size of government—and burrow just a bit deeper. At the core of 
partisanship, there is a set of values that define policy preferences and guide party leaders in 
the enforcement of public policy in general and immigration policy in particular. Debates over 
immigration policy bring out concerns over the impact of immigrants, along with their cultural 
traditions, on both the unemployment and crime rate, issues dating back to the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  
I argue that these socio-economic and demographic factors act as a switch, activating 
partisan values and triggering a reaction or response from elected party leaders. I assume that 
Republicans uphold values of law and order and the rule of law. In general, they argue that 
undocumented immigrants are law breakers because either they crossed the border without 
authorization or overstayed their visas. This argument coupled with the perennial view that 
immigrants are prone to crime and commit more crimes than the U.S.-born may lead 
Republican to prefer rigorous enforcement. On the other hand, I assume that Democratic 
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leaders value social integration. They emphasize that the United States is a country of 
immigrants—whether first or fifth generation, who through time, have contributed to society. 
This view may lead them to support programs that facilitate integration rather than programs 
that facilitate deportation.  
Moreover, I argue that partisanship influences bureaucratic discretion and shapes 
immigration policy enforcement. Moreover, this effect is either amplified or attenuated when 
socio-economic and demographic factors activate partisan values. Thus, the same issues may 
activate the core values of both Republican and Democratic parties yet produce diverging 
responses. While this is a theoretical argument that can be applied to any other public policy, 
this analysis focuses on immigration policy. The issue of immigration is contentious and salient 
and is fodder for political campaigns. Both incumbents and challengers build their political 
platforms based on this hot button issue. Promises of immigration policy reform and of ridding 
the country of undocumented immigrants abound. This political rhetoric at the national level 
(Hopkins 2010)—along with congressional legislative inaction on immigration policy reform and 
rapid growth of immigrant populations at the local level—has influenced states to adopt 
restrictive policies including the enforcement of immigration policy. Yet, so far, no study has 
explored the factors that influence variation in the number of arrests and removals of 
undocumented immigrants.  
In this study, I explore the links between the state governor and the president in 
relation to local and federal agencies, respectively. In particular, I explore whether the 
partisanship affiliation of these leaders influence the enforcement actions of the agencies. 
Additionally, I focus on how issues such as crime, unemployment, and rapid demographic 
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change may activate partisan values leading either to an increase or decrease in enforcement 
actions. To explore these links and to discern whether partisanship matters in the enforcement 
of immigration policy, I use data generated by the 287(g) program—a federal program in which 
local and state law enforcement agencies (LEA) collaborate with the federal government 
identifying, arresting, detaining, and removing undocumented immigrants. At the local level, 
LEAs have the discretion to arrest undocumented immigrants, while at the federal level, the 
federal agency exercises discretion to remove them from the country. Given that the data 
available span two presidential administrations, this study focuses on the last term of the Bush 
and the first term of the Obama administrations.  
 This study contributes to the growing body of literature on immigration policy 
enforcement in four ways. First, it provides information on the intricacies of the 287(g) 
Program, how it works, and the interrelationship between local, state, and federal governments 
in the enforcement of immigration policy. Second, it posits that partisanship, with its 
concomitant public policy preferences—filtered through the president and state governor—
influences the discretion of bureaucrats from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies 
in their approach to immigration policy enforcement. Moreover, partisanship may be pivotal in 
explaining variation in the number of arrests and removals across participating localities and 
states. Third, it explores how social factors, of concern to constituencies, either amplify or 
attenuate the effect of partisanship on enforcement actions. And fourth, by focusing on 
immigration policy enforcement, I can begin to explore how states and national political leaders 
use their power not only to influence the discretion of law enforcement officers, but also to 
establish a quasi-immigration policy reform—one locality and state at a time.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present previous studies on the president’s and 
governor’s constitutional powers and their effect on local, state, and federal agencies’ 
discretionary actions. Additionally, I examine studies in which partisanship is an influencing 
factor on various spheres of government and in public policy outcomes. Second, I describe the 
complexities of the 287(g) Program: the statute that defines the program and the application 
process to gain approval to participate. Finally, I describe how the program operated under 
both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the removal process and opportunities for 
discretion that local and federal agencies encounter in the fulfillment of their duties.  
 
Literature Review 
It is well established that the president influences the behavior of the federal agencies. The 
literature on the bureaucracy and the administrative presidency provide an array of studies that 
explore the determinants that explain how that influence occurs. A number of scholars have 
focused on the president’s constitutional powers and how he wields them on the federal 
agencies. First, the budgetary power allows the president either to increase, decrease, or 
maintain the amount of funds allocated to the agency. Wood’s (1988) study of the effect of the 
Reagan administration’s budget reduction on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
enforcement activities found that both monitoring and abatement activities decreased by 41% 
and 69% points, respectively. 
 Second, with the appointment power, the president can pack the federal agencies with 
appointees with whom he has an ideological affinity and could advance his policy priorities 
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(Moe 1985).  Wood (1988, 1991) provides examples on how Reagan’s appointment of a like-
minded secretary to head the EPA contoured policy enforcement. While the first appointee, 
Ann Gorsuch, followed Reagan’s directives to decrease enforcement activities, the second 
appointee, William Ruckelshaus, increased them—an action in response to external political 
forces. Finally, although the president’s political rhetoric is not considered a constitutional 
power, it was found to influence the behavior of the bureaucracy by signaling policy 
preferences and priorities, specifically on the “war on drugs” (Whitford and Yates, 2003, 2009). 
Additionally, presidents can influence the actions of bureaucrats, congressional representatives, 
and state governments through their political rhetoric. The rhetoric explicitly states the 
president’s policy preferences whether is on the type of public policy she wants to see adopted 
or the manner and rigor with which these policies ought to be implemented and enforced. 
Karch’s (2012) study on the national government’s legislative activities demonstrates the 
influencing power of the political rhetoric on state governments’ legislative agenda. In 
particular, the study found that President Bush’s statements to the media on federal funding 
for embryonic stem cell research made the issue salient. Thereby, he drew the attention of the 
public and of congressional and state legislators. His statements coupled with national 
legislative activity on the issue influenced state governments to put stem cell research policy in 
their legislative agendas.  
Governors, because of their institutional powers, also have considerable influence over 
the crafting and implementing of public policies. Among the most notable powers at their 
disposal are the appointment, veto, and budgetary. With the strategic use of these powers, 
governors can maneuver around obstacles that may impede the fulfillment of their policy 
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preferences. Although the governors do not have any legislative power, their veto power makes 
them key players in the legislative process. The veto threat, whether explicitly or implicitly 
stated, can make legislatures design policy that would accommodate the governor’s 
preferences. Even when the legislature can override a veto, governors can still rely on their 
cabinet members, with whom they have an ideological affinity. In this manner, governors exert 
more control over the implementation of policies, enforcing them in a manner that meets their 
political goals. Finally, the budgetary power allows them to fund their pet projects and defund 
those that do not fall within the purview of their public policy agendas.  
Political parties are pivotal players in U.S. governance. Each party upholds a set of values 
that guide its work in the crafting of public policy. Furthermore, constituencies tend to 
associate specific public policy issues with either the Republican or Democratic Party (Egan 
2010). Party leaders embrace these values and derive their power from being elected to office 
to pursue particular policies. Because of the centrality of political parties in governmental 
politics, elected leaders exert a great deal of influence on the courts, the design of public policy, 
and local, state, and federal agencies, among others.  
A number of studies have analyzed the partisan influence on different spheres of 
government. Studies on judicial nominations have found that partisanship plays a key role in 
the confirmation process of justices. For instance, Shipan’s (2008) study on the president’s 
Supreme Court nominees found that when legislators are from the same political party of the 
president, they are more likely to confirm, even controlling for nominee’s qualifications and 
ideology. Similarly, when the Senate is controlled by the president’s opposing party, 
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confirmation of both lower-court judges (Binder and Maltzman 2002) and of Supreme Court 
nominees (Shipan and Shannon 2003) is delayed.  
Another strand of research has focused on policy design. Legislators make calculated 
decisions as to whom and how much authority they allocate. They can either write detailed 
laws that constrain the president or they can write them in vague language that gives ample 
discretion to the president, state governments, or both (Huber and Shipan 2002). In a similar 
vein, studies on delegation found that legislators allocate more authority to the president when 
they share partisan ideology (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999), and when Republicans control the 
state institutions, Republican congressional legislators allocate more authority to the states, the 
same holds true for Democratic legislators (Krause and Bowman 2005).  
While partisanship has a clear effect in areas of judicial nominations and in the 
policymaking process, studies on bureaucratic discretion present mixed findings. For instance, 
in the enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, street-level bureaucrats issued 
more violations and higher fines in liberal states (Huber 2007). Those findings echoed previous 
studies (Scholz et al., 1991; Scholz 1986). Similarly, bureaucrats issued more citations for 
violations of regulations in nursing homes when Democrats held more seats of the state 
legislature (Boehmke and Shipan 2015). On the other hand, Chen’s (2013) study on the effect of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) distributive aid on voter turnout 
provides another angle on the effect of partisanship. He found that FEMA treated both 
Republican and Democratic applicants similarly, not only in providing them with federal aid, but 
also in the effectiveness with which their applications were processed.  
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Literature on Immigration 
The political science literature contains a substantial number of studies on immigration and 
immigrant policy. Traditionally, studies on public opinion have focused on immigration policy 
(Harwood 1986), elite discourse (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008), and economic 
motivations (Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997). Other studies have explored economic 
concerns and prejudice toward immigrants (Burns and Gimpel 2000), minority party use of 
immigration as a wedge issue (Jeong et al., 2011), congressional legislators and policy reform 
(Gimpel and Edwards 1999), and failure of immigration reform (Jones-Correa 2013).  
An emerging body of literature on immigration has centered around two areas: state 
policymaking and local and state government participation in immigration federal programs. In 
the area of state legislation, these studies analyze state-level restrictive immigration policies 
(Monogan 2013), restrictionist coalitions (Reich and Barth 2012), states’ rights to grant or deny 
in-state tuition to undocumented students (Reich and Barth 2010), and partisan effects on the 
introduction and adoption of restrictive immigration policies (Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 
2012; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). They also examine the growth of the Latino population 
and restrictionist policies (Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013; Turner and Sharry 2012; Hopkins 
2010), immigration policy innovation (Boushey and Luedtke 2011; Newton 2012), de facto 
state-level immigration policies (Newton 2009), descriptive representation (Filindra and 
Pearson-Merkowitz 2013), and restrictive bill sponsorship (Wallace 2014). 
While state-level restrictive immigration policies have been a focus of political science 
research, as of late, an emerging body of scholarship is exploring federal immigration 
enforcement programs. More specifically, these studies explore local and state governments’ 
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characteristics and their decision to collaborate with the federal agency in the enforcement of 
immigration policy (Wong 2012; Creek and Yoder 2012). Other studies look at the effect of 
local-state-federal collaboration on community safety (Kirk, Papachristos, Fagan, and Tyler 
2012), and the size of the Mexican immigrant population (Parrado 2012).  
 
The Origins of the 287(g) Program         
The passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by adding section 287(g) (U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General [OIG] 2010), which led to the creation of the 
287(g) Program. This section of the act authorizes U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE)—the main investigative branch of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to 
delegate authority to state, tribal, and local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) in the 
enforcement of immigration policy. To participate in the program, states and local LEAs enter 
into an agreement with ICE by signing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). A copy of MOAs 
drafted during both the Bush and Obama administrations can be found in the Appendix.  
This MOA stipulates the scope and conditions, as explained below, of the partnership 
and establishes the requirements for state and local law enforcement officers’ eligibility and 
the training they should receive: LEA officers are required to follow federal guidelines in order 
to protect the civil rights of individuals. Moreover, the MOAs authorize trained and certified 
LEA officers to do the following: stop anyone believed to be undocumented; arrest without 
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warrant; issue immigration holds;2 interrogate; and detain and transport undocumented 
immigrants to detention facilities. These MOAs also establish the financial responsibilities for 
ICE and for the participating LEA. For instance, ICE covers costs for training and technological 
equipment, while the LEA cover the salaries, benefits, and transportation of its officers who 
have been certified to function as ICE agents. An additional responsibility of the LEA is to inform 
community members of the nature and purpose of the 287(g) Program.  
Two critical sections of the MOA, which cover agency discretion, are: 1) the designation 
of authorized functions, and 2) ICE supervision of LEA. The designation of authorized functions 
establishes the parameters of authority which allow deputized LEA officers to function as ICE 
agents in the enforcement of immigration policy. Specifically, LEA officers have the authority to 
interrogate and to arrest without warrant for both civil offenses (i.e., violation of immigration 
law) and criminal offenses (e.g., burglary, homicide, etc.). In addition, these agencies can take 
sworn statements, collect biometric information, issue immigration detainers, detain and 
transport undocumented immigrants to ICE-approved facilities, prepare legal documents (e.g., 
Notice to Appear), as well as other documents for the review of an ICE supervisor. The second 
section describing ICE supervision emphasizes the role that ICE supervisors play in guiding LEA 
officers to fulfill their duties as deputized officers. In particular, the MOA states that LEA 
officers “are not authorized to perform immigration officer functions except when working 
under the supervision or guidance of ICE” (Myers and Ferguson 2007; Morton and Ferguson 
                                                          
2 This is a formal request that ICE makes to the local LEA to hold the arrestee in custody for a maximum of 48 hours 
after the release date. The goal is to transfer custody of the arrestee from the local to the federal agency. 
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2009). Moreover, when there is a conflict between the deputized LEA officer and the ICE 
supervisory officer, the conflict has to be reported to the ICE Field Office Director.   
 
Removals under Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
The passage of INA in 1952 marked a watershed moment in immigration policy. It was the first 
law that passed establishing the removal process of foreigners (Shugart, Tollison, and Kimenyi 
1986). INA was amended with the passage of IIRIRA in 1996, which created several changes to 
the enforcement of immigration policy. First, at the core of the 1996 act is a partnership 
between DHS and state and local governments in the enforcement of immigration policy. 
Second, the act expanded the administrative power of DHS in the removal process by shifting 
some removal decisions from the immigration court to the federal agency. While the intent of 
IIRIRA in allocating more authority to DHS was to avoid choking the lower courts (i.e., 
Immigration Court and Board of Immigration Appeals) with a large number of removal cases, it 
ended up increasing the caseload of the U.S. Court of Appeals, especially in the Second and 
Ninth Circuits (Law 2010). As a result, since 1997 (when IIRIRA took effect), most formal 
removals are decided by DHS officials (Rosenblum, Meissner, Bergeron, and Hipsman 2014). 
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Participation in the 287(g) Program 
Although states had the option to join the 287(g) Program in 1997, no state or LEA signed an 
MOA until 2002,3 a response to the September 11, 2001 events. Prior to 2001, the issue of 
illegal immigration had been debated as an issue of states’ fiscal burden, job competition, and 
rising crime rates. After 2001, the debate took on a different dimension: immigration was seen 
as a threat to national security. Despite the urgency to secure the borders and to deport 
anyone illegally in the country, by 2005 only four states and local LEAs had signed the MOA. The 
number of signed MOAs with ICE increased significantly in 2007 and 2008, only to plateau in 
2009. Nonetheless, from 2009 to 2012, the number of participating state and local LEAs has 
remained stable at 80 participants in 25 states (see Table 2.1) 
 A number of circumstances may explain the initial increase and subsequent decrease in 
the number of MOAs signed between ICE and LEAs from 2005 to 2009. First, in 2006—the first 
year that funds were allocated—Congress authorized $5 million for start-up costs. The surge in 
signed MOAs for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 correlates with the increase in funding to the 
program: $15 million and $42.1 million, respectively (See Table 2). Second, in 2009, partisan 
control of the White House switched from Republican to Democratic. This change in 
administration signaled a change in how the collaboration, in the enforcement of immigration 
policy, between ICE and subnational governments would proceed. Those changes stem from 
the diverging ideologies of the two political parties. While Republicans prefer to devolve 
                                                          
3 Although undocumented immigration had been a simmering issue across communities, their removal was not 
seen as a priority until after the events of September 11, 2001 when immigration was linked to national security. 
Prior to 2001, the 287(g) was just a section of the IIRIRA that had not been developed into a federal enforcement 
program; Congress had not appropriated funds to set up an infrastructure that would facilitate an active 
participation of local governments in the removal of undocumented immigrants. 
26 
 
authority to the states, Democrats prefer to centralize it (Peterson 1995). Both ideologies are 
reflected in the content of the MOAs drafted during the Republican and Democratic 
administrations. While the Republican administration did not specify who should be removed, 
the Democratic administration emphasized the removal of undocumented immigrants with 
criminal records. Nevertheless, during the Republican administration, a large number of arrests, 
which eventually led to removals, resulted from minor traffic violations (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2009). 
 
Application Process 
Participation in the 287(g) Program is neither automatic nor guaranteed. After the state and 
local LEAs submit a request to ICE to participate in the program, the latter forwards the request 
to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) and to the Field Office Director (FOD) of Enforcement and 
Removal Operations (ERO) to determine whether the latter three have the capacity to handle 
the additional workload, which includes more detentions and more removals. Moreover, the 
SAC initiates an evaluation of the LEA for consideration of acceptance.4 Then, both LEA and ICE 
evaluate the community needs and decide whether the 287(g) Program is the most appropriate 
for their state and locality (S. Rept. No. 111-222, 2011) 
The 287(g) Program is one of twelve programs that are part of the ICE Agreements of 
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ICE ACCESS), which was started in 
2007 to address specific community needs and priorities. LEAs whose community needs are not 
addressed by the 287(g) Program have the option to participate in any of the programs under 
                                                          
4 M. Foreman, personal communication, December 14, 2007; R. Jones, personal communication, n.d. 
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ICE ACCESS. Included in those programs are the Criminal Alien Program, Fugitive Operations, 
Operation Predator, Secure Communities, Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), and 
Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces (ICE 2008).  
  While many local and state LEAs may have an interest in participating in the 287(g) 
Program, ICE makes the final decision as to which LEAs participate. The decision seems to hinge 
on the availability of resources for the ICE regional office and on the community needs of the 
applying LEA, as determined by ICE.  
 
The Bush Administration and the 287(g) Program 
Although the MOAs fulfill the provision of Section 287(g) of the INA, their level of specificity as 
to how LEA officers are to identify undocumented immigrants varies across both the Bush and 
Obama Administrations. Specifically, under the Bush Administration, supervision of LEA officers 
was lax, priorities for deportations were not articulated (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2009), and LEA officers had the authority to arrest without warrant anyone attempting 
to enter the country illegally, among others. As written, MOAs gave ample discretion to LEAs in 
the enforcement of immigration policy. More specifically, because the MOAs authorized LEA 
officers to question, arrest without warrant, issue legal documents, and transport 
undocumented immigrants to ICE-approved detention facilities, and because several LEAs were 
operating under the Task Force Model, state and local LEA officers possessed considerable 
discretion.  
 The GAO’s study found that undocumented people who committed minor traffic 
violations (e.g., broken taillight), or who were “carrying an open container of alcohol” were 
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arrested and eventually removed. In some instances, undocumented immigrants were either 
walking down the street or standing around listening to the radio when LEA deputized officers 
approached and requested identification; failure to provide it led to an arrest and to the 
initiation of removal proceedings (GAO 2009: 7).  
 Moreover, states and local LEAs had the option to choose from three enforcement 
models. The first model is the Jail Enforcement Model (JEM), in which deputized local or state 
law enforcement officers identify and process removable immigrants who have been charged 
or convicted of an offense. The second model is the Task Force Model (TFM). In this model, 
deputized officers, during the course of their duties—as patrol officers, criminal detectives, or 
investigators—identify and process removable immigrants in the community setting. The third 
model is known as the Joint Model (JM), which is basically a combination of the Task Force and 
Jail Enforcement Models.  
 
The Obama Administration and the 287(g) Program 
In 2009, the switch in party control of the presidential administration—along with Democrats 
controlling both chambers of Congress—brought changes to the 287(g) Program. To start, in 
January 2009 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated the 287(g) Program. 
Basically, the GAO evaluated how the program had been operating since its inception under the 
Bush Administration. The report findings included lack of clear program objectives, lax oversight 
of participating LEAs, unclear venues to address complaints, lack of instructions on data to be 
collected and reported, no performance measures, and little guidance for how LEAs were to use 
their 287(g) authority, among others. The GAO report echoed concerns raised by the House 
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Appropriations Committee which, in 2008, expressed apprehension as to the lack of oversight 
of states and local LEAs in the enforcement of immigration laws. In addition to the GAO report, 
immigrant advocate groups filed complaints with ICE voicing their concerns as to how the 
program trampled on the rights of immigrant communities. The complaints included racial 
profiling—for example targeting Latinos—and civil rights abuses. Inevitably, several lawsuits 
(e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio in 2008) were filed against LEAs, challenging the 287(g) Program.  
 Second, based upon findings and recommendations from the GAO report, ICE crafted a 
new MOA—what then-Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano called the “MOA Model.” The new 
agreement included provisions on improved oversight of participating LEAs, specific program 
objectives, and prioritized removals. Moreover, ICE voided the old agreements and required 
participating LEAs to sign “standardized” versions of the old one. In October 2009, ICE 
announced that it had renewed MOAs with 67 state and local LEAs to participate in the 287(g) 
Program, six jurisdictions had either declined or withdrawn from the program, and eleven new 
jurisdictions had been added (ICE Public Affairs 2009). In stark contrast to the old MOA, the 
“MOA Model” includes an additional appendix—the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).  
Because the Task Force Model posed the most problems and generated the most 
complaints, the SOP aims at addressing some of those problems. It includes a “Prioritization” 
section in which ICE unambiguously states that the “ICE retains sole discretion in determining 
how it will manage its limited resources and meet its mission requirements.” The prioritization 
of removals emphasizes the removal of undocumented immigrants with criminal records and 
specifically delineates the type of crimes that warrant their being placed in removal 
proceedings. Moreover, the MOA requires that LEAs complete the processing of state criminal 
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charges, for which undocumented immigrants were arrested, before placing them in removal 
proceedings. With this provision, ICE not only eliminated or lessened the numerous arrests and 
detentions based on minor traffic infractions, but also ended up constraining administrative 
discretion of participating states and local LEAs, and likely limited the number of removals.  
 Third, the new MOA provides a section on “Supervision” that clearly and specifically 
establishes the chain of command: it delineates LEA officers’ duties, ICE supervisor functions, 
and the Field Office Director (FOD) authority over the latter two. For example, when the 
deputized officer places an immigration detainer, she has to notify the ICE supervisor within 24 
hours. If an arrestee claims to be a U.S. citizen, the LEA officer—within one hour—has to notify 
the ICE supervisor, who, in turn, will notify the FOD. Thus, while the ICE supervisor can audit the 
computer system, which collects the 287(g) Program data for participating LEAs, the FOD 
provides them with updated DHS policies on arrests and processing of undocumented 
immigrants. Despite major corrections to the 287(g) Program, the Obama Administration 
increased its budget from $42.1 million in 2008 to $54 million in 2009 and then again to $68 
million in 2010. This funding will continue through 2012.  
 
Explaining Removals 
In this section, I include the federal agency definition of removals and outline the technical 
aspects of the stages of removal at the local, state, and federal level.  Then, in the Opportunity 
for Discretion section, I explain each stage of the removal process and the opportunities for 
discretion that state and local LEA officers and ICE agents encounter in the fulfillment of their 
duties.  
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Removal Process 
From 2005 to 2012, 80 LEAs in 25 states signed an MOA with ICE. In this study, I focus on the 
states with signed MOAs, with either local or state LEAs, for a number of reasons. First, the 
287(g) Program—from its inception—has been controversial. The controversy is rooted in the 
deputation of LEA officers to function as ICE agents. Immigrant advocates and local law 
enforcement officials who criticize the program contend that cross-deputizing local law 
enforcement officers erodes community safety as immigrant communities may refrain from 
assisting law enforcement agencies in both reporting and solving local crimes. They further 
argue that the involvement of LEAs in the enforcement of immigration policies makes 
communities less safe (Harris 2006). Moreover, those law enforcement officers cite budgetary 
concerns over the cost of implementing the program (Chapin 2011; Branche 2010). They assert 
that LEAs have to reallocate funds from local community programs to the enforcement of 
immigration policy, a role they deem to be exclusive of the federal government.  
Second, the controversy over the deputation of LEA officers has resulted in several 
lawsuits challenging the 287(g) program. In particular, the lawsuits charge civil rights violations 
(Melendres v. Arpaio 2008; Villegas v. Davidson County Sheriff’s Office 2008), racial profiling in 
traffic stops, violations to provisions of IIRIRA, inadequate training of LEA officers, ICE lax 
supervision, and improper delegation of authority from the ICE to state and local LEAs (Albarran 
v. Morton 2010). 
Third, states and localities that signed MOAs are located in every region of the United 
States; specifically, there are 3 states in the Midwest, 4 in the Northeast, 6 in the West, and 10 
states in the South working in partnership with ICE. However, in terms of the number of MOAs 
signed within each region, there is ample variation. More specifically, there are 3 in the 
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Midwest, 5 in the Northeast, 18 in the West, and 43 in the South. Fourth, it is a matter of 
practicality; the data are available. Moreover, the data cover two presidential administrations, 
thus allowing for a comparison of the factors that determine the number of arrests and 
removals and how removals proceed under each administration. 
The removal process occurs in three overlapping stages: local and state level, federal 
level, and judicial level. At the local and state level, the process starts with the arrest. It is 
followed by the federal level, where the process continues, by placing an “immigration 
detainer” or “ICE hold”5  on the arrestee. The judicial level, and final step—is characterized by a 
hearing before an immigration judge. In this study, I focus on the first two stages, where 
bureaucratic discretion occurs.  
 
Stage I 
At the local level, the removal process starts with the arrest. Any person who is arrested, 
regardless of immigration status, has to go through the central booking unit. During the 
booking phase, a law enforcement officer fills out an intake assessment form. The form 
contains two key questions that may determine whether the arrestee is an undocumented 
person: “What country were you born in?” and “What country are you a citizen or national of?” 
If the answer to either of those two questions is a country other than the United States, then 
the arrestee moves to the next stage of the booking process (Frederick County 2010).  At the 
first stage—the local level—during the Bush Administration, deputized officers working under 
                                                          
5 The detainer, or hold, is a notice that serves three purposes: notifies LEA that ICE will take custody of the 
arrestee, requests information as to date of release of the detainee from local custody; and requests that LEA 
maintain the detainee in custody for a maximum of 48 hours, not including weekends and holidays—or release the 
arrestee. 
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the TFM could arrest anyone they suspected of being undocumented in the country. All that 
changed during the Obama Administration. The new MOA, as previously discussed, set 
priorities for removal and the conditions under which undocumented immigrants could be 
placed in removal proceedings. 
 
Stage II 
In the second stage—the federal level—of the removal process, the arrestee is taken to the ICE 
Processing Unit in which certified and deputized local law enforcement officers function as ICE 
agents. At this stage, biometric data (i.e., fingerprints and photographs) are collected. LEA 
deputized officers do an in-depth interview to ascertain the identity of the arrestee and to 
determine whether he has a criminal record. Once all the pertinent information has been 
collected, the officer creates an Alien File (A-File) (Frederick County 2010).  After it is 
determined that the arrestee is an undocumented person, deputized officers have two options. 
First, pursuant to Section 287(g) of IIRIRA, they may place what is commonly known as an 
“immigration detainer” or “ICE hold,” ICE Form I-247. When ICE issues a detainer requesting 
that the LEA maintain custody exceeding the standard 48 hours, the detainer has to be 
supported by a judicial order (Mendocino County Sheriff’s Office 2014). Once the detainer is 
issued, the LEA officer has to provide a copy to the detainee and notify ICE of the expected 
release date, at least 30 days in advance.  Moreover, as noted in Form I-247, the detainer is 
only valid once the detainee has been convicted of a state or federal felony. At this stage, ICE 
serves on the arrestee a Notice of Legal Services, change of address form, and the arrestee is 
allowed to notify his home country’s consulate. 
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As a second option, LEA officers may release the arrestee. Whether LEA or ICE maintain 
custody or release the arrestee, in most cases, they will issue and serve a Notice to Appear 
(NTA) in immigration court. The NTA—a legal document—contains charges of removal against 
the immigrant, requests current address and telephone number, provides legal authority for 
the proceedings, and date and place of legal proceedings, among other information. Other 
notices that may be served at this time are Notice of Intent to Administratively Remove (i.e., 
Notice of Intent to Expeditiously Remove)—removal without a hearing before an immigration 
judge. After LEA officers have completed the booking process, the on-site ICE supervisor 
reviews the A-File for completeness and approval (Johnson 2011). At times, DHS may hold a 
removal hearing with the arrestee before filing the NTA with the court (U.S. DOJ 2013; USCIS 
2014). It is at this juncture, in the removal process, where ICE can exercise a great degree of 
discretion, as I explain in the next section. 
 
Opportunities for Discretion 
Although it may seem that the removal process is strictly mechanical in which an arrestee 
smoothly moves from one stage to the next, and in which LEA officers merely fill out forms, 
collect biometric data, and verify the documented status of the individual, the process, in fact, 
is complicated and far from mechanical. At every stage of the process, LEA officers and ICE 
supervisors have opportunities to exercise plenty of discretion.  
 During the Bush administration, LEA officers had ample discretion to arrest, even for 
minor infractions, as noted in the Government Accountability Office report (2009). In fact, any 
undocumented immigrant caught was placed in removal proceedings. In stark contrast, the 
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Obama administration set priorities for removal. Even when LEA officers arrest undocumented 
immigrant for minor or no violations at all, the DHS and ICE have discretion whether to remove 
the person or not. The standardization of the MOA aimed at removing those with criminal 
records. The standardized MOA does not take away LEA officers’ discretion; it set boundaries.  
In a 2009 press release from DHS and ICE announcing the new MOA, John Morton, 
Assistant Secretary for ICE, stated that the state-local-federal partnership, by prioritizing the 
removal of undocumented immigrants with criminal records who are a “threat to local 
communities,” improves “public safety.” Similarly, Janet Napolitano, DHS Secretary, proclaimed 
that the new agreements “promote public safety.” Although “public safety” is echoed in the 
MOA, ICE did not clarify what is considered a threat to public safety that would warrant placing 
an undocumented immigrant in removal proceedings, especially when the latter has no criminal 
record. The vague language left the door open to interpretation and gave wiggle room for 
deputized LEA officers to exercise discretion. Thus, LEA officers may arrest undocumented 
immigrants, charging them with violating state or local laws that remotely fit the elusive term of 
public safety. Noting the crucial importance of the arrest in the removal process, Motomura 
(2010; 2014) argues that in immigration law, “the decision to arrest has been the discretion that 
matters.” He further argues that because arrests may trigger federal action leading to removals, 
state and local LEAs will use arrests as a tool to bring undocumented immigrants into contact 
with the federal agency—DHS.  
Stage I 
At stage I of the removal process, deputized LEA officers—working under the Task Force Model, 
patrolling the streets or investigators—have to decide whether to approach or not to approach 
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an individual and request identification. If the latter does not have a government-issued 
identification, the LEA officer has two options: arrest or not arrest. In principle, the goal of the 
arrest is to ascertain the identification of the individual. If the individual arrested is an 
undocumented immigrant, the LEA officer has at least six options: 1) issue an immigration 
detainer and an NTA—a legal document notifying a person of impending hearing in immigration 
court. It signals the beginning of the removal process. 2) do not issue a detainer, but issue an 
NTA and release, 3) issue neither a detainer nor an NTA, therefore release, 4) offer expedited 
removal, 5) offer other forms of relief, or 6) release on humanitarian grounds. Those released 
on humanitarian grounds include pregnant or nursing women, primary caretakers of children or 
of infirm persons, people with longstanding ties to the community, minors, elderly with 
significant health problems, and those who hold a record of military services (United States of 
America v. State of Alabama & Governor Robert J. Bentley 2011). Whichever option she 
chooses, the LEA officer has to get approval from an ICE supervisor, thus the removal process 
enters stage II. Although DHS and ICE have issued memoranda establishing priorities for 
detention and removal of undocumented immigrants, local and state LEAs have a great deal of 
discretion during the arrest phase of the process.  
 
Stage II 
Congress delegated broad authority—embedded in INA and further expanded in IIRIRA—to the 
DHS (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Services) in the enforcement of immigration 
laws. Prosecutorial discretion, in its simplest form, is  
“the authority of an agency charged with enforcing a law to decide whether to enforce, 
or not to enforce, the law against someone….In the immigration context, the term 
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applies not only to the decision to issue, serve, or file a Notice to Appear (NTA), but also 
to a broad range of other discretionary enforcement decisions” (Meissner 2000).  
The federal agency uses its prosecutorial discretion to achieve its goal “to enhance the safety 
and security of communities,” as stated in the MOAs. Since the September 11, 2001 events, 
undocumented immigrants have been deemed a threat to national security, thus their removal 
from the country has been seen as paramount to improving safety and security. 
 ICE developed a set of priorities establishing the types of crimes that warrant 
mandatory detention and removal. It is in the implementation of those priorities that the 
federal agency exercises the most discretion. Funding resources for the removal of 
undocumented immigrants are limited. With approximately 11.2 million undocumented people 
in the country, the cost of removing all of them is prohibitive. Thus, funding resources limit the 
number of people ICE can remove each year. Therefore, the federal agency had to come up 
with enforcement priorities, emphasizing the removal of undocumented immigrants with 
criminal records and deciding in which states to focus its enforcement activities.  
In addition to priorities for removal, ICE has the discretion to take a range of actions. 
Because the MOA stipulates that ICE supervisors overseeing LEA officers have to approve their 
actions, the former have the opportunity to use their discretionary powers. At this juncture, an 
ICE supervisor has to decide whether to approve the LEA officer’s decision, or to choose a 
different option altogether, including an option not available to the LEA officer. For instance, 
through the use of a little-known tool—stipulated removal—ICE may expedite the removal 
process and thus more efficiently use agency resources. The stipulated removal is a formal 
removal, in which the detainee agrees to waive the right to an in-person hearing in immigration 
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court (Koh 2013). When detainee agrees to sign the stipulated removal waiver, one is quickly 
removed from the country. It also means that one is permanently banned from entering the 
country. Koh, Srikantiah, and Tumlin (2011), found that ICE mainly uses the stipulated removal 
on immigrants who are detained, who have no legal representation, and who are detained due 
to minor immigration offenses. The enforcement option that the ICE supervisor chooses may 
depend upon internal and external factors facing the federal agency.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the intricacies of the 287(g) program and the complexity of 
its implementation given the two presidential administrations under which it has operated. 
Because these administrations differ in their partisan values, they provide varying degrees of 
and opportunities for discretion to local law enforcement officers and federal agents charged 
with the enforcement of immigration policy. These opportunities for discretion are embedded 
in the MOAs and in the complexity of the arrest and removal processes. In this implementation 
of the program and in the opportunities for discretion granted by the presidential regimes, I 
build a theory of immigration policy enforcement that I present in the next chapter. 
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Table 2-1 Memorandum of Agreement—287(g) Program 
State State Law Enforcement 
Agency Local Law Enforcement Agency 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alabama  
 AL Department of Public 
Safety  
    TF    
 Etowah County Sheriff’s Office     JE    
Arkansas 
  Benton County Sheriff’s Office   JE TF      
City of Springdale Police 
Department   TF  TF    
Rogers Police Department   TF  TF    
Washington County Sheriff’s 
Office   JE  
JE 
TF    
Arizona 
 AZ Department of 
Corrections    NA  JE    
AZ Department of Public 
Safety    
JE 
TF  
JE 
TF    
 City of Mesa Police 
Department     
JE 
TF    
City of Phoenix Police 
Department    TF 
JE 
TF    
Florence Police Department     TF    
Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Office   VTF  JE    
Pima County Sheriff’s Office    JE TF 
JE 
TF    
Pinal County Sheriff’s Office    JE TF 
JE 
TF    
Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office    JE TF 
JE 
TF    
California 
  Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Office NA        
  
45 
Orange County Sheriff’s Office  NA    JE   
Riverside County Sheriff’s 
Office  JE    JE   
San Bernardino County 
Sheriff’s Office JE    JE    
Colorado 
 CO Department of Public 
Safety  
  IEU  TF    
 El Paso County Sheriff’s Office   JE  JE    
Connecticut 
  City of Danbury Police 
Department  
    TF    
Delaware 
 DE Department of 
Corrections 
     JE    
Florida 
 FL Department of Law 
Enforcement 
 NA        
 Bay County Sheriff’s Office     TF    
Brevard County Sheriff’s Office NA        
Collier County Sheriff’s Office   VTF  JE TF 
   
Jacksonville County Sheriff’s 
Office 
   JE JE    
Manatee County Sheriff’s 
Office 
NA        
Georgia 
 GA Department of Public 
Safety  
  VTF  TF    
 Cobb County Sheriff’s Office   JE  JE    
Gwinnett County Sheriff’s 
Office 
    JE    
Hall County Sheriff’s Office    JE JE TF 
   
Whitfield County Sheriff’s 
Office 
   JE JE    
  
46 
Maryland 
  Frederick County Sheriff’s 
Office 
   JE JE TF 
   
Massachusetts 
 MA Department of 
Corrections 
   JE      
 Framingham Police 
Department  
  TF      
Barnstable County Sheriff’s 
Office  
  JE      
Minnesota 
 MN Department of Public 
Safety 
     TF    
Missouri 
 MO State Highway Patrol     VTF TF    
North Carolina 
  Alamance County Sheriff’s 
Office  
  NA  JE    
Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 
Office   JE    
  
Cumberland County Sheriff’s 
Office   JE    
  
Durham County Sheriff’s Office    VTF TF    
Gaston County Sheriff’s Office   JE  JE    
Guilford County Sheriff’s Office    NA  TF    
Henderson County Sheriff’s 
Office    NA JE  
  
Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s 
Office  NA   JE  
  
Wake County Sheriff’s Office    JE JE    
New Hampshire 
  Hudson City Police Department   TF  TF    
New Jersey 
  Hudson County Department of 
Corrections 
    JE    
Monmouth County Sheriff’s 
Office 
NA        
  
47 
New Mexico 
 NM Department of 
Corrections  
  JE   JE   
Nevada 
  Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department  
   JE JE    
City of Mesquite Police 
Department 
NA        
Ohio 
  Butler County Sheriff’s Office    JE TF 
JE 
TF 
   
Oklahoma 
  Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office   JE  JE TF 
   
Rhode Island 
 Rhode Island State Police      TF    
South Carolina 
  Beaufort County Sheriff’s 
Office  
   NA TF    
Charleston County Sheriff’s 
Office   
    JE    
Lexington County Sheriff’s 
Office 
     JE   
York County Sheriff’s Office   JE  JE    
Tennessee 
 TN Department of Safety      NA    
 Davidson County Sheriff’s 
Office  
  JE  JE    
Texas 
  Carrolton Police Department      JE    
Farmers Branch Police 
Department 
    TF    
Harris County Sheriff’s Office     JE    
Houston Police Department   NA        
Utah 
  Washington County Sheriff’s 
Office 
    JE    
  
48 
 
Weber County Sheriff’s Office     JE    
Virginia 
  City of Manassas Police 
Department 
   VTF     
City of Manassas Park Police 
Department 
   VTF TF    
Herndon Police Department   VTF  TF    
Loudoun County Sheriff’s 
Office 
    TF    
Prince William County Police 
Department  
    TF    
Prince William County Sheriff’s 
Office 
   VTF TF    
Prince William- Manassas Adult 
Detention Center 
  JE      
Rockingham County Sheriff’s 
Office 
  JE VTF  
JE 
TF 
   
Shenandoah County Sheriff’s 
Office 
  JE VTF  
JE 
TF 
   
 
IEU = Immigration Enforcement Unit 
NA = Not Available—No MOA on file 
JE = Jail Enforcement 
TF = Task Force 
VTF = Various Task Forces 
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 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT  
This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) constitutes an agreement between United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and the Benton County, Arkansas, Sheriff's Office, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Law Enforcement Agency" (LEA), pursuant to which ICE authorizes up to a maximum of 
four (4) nominated, trained, and certified LEA personnel to perform certain immigration 
enforcement functions as specified herein. It is the intent of the parties that these delegated 
authorities will enable the LEA to identify and process immigration violators in Benton County, 
Arkansas. ICE and LEA points of contact for purposes of this MOA are identified in Appendix 
A.  
I. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this MOA is to set forth the terms and conditions pursuant to which selected 
LEA personnel (participating LEA personnel) will be nominated, trained, and thereafter 
perform certain functions of an immigration officer within Benton County. Nothing contained 
herein shall otherwise limit the jurisdiction and powers normally possessed by participating 
LEA personnel as members of the LEA. However, the exercise of the immigration enforcement 
authority granted under this MOA to participating LEA personnel shall occur only as provided 
in this MOA. This MOA also describes the complaint procedures available to members of the 
public regarding immigration enforcement actions taken by participating LEA personnel 
pursuant to this agreement.  
II. AUTHORITY  
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), also codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g), as amended by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-276, authorizes 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, acting through the Assistant Secretary 
of ICE, to enter into written agreements with a State or any political subdivision of a State so 
that qualified personnel can perform certain functions of an immigration officer. This MOA 
constitutes such a written agreement.  
III. POLICY  
This MOA sets forth the scope of the immigration officer functions that DHS is authorizing the 
participating LEA personnel to perform. It sets forth with specificity the duration of the 
authority conveyed and the specific lines of authority, including the requirement that 
participating LEA personnel are subject to ICE supervision while performing immigration 
related duties pursuant to this MOA. For the purposes of this MOA, ICE officers will provide 
supervision for participating LEA personnel only as to immigration enforcement functions. 
Benton County Sheriff's Office retains supervision of all other aspects of the employment of 
and performance of duties by participating Benton County Sheriff's Office personnel.  
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IV. ASSIGNMENTS  
Before participating LEA personnel receive authorization to perform immigration officer 
functions granted under this MOA, they must successfully complete mandatory five week 
training, as described in Section VIII, in the enforcement of federal immigration laws and 
policies as provided by ICE instructors and thereafter pass examinations equivalent to those 
given to ICE officers. Only participating LEA personnel who are selected, trained, authorized, 
and supervised, as set out herein, have authority pursuant to this MOA to conduct the 
immigration officer functions enumerated in this MOA.  
Participating LEA personnel performing immigration-related duties pursuant to this MOA will 
be LEA officers assigned to LEA officers assigned to and or co-located as task force officers 
to assist ICE agents with criminal investigations in Benton County and in the area of the task 
force's jurisdiction.  
Joint Task Force: Benton County is committed to providing support to a proposed Regional  
Multi-Jurisdictional ICE Task Force in cooperation with ICE and other county and 
municipal law enforcement entities in Northwest Arkansas. The mission of this Task Force 
is to identify and remove criminal aliens from Benton County and within the task force's 
area of jurisdiction.  
V. DESIGNATION OF AUTHORIZED FUNCTIONS  
For the purposes of this MOA, participating LEA personnel will be authorized to perform the 
following functions pursuant to the stated authorities, subject to the limitations contained in 
this MOA:  
• The power and authority to interrogate any person believed to be an alien as to his right 
to be or remain in the United States (INA § 287(a)(l) and 8 c.F.R. § 287.5(a)(l» and to process 
for immigration violations those individuals who are convicted of State or Federal felony 
offenses;  
• The power and authority to arrest without warrant any alien entering or attempting to 
unlawfully enter the United States, or any alien in the United States, if the office has reason to 
believe the alien to be arrested is in the United States in violation of law and is likely to escape 
before a warrant can be obtained. INA § 287(a)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)(l);  
• The power and authority to arrest without warrant for felonies which have been 
committed and which are cognizable under any law of the United States regulating the 
admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens. INA § 287(a)(4) and 8 C.F.R. § 
287.5(c)(2). Notification off such arrest must be made to ICE within 24 hours;  
• The power and authority to serve warrants of arrest for immigration violations pursuant 
to 8 c.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3);  
 
• The power and authority to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence (INA § 
287(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2)), to complete required criminal alien processing, including 
fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing of aliens, as well as the preparation of affidavits 
and the taking of sworn statements for ICE supervisory review;  
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• The power and authority to prepare charging documents (INA Section 239, 8 C.F.R. 
239.1; INA Section 238, 8 C.F.R 238.1; INA Section 241(a)(5), 8 C.F.R 241.8; INA Section 
235(b)(1), 8 C.F.R. 235.3) including the preparation of a Notice to Appear (NTA) application or 
other charging document, as appropriate, for the signature of an ICE officer for aliens in 
categories established by ICE supervisors;  
• The power and authority to issue immigration detainers (8 C.F.R. § 287.7) and 1-213, 
Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, for processing aliens in categories established by ICE 
supervisors; and  
• The power and authority to detain and transport (8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)(6)) arrested aliens to 
ICE-approved detention facilities.  
 
VI. DETENTION ISSUES  
The LEA is expected to pursue to completion prosecution of the state or local charges that 
caused the individual to be taken into custody. ICE will assume custody of individuals who 
have been convicted of a State or local offense only after such individuals have concluded 
service of any sentence of incarceration. ICE will also assume custody of aliens with prior 
criminal convictions and when immigration detention is required by statute. The ICE Detention 
and Removal Field Officer Director or his designee will assess on a case-by-case basis the 
appropriate removal vehicle to be employed and/or whether to assume custody of individuals 
that do not meet the above criteria based on special interests or other extenuating circumstances 
after processing by the LEA. The immigration laws provide ICE Detention and Removal 
Operations (DRO) with the discretion to manage limited ICE detention resources, and ICE 
Field Office Directors may exercise this discretion, in appropriate cases, by declining to detain 
aliens whose detention is not mandated by federal statute.  
If ICE determines that it is necessary, the LEA will enter into an Inter-Governmental Service 
Agreement (IGSA) with ICE pursuant to which, the LEA will provide, for a reimbursable fee, 
detention of incarcerated aliens in LEA facilities, upon the completion of their sentences. The 
LEA facility will be expected to meet the ICE detention standards for either a less than 72 hour 
or over 72 hour facility as determined by ICE, and consistent with the anticipated detention 
period.  
The parties understand that the LEA will not continue to detain an alien after that alien is 
eligible for release from the LEA's custody in accordance with applicable law and LEA policy, 
except for a period of up to 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and any holiday, pursuant 
to an ICE detainer issued in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, absent an IGSA in place as 
described above.  
3  
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Upon completion of processing and release from the LEA's affiliated detention facilities of 
an individual who participating LEA personnel have determined to be a removable alien, the 
alien will be transported by the LEA on the same day to an ICE designated office or facility, 
after notification to and coordination with the ICE supervisory officer, so that no further 
detention costs will be incurred by ICE.  
VII. NOMINATION OF PERSONNEL  
The Benton County Sheriff's Office will nominate candidates for initial training and 
certification under this MOA. For each candidate, ICE may request any information necessary 
for a background check and to evaluate a candidate's suitability to participate in the 
enforcement of immigration authorities under this MOA. All candidates must be United 
States citizens. All candidates must have at least two years of LEA work experience. All 
candidates must be approved by ICE and must be able to qualify for appropriate federal 
security clearances.  
Should a candidate not be approved, a substitute candidate may be submitted, if time permits 
such substitution, to occur without delaying the start of training. Any future expansion in the 
number of participating LEA personnel or scheduling of additional training classes may be 
based on an oral agreement of the parties, but will be subject to all the requirements of this 
MOA.  
VIII. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL  
ICE will provide participating LEA personnel with the mandatory five week training tailored 
to the immigration functions to be performed.  
Training will include, among other things: (i) discussion of the terms and limitations of this 
MOA; (ii) the scope of immigration officer authority; (iii) relevant immigration law; (iv) the 
ICE Use of Force Policy; (v) Civil Rights laws; (vi) the U.S. Department of Justice "Guidance 
Regarding the Use Of Race By Federal Law Enforcement Agencies," dated June 2003; (vii) 
public outreach and complaint procedures; (viii) liability issues; (ix) cross-cultural issues; and 
(x) the obligation under federal law and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to 
make proper notification upon the arrest or detention of a foreign national.  
Approximately one year after the participating LEA personnel are trained and certified, ICE 
may provide additional updated training on relevant administrative, legal, and operational 
issues related to the performance of immigration officer functions, unless either party 
terminates this MOA pursuant to Section XX, below. Local training on relevant issues will 
be provided on an ongoing basis by ICE supervisors or a designated team leader.  
4  
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IX. CERTIFICATION AND AUTHORIZATION  
The ICE Training Division will certify in writing to the ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or 
the ICE Field Office Director in New Orleans the names of those LEA personnel who 
successfully complete training and pass all required testing. Upon receipt of Training Division 
certification, the ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or the ICE Field Office Director in New 
Orleans will provide the participating LEA personnel with a signed authorization to perform 
specified functions of an immigration officer for an initial period of one year from the date of 
the authorization. ICE will also provide a copy of the authorization to the LEA. The ICE 
supervisory officer, or designated team leader, will evaluate the activities of all personnel 
certified under this MOA.  
Authorization of participating LEA personnel to act pursuant to this MOA may be revoked at 
any time by ICE or the LEA. Such revocation will require immediate notification to the other 
party to this MOA. The AGENCY DESIGNEE and the ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or 
the ICE Field Office Director in New Orleans will be responsible for notification of the 
appropriate personnel in their respective agencies. The termination of this MOA shall 
constitute revocation of all immigration enforcement authorizations delegated hereunder.  
x. COSTS AND EXPENDITURES  
Participating LEA personnel will carry out designated functions at the LEA's expense, 
including salaries and benefits, local transportation, and official issue material.  
ICE will provide the instructors and training materials. The LEA is responsible for the salaries  
and benefits, including overtime, for all of its personnel being trained or performing duties 
under this MOA, and for those personnel performing the regular functions of the participating 
LEA personnel while they are receiving training. ICE will cover the costs of all LEA 
candidates' travel, housing, and per diem affiliated with the training required for participation 
in this agreement.  
ICE is responsible for the salaries and benefits of all of its personnel, including instructors and  
supervisors. IfICE determines that it is necessary, the LEA will enter into an Inter 
Governmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with ICE pursuant to which LEA will provide, for a  
reimbursable fee, transportation for all incarcerated aliens in the LEA's facilities, upon the  
completion of their sentences, or upon completion of processing in those circumstances in 
which State or local prosecution is not available, to a facility or location designated by ICE.  
If ICE determines that it is necessary, the LEA will provide ICE, at no cost, with an office 
within each participating LEA facility for ICE supervisory employees to work.ICE agrees to 
be responsible for the purchase, installation, and maintenance of technology 
(computerlIAFISlPhoto and similar hardware/software) necessary to support the investigative 
functions of participating LEA personnel at each LEA facility with an active 287(g) program. 
The use of this equipment is to be limited to the performance of responsibilities authorized by 
this MOA under section 287(g) of the INA by participating LEA personnel.  
5  
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ICE also agrees to provide the necessary technological support and software updates for use by  
participating LEA personnel to accomplish the delegated functions. Such hardware, software,  
and other technology purchased or provided by ICE, shall remain the property of ICE and shall  
be returned to ICE upon termination of this agreement, or when deemed necessary by the ICE  
Special Agent in Charge and/or the ICE Field Office Director in New Orleans.  
The LEA is responsible to provide all administrative supplies, i.e. paper, toner, pens, pencils 
and other similar items necessary for normal office operations. The LEA is also responsible 
provide necessary security equipment, i.e. handcuffs, leg restraints and flexi cuffs etc.  
XI. ICE SUPERVISION  
Immigration enforcement activities conducted by the participating LEA personnel will be 
supervised and directed by ICE supervisory officers or the designated team leader in Northwest 
Arkansas. Participating LEA personnel are not authorized to perform immigration officer 
functions, except when working under the supervision of an ICE officer, or when acting 
pursuant to the guidance provided by an ICE agent. Participating LEA personnel shall give 
timely notice to the ICE supervisory officer within 24 hours of any detainer issued under the 
authorities set forth in this MOA. The actions of participating LEA personnel will be reviewed 
by ICE supervisory officers on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the requirements 
of the immigration laws and procedures and to assess the need for individual additional training 
or guidance.  
For purposes of this MOA, ICE officers will provide supervision of participating LEA 
personnel only as to immigration enforcement functions. The LEA retains supervision of all 
other aspects of the employment of and performance of duties by participating LEA personnel.  
In the absence of a written agreement to the contrary, the policies and procedures to be utilized 
by the participating LEA personnel in exercising these authorities shall be DHS and ICE 
policies and procedures, including the ICE Use of Force Policy. However, when engaged in 
immigration enforcement activities, no participating LEA personnel will be expected or 
required to violate or otherwise fail to maintain the LEA's rules, standards, or policies, or be 
required to fail to abide by restrictions or limitations as may otherwise be imposed by law.  
If a conflict arises between an order or direction of an ICE supervisory officer or a DHS or ICE 
policy and the LEA's rules, standards, or policies, the conflict shall be promptly reported to the 
ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or the ICE Field Office Director in New Orleans, or 
designees, and the Benton County Sheriff's Office, or designee, when circumstances safely 
allow the concern to be raised. The ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or the ICE Field Office 
Director in New Orleans and Sheriff Keith Ferguson or Chief Deputy Don Townsend shall 
attempt to resolve the conflict.  
6  
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XII. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS  
The LEA will be responsible for tracking and maintaining accurate data and statistical 
information for their 287(g) program, including any specific tracking data requested by ICE. 
Upon ICE's request, such data and information shall be provided to ICE for comparison and 
verification with ICE's own data and statistical information, as well as for ICE's statistical 
reporting requirements and to assess the progress and success of the LEA's 287(g) program.  
Xli. LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY  
If any participating LEA personnel are the subject of a complaint of any sort that may result 
in that individual receiving employer discipline or becoming the subject of a criminal 
investigation or civil lawsuit, the LEA shall, to the extent allowed by State law, immediately 
notify ICE of the existence and nature of the complaint. The resolution of the complaint shall 
also be promptly reported to ICE. Complaints regarding exercise of immigration enforcement 
authority by participating LEA personnel shall be handled as described below.  
Except as otherwise noted in this MOA or allowed by federal law, the LEA will be responsible 
and bear the costs of participating LEA personnel with regard to their property or personnel 
expenses incurred by reason of death, injury, or incidents giving rise to liability.  
Participating LEA personnel will only be treated as federal employees for purposes of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 2671-2680, and worker's compensation claims, 5 U.S.c. 
§ 8101 et seq., when performing a function as authorized by this MOA. 8 U.S.c. § 1357(g)(7). 
It is the understanding of the parties to this MOA that participating LEA personnel will enjoy 
the same defenses and immunities available to ICE officers from personal liability arising 
from tort lawsuits based on actions conducted in compliance with this MOA. 8 U.S.c. § 
1357(g)(8).  
Participating LEA personnel named as defendants in litigation arising from activities carried 
out under this MOA may request representation by the U.S. Department of Justice. Such 
requests must be made in writing directed to the Attorney General of the United States, and 
will be handled in coordination with the ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or the ICE Field 
Office Director in New Orleans. Requests for representation must be presented to the ICE 
Office of the Chief Counsel at P.O. Box 1128, Oakdale, Louisiana 71463-1128. Any request 
for representation and related correspondence must be clearly marked "Subject to Attorney-
Client Privilege." The Office of the Chief Counsel will forward the individual's request, 
together with a memorandum outlining the factual basis underlying the event(s) at issue in 
the lawsuit, to the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, which will forward the request, 
the factual memorandum, and an advisory statement opining whether such representation 
would be in the interest of the United States, to the Director of the Constitutional and 
Specialized Torts Staff, Civil Division, Department of Justice. ICE will not be liable for 
defending or indemnifying acts of intentional misconduct on the part of participating LEA 
personnel.  
7  
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The LEA agrees to cooperate with any federal investigation related to this MOA to the full 
extent of its available powers. It is understood that information provided by any LEA 
personnel under threat of disciplinary action in an administrative investigation cannot be used 
against that individual in subsequent criminal proceedings, consistent with Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  
As the activities of participating LEA personnel under this MOA are undertaken under federal 
authority, the participating LEA personnel will comply with federal standards and guidelines 
relating to the Supreme Court's decision in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and 
its progeny, which relates to the disclosure of potential impeachment information about 
possible witnesses or affiants in a criminal case or investigation.  
XIV. COMPLAINT PROCEDURES  
The complaint reporting and resolution procedure for allegations of misconduct by 
participating LEA personnel, with regard to activities undertaken under the authority of this 
MOA, is included at Appendix B.  
XV. CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS  
Participating LEA personnel who perform certain federal immigration enforcement functions 
are bound by all federal civil rights statutes and regulations, including the U.S. Department 
of Justice "Guidance Regarding The Use Of Race By Federal Law Enforcement Agencies" 
dated June 2003.  
Participating LEA personnel will provide an opportunity for subjects with limited English 
language proficiency to request an interpreter. Qualified foreign language interpreters will be 
provided by the LEA as needed. The participating LEA will be reimbursed for expenses 
incurred in providing qualified foreign language interpreters for subjects.  
XVI. STEERING COMMITTEE  
The ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or the ICE Field Office Director in New Orleans and 
Sheriff Keith Ferguson or Chief Deputy Don Townsend shall establish a steering committee 
that will meet periodically to review and assess the immigration enforcement activities 
conducted by the participating LEA personnel and to ensure compliance with the terms of 
this MOA. The steering committee will meet periodically in Northwest Arkansas at locations 
to be agreed upon by the parties, or via teleconference. Steering committee participants will 
be supplied with specific information on case reviews, individual participants' evaluations, 
complaints filed, media coverage, and, to the extent practicable, statistical information on 
increased immigration enforcement activity in Benton County. An initial review meeting will 
be held no later than nine months after certification of the initial class of participating LEA 
personnel under Section IX, above.  
8  
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XVII. COMMUNITY OUTREACH  
The LEA may, at its discretion, engage in community outreach with individuals and 
organizations expressing an interest in this MOA. ICE may participate in such outreach 
upon the LEA's request.  
XVIII. RELATIONS WITH THE NEWS MEDIA  
The LEA may, at its discretion, communicate the substance of this agreement to 
organizations and groups expressing an interest in the law enforcement activities to be 
engaged in under this MOA. This MOA also describes the complaint procedures available 
to members of the public regarding actions taken by participating LEA personnel pursuant 
to this agreement.  
The LEA hereby agrees to coordinate with ICE regarding information to be released to the 
media regarding actions taken under this MOA. The points of contact for ICE and the LEA 
for this purpose are identified in Appendix C.  
XIX. MODIFICATION OF THIS MOA  
Modifications to this MOA must be proposed in writing and approved by the signatories.  
xx. DURATION AND TERMINATION OF THIS MOA  
This MOA will remain in effect from the date of signing until it is terminated by either 
party. Either party, upon written notice to the other party, may terminate the MOA at any 
time. A termination notice shall be delivered personally or by certified or registered mail 
and termination shall take effect immediately upon receipt of such notice.  
Either party, upon written or oral notice to the other party, may temporarily suspend 
activities under this MOA when resource constraints or competing priorities necessitate. 
Notice of termination or suspension by ICE shall be given to Sheriff Keith Ferguson or 
Chief Deputy Don Townsend. Notice of termination or suspension by the LEA shall be 
given to the ICE Special Agent in Charge and/or the ICE Field Office Director in New 
Orleans.  
Except for the provisions contained in Section XIII, this MOA does not, is not intended to, 
shall not be construed to, and may not be relied upon to create, any rights, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law by any person in any matter, civil or criminal.  
9  
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By signing this MOA, each party represents it is fully authorized to enter into this MOA, and 
accepts the terms, responsibilities, obligations, and limitations of this MOA, and agrees to be 
bound thereto to  
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APPENDIX A  
POINTS OF CONTACT  
The ICE and LEA points of contact for purposes of implementation of this MOA are:  
For the LEA:  
For ICE DRO:  
For ICE 01:  
Sheriff Keith Ferguson or Chief Deputy Don Townsend 1300 S.W. 14
th 
Street 72712  
Assistant Field Office Director 1250 Poydras Street Suite 325 LA 70113  
Assistant Special Agent in Charge 1250 Poydras Street Suite 2200 LA 70113  
11 b6 b6,b7c b2Low b6,b7c b2Low  
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APPENDIX B  
COMPLAINT PROCEDURE  
This MOA is an agreement between DHS/ICE and the Benton County Sheriff's Office, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Law Enforcement Agency" (LEA), pursuant to which selected LEA personnel 
are authorized to perform immigration enforcement duties in specific situations under Federal 
authority. As such, the training, supervision, and performance of participating LEA personnel 
pursuant to the MOA, as well as the protections for individuals' civil and constitutional rights, are 
to be monitored. Part of that monitoring will be accomplished through these complaint reporting 
and resolution procedures, which the parties to the MOA have agreed to follow.  
The MOA sets forth the process for designation, training, and certification of certain LEA 
personnel to perform certain immigration enforcement functions specified herein. Complaints filed 
against those personnel in the course of their non-immigration duties will remain the domain of 
the LEA and be handled in accordance with the LEA's Manual of Policy and Procedures, or 
equivalent rules, regulations or procedures. The LEA will also handle complaints filed against 
personnel who may exercise immigration authority, but who are not designated and certified under 
this MOA. The number and type of the latter complaints will be monitored by the Steering 
Committee established under Section XVI of the MOA.  
In order to simplify the process for the public, complaints against participating LEA personnel 
relating to their immigration enforcement can be reported in a number of ways. The ICE 
Headquarters Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the LEA's Administrative 
Investigations Unit will coordinate complaint receipt and investigation.  
The ICE OPR will forward complaints to the Department of Homeland Security's Office of 
Inspector General (DHS OIG) as appropriate for review, and ensure notification as necessary to 
the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ CRD). The ICE OPR will coordinate 
complaints related to participating personnel with the LEA's Administrative Investigations Unit as 
detailed below. Should circumstances warrant investigation of a complaint by the DHS OIG or the 
DOJ CRD, this will not preclude the DHS OIG, DOJ CRD, or ICE OPR from conducting the 
investigation in coordination with the LEA's Administrative Investigations Unit, when appropriate.  
The ICE OPR will adhere to established procedures relating to reporting and resolving allegations 
of employee misconduct, and the LEA's Administrative Investigations Unit will follow applicable 
LEA policies and procedures, personnel rules, state statutes, and collective bargaining agreement 
requirements.  
12  
  
61 
 
1. Complaint Reporting Procedures  
Complaint reporting procedures shall be disseminated as appropriate by the LEA within facilities 
under its jurisdiction (in English and other languages as appropriate) in order to ensure that 
individuals are aware of the availability of such procedures.  
Complaints will be accepted from any source (e.g.: ICE, LEA, participating LEA personnel, 
inmates, and the public).  
Complaints can be reported to federal authorities as follows:  
A. Telephonically to the ICE OPR at the Joint Intake Center (HC) in Washington, 
D.C. , at the toll-free number 1-877-246-8253, or  
B. Telephonically to the Resident Agent in Charge of the ICE OPR office in New 
Orleans at (504) 525-0754 or SAC New Orleans at 504-310-8800.  
C. Via mail as follows:  
• Department of Homeland Security  
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Professional Responsibility 425 I 
Street, NW Room 3260 Washington, D.C. 20536  
 
Complaints can also be referred to and accepted by any of the following LEA entities:  
A. The LEA's Administrative Investigations Unit Captain Mike Sydoriak, 
Captain 1300 SW 14
th 
St. Bentonville, AR 72712 cm Commander  
B. The supervisor of any participating LEA personnel  
2. Review of Complaints  
All complaints (written or oral) reported to the LEA directly, which involve activities connected 
to immigration enforcement activities authorized under this MOA, will be reported to the ICE 
OPR. The ICE OPR will verify participating personnel status under the MOA with the assistance 
of the Special Agent in Charge of the ICE Office of Investigations in New Orleans. Complaints 
received by any ICE entity will be reported directly to the ICE OPR as per existing ICE policies 
and procedures.  
13  
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In all instances, the ICE OPR, as appropriate, will make an initial determination regarding DHS 
investigative jurisdiction and refer the complaint to the appropriate office for action as soon as 
possible, given the nature of the complaint.  
Complaints reported directly to the ICE OPR will be shared with the LEA's Administrative 
Investigations Unit when the complaint involves LEA personnel. Both offices will then 
coordinate appropriate investigative jurisdiction, which may include initiation of a joint 
investigation to resolve the issue(s).  
3. Complaint Resolution Procedures  
Upon receipt of any complaint, the ICE OPR will undertake a complete review of each complaint 
in accordance with existing ICE allegation criteria and reporting requirements. As stated above, 
the ICE OPR will adhere to existing ICE reporting requirements as they relate to the DHS OIG 
and/or the DOl CRD. Complaints will be resolved using the existing procedures, supplemented 
as follows:  
A. Referral of Complaints to LEA's Administrative Investigations Unit.  
The ICE OPR will refer complaints, as appropriate, involving LEA personnel to 
the LEA's Administrative Investigations Unit for resolution. The Sheriff, Keith 
Ferguson or Chief Deputy Don Townsend will inform ICE OPR of the 
disposition and resolution of any complaints referred by ICE OPR.  
B. Interim Action Pending Complaint Resolution  
Whenever any participating LEA personnel are under investigation and subject 
to interrogation by the LEA for any reason that could lead to disciplinary action, 
demotion, or dismissal, the requirements of the Benton County Sheriff's Office 
Policy shall be honored. If appropriate, an individual may be removed from 
participation in the activities covered under the MOA pending resolution of an 
inquiry.  
C. Time Parameters for Resolution of Complaints  
It is expected that any complaint received will be resolved within 90 days. 
However, this will depend upon the nature and complexity of the substance of 
the complaint itself.  
D. Notification of Resolution of a Complaint  
ICE OPR will coordinate with the LEA's Administrative Investigations Unit to 
ensure notification as appropriate to the subject(s) of a complaint regarding 
the resolution of the complaint.  
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APPENDIX C  
PUBLIC INFORMATION POINTS OF CONTACT  
Pursuant to Section XVIII of this MOA, the signatories agree to coordinate any release of 
information to the media regarding actions taken under this MOA. The points of contact for 
coordinating such activities are:  
For the LEA: Sheriff Keith Ferguson or Chief Deputy Don Townsend  
1300 SW 14
th 
St. Bentonville, AR 72712  
(479) 271-1008  
For ICE: Temple Black Public Affairs Officer  
1250 Poydras Street Suite 2200 New Orleans, LA 70113  
504.310.8887  
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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) constitutes an agreement between United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and the Benton County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO), pursuant to which ICE 
delegates nominated, trained, certified, and authorized BCSO personnel to perform certain 
immigration enforcement functions as specified herein. It is the intent of the parties that these 
delegated authorities will enable the BCSO to identify and process immigration violators and 
conduct criminal investigations under ICE supervision, as detailed herein, within the confines of 
the BCSO's area of responsibility. The BCSO and ICE enter into this MOA in good faith and 
agree to abide by the terms and conditions contained herein. 
 
I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this collaboration is to enhance the safety and security of communities by 
focusing resources on identifying and processing for removal criminal aliens who pose a threat to 
public safety or a danger to the community. This MOA sets forth the terms and conditions 
pursuant to which selected BCSO personnel (participating BCSO personnel) will be nominated, 
trained, and approved by ICE to perform certain functions of an immigration officer within the 
BCSO's area of responsibility. Nothing contained herein shall otherwise limit the jurisdiction and 
powers normally possessed by participating BCSO personnel as members of the BCSO. 
However, the exercise of the immigration enforcement authority granted under this MOA to 
participating BCSO personnel shall occur only as provided in this MOA. 
 
II. AUTHORITY 
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) 
(1996), as amended by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, authorizes the 
Secretary of DHS, acting through the Assistant Secretary of ICE, to enter into written agreements 
with a State or any political subdivision of a State so that qualified personnel can perform certain 
functions of an immigration officer. This MOA constitutes such a written agreement. 
 
III. POLICY 
This MOA sets forth the following: 1) the functions of an immigration officer that DHS is 
authorizing the participating BCSO personnel to perform; 2) the duration of the authority 
conveyed; 3) the supervisory requirements, including the requirement that participating BCSO 
personnel are subject to ICE supervision while performing immigration-related duties pursuant 
to this MOA; and 4) program information or data that the BCSO is required to collect as part of 
the operation of the program. For the purposes of this MOA, ICE officers will provide 
supervision for participating BCSO personnel only as to immigration enforcement and/or 
immigration investigative functions as authorized in this MOA. BCSO retains supervision of all 
other aspects of the employment and performance of duties by participating BCSO personnel. 
The BCSO is expected to pursue to completion all criminal charges that caused the alien to be 
taken into custody and over which the BCSO has jurisdiction. 
 
ICE will assume custody of an alien 1) who has been convicted of a State, local or Federal 
offense only after being informed by the alien's custodian that such alien has concluded service 
of any sentence of incarceration; 2) who has prior criminal convictions and when immigration 
detention is required by statute; and 3) when the ICE Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) 
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Field Office Director (FOD) or his designee decides on a case-by-case basis to assume custody 
of an alien who does not meet the above criteria. 
 
IV. DESIGNATION OF AUTHORIZED FUNCTIONS 
Approved participating BCSO personnel will be authorized to perform immigration officer 
functions outlined in 287(g)(1) of the INA regarding the investigation, apprehension, or 
detention of aliens in the United States, subject to the limitations contained in the Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP) in Appendix D to this MOA. 
 
V. DETENTION AND TRANSPORTATION ISSUES 
ICE retains sole discretion in determining how it will manage its limited detention resources and 
meet its mission requirements. ICE Field Office Directors may, in appropriate cases, decline to 
detain aliens whose detention is not mandated by Federal statute. ICE and the BCSO will 
prioritize the detention of aliens in conformity with ICE detention priorities. ICE reserves the 
right to detain aliens to the extent provided by law. 
 
If ICE deems it necessary, the BCSO will enter into an Inter-Governmental Service Agreement 
(IGSA) with ICE pursuant to which the BCSO will provide, for a reimbursable fee, detention of 
incarcerated aliens in BCSO facilities, upon the completion of their sentences. If ICE and the 
BCSO enter into an IGSA, the BCSO must meet the applicable ICE National Detention 
Standards. 
 
In addition to detention services, if ICE deems it necessary, the IGSA may include a 
transportation component for the transportation of all incarcerated aliens for a reimbursable fee. 
Under a transportation IGSA, the BCSO will transport all incarcerated aliens in its facilities who 
are subject to removal, upon completion of their sentences, to a facility or location designated by 
ICE. Reimbursement to the BCSO will occur only when the BCSO obtained the prior approval 
of ICE for the transportation. ICE will not reimburse if the BCSO did not obtain prior approval 
from ICE. 
The parties understand that the BCSO will not continue to detain an alien after that alien is 
eligible for release from the BCSO' s custody in accordance with applicable law and BCSO 
policy, except for a period of up to 48-hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and any Federal 
holiday, pursuant to an ICE detainer issued in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, absent an IGSA 
in place as described above. 
 
VI. NOMINATION OF PERSONNEL 
The BCSO will nominate candidates for ICE training and approval under this MOA. All 
candidates must be United States citizens. The BCSO is responsible for conducting a criminal 
background check within the last five years for all nominated candidates. Upon request, the 
BCSO will provide all related information and materials it collected, referenced, or considered 
during the criminal background check for nominated candidates to ICE. 
 
In addition to the BCSO background check, ICE will conduct an independent background check 
for each candidate. This background check requires all candidates to complete a background 
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questionnaire. The questionnaire requires, but is not limited to, the submission of fingerprints, a 
personal history questionnaire, and the candidate's disciplinary history (including allegations of 
excessive force or discriminatory action). ICE reserves the right to query any and every national 
and international law enforcement database to evaluate a candidate's suitability to participate in 
the enforcement of immigration authorities under this MOA. Upon request by ICE, the BCSO 
will provide continuous access to disciplinary records of all candidates along with a written 
privacy waiver signed by the candidate allowing ICE to have continuous access to his or her 
disciplinary records. 
 
The BCSO agrees to use due diligence to screen individuals nominated for training and agrees 
that individuals who successfully complete the training under this MOA will perform 
immigration officer functions authorized under 287(g) of the INA for a minimum of two years. 
If BCSO personnel under consideration are in a bargaining unit, that BCSO must, prior to the 
execution of the MOA, have an agreement with the exclusive representative that allows the 
designated officers to remain in their position for a minimum of two years. This requirement may 
be lifted solely at the discretion· of ICE for good cause in situations that involve, among other 
things, imminent promotion, officer career development, and disciplinary actions. Failure by the 
BCSO to fulfill this commitment could jeopardize the terms of this MOA, and ICE reserves the 
right, under these circumstances, to take appropriate action as necessary, including terminating 
this MOA. 
All BCSO candidates shall have knowledge of and have enforced laws and regulations pertinent 
to their law enforcement activities and their jurisdictions. 
In the task force model setting, all BCSO task force officer candidates must be sworn/certified 
officers, must possess arrest authority, must be authorized to carry firearms, and must be 
employed full-time by the BCSO. Each BCSO candidate must certify that he/she is not 
prohibited from carrying a firearm pursuant to State or Federal law, including, but not limited to, 
the Lautenberg Amendment (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) or (9)). 
 
All BCSO candidates must be approved by ICE and must be able to qualify for access to 
appropriate DRS and ICE databases. Should a candidate not be approved, a qualified substitute 
candidate may be submitted. Such substitution must occur without delaying the start of training. 
Any future expansion in the number of participating BCSO personnel or scheduling of additional 
training classes may be based on an oral agreement between the parties and is subject to all the 
requirements of this MOA and the accompanying SOP. 
 
VII. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL 
ICE will provide participating BCSO personnel with Immigration Authority Delegation Program 
(IADP) training consistent with the accompanying SOP. 
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VIII. CERTIFICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
Before participating BCSO personnel receive authorization to perform immigration officer 
functions granted under this MOA, they must successfully complete the IADP training, as 
described in the accompanying SOP. The IADP will be provided by ICE instructors who will 
train participating BCSO personnel in the enforcement of Federal immigration laws and policies, 
the scope of the powers delegated pursuant to this MOA and civil rights and civil liberties 
practices. Participating BCSO personnel must pass an ICE examination after instruction. Upon 
completion of training, those BCSO personnel who pass the ICE examinations shall be deemed 
"certified" under this MOA. 
ICE will certify in writing the names of those BCSO personnel who successfully complete 
training and pass all required test( s). Upon receipt of the certification, the ICE Special Agent in 
Charge (SAC) and/or the ICE FOD in New Orleans, Louisiana, will provide the participating 
BCSO personnel a signed authorization letter allowing the named BCSO personnel to perform 
specified functions of an immigration officer for an initial period of one year from the date of the 
authorization. ICE will also provide a copy of the authorization letter to the BCSO. Only those 
certified BCSO personnel who receive authorization letters issued by ICE and whose 
immigration enforcement efforts are subject to a designated ICE supervisor may conduct 
immigration officer functions described in this MOA. 
 
Along with the authorization letter, ICE will issue the certified BCSO personnel official 
Delegation of Authority credentials. Upon receipt of the Delegation of Authority credentials, 
BCSO personnel will provide ICE a signed receipt of the credentials on the ICE Record of 
Receipt - Property Issued to Employee (Form G-570). 
Authorization of participating BCSO personnel to act pursuant to this MOA may be withdrawn 
at any time and for any reason by ICE or the BCSO, and must be memorialized in a written 
notice of withdrawal identifying an effective date of withdrawal and the personnel to which the 
withdrawal pertains. Such withdrawal may be effectuated immediately upon notice to the other 
party. The BCSO and the ICE SAC and/or the ICE FOD in New Orleans, Louisiana, will be 
responsible for notification of the appropriate personnel in their respective agencies. The 
termination of this MOA shall constitute immediate revocation of all immigration enforcement 
authorizations delegated hereunder. 
The BCSO will immediately notify ICE when any certified and/or authorized BCSO personnel is 
no longer participating in the 287(g) program so that appropriate action can be taken, including 
termination of user account access to DHS and ICE systems. 
 
IX. COSTS AND EXPENDITURES 
Participating agencies are responsible for personnel expenses, including, but not limited to, 
salaries and benefits, local transportation, and official issue material. The BCSO is responsible 
for the salaries and benefits, including overtime, of all of its personnel being trained or 
performing duties under this MOA and of those personnel performing the regular functions of 
the participating BCSO personnel while they are receiving training. The BCSO will cover the 
costs of all BCSO personnel's travel, housing, and per diem affiliated with the training required 
for participation in this MOA. ICE is responsible for the salaries and benefits of all of its 
personnel, including instructors and supervisors.  
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If ICE determines the training provides a direct service for the Government and it is in the best 
interest of the Government, the Government may issue travel orders to selected personnel and 
reimburse travel, housing, and per diem expenses only. The BCSO remains responsible for 
paying salaries and benefits of the selected personnel. 
ICE will provide instructors and training materials. Subject to the availability of funds, ICE will 
be responsible for the purchase, installation, and maintenance of technology 
(computer/IAFISlPhoto and similar hardware/software) necessary to support the investigative 
functions of participating BCSO personnel at each BCSO facility with an active 287(g) program. 
Only participating BCSO personnel certified by ICE may use this equipment. ICE will also 
provide the necessary technological support and software updates for use by participating BCSO 
personnel to accomplish the delegated functions. Such hardware, software, and other technology 
purchased or provided by ICE shall remain the property of ICE and shall be returned to ICE 
upon termination of this agreement, or when deemed necessary by the ICE SAC and/or the ICE 
FOD in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
The BCSO is responsible for covering all expenses at the BCSO facility regarding cabling and 
power upgrades. If the connectivity solution for the BCSO is determined to include use of the 
BCSO's own communication lines - (phone, DSL, site owned T-IIT-3, etc), the BCSO will be 
responsible for covering any installation and recurring costs associated with the BCSO line. The 
BCSO is responsible for providing all administrative supplies, such as paper, toner, pens, pencils, 
or other similar items necessary for normal office operations. The BCSO is also responsible for 
providing the necessary security equipment, such as handcuffs, leg restraints and flexi cuffs, etc. 
Also, if ICE deems it necessary, the BCSO will provide ICE, at no cost, with an office within 
each participating BCSO facility for ICE supervisory employees to work. 
 
x. ICE SUPERVISION 
Immigration enforcement activities conducted by the participating BCSO personnel will be 
supervised and directed by ICE supervisory officers or designated ICE team leaders. 
Participating BCSO personnel are not authorized to perform immigration officer functions 
except when working under the supervision or guidance of ICE. To establish supervisory and 
other administrative responsibilities, the SACIFOD will specify the supervisory and other 
administrative responsibilities in an accompanying agreed-upon SOP. Participating BCSO 
personnel shall give timely notice to the ICE supervisory officer within 24 hours of any detainer 
issued under the authorities set forth in this MOA. The actions of participating BCSO personnel 
will be reviewed by ICE supervisory officers on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of the immigration laws and procedures and to assess the need for individual 
training or guidance. 
For purposes of this MOA, ICE officers will provide supervision of participating BCSO 
personnel only as to immigration enforcement functions and for investigations conducted in 
conjunction to this authority. The BCSO retains supervision of all other aspects of the 
employment of and performance of duties by participating BCSO personnel. In the absence of a 
written agreement to the contrary, the policies and procedures to be utilized by the participating 
BCSO personnel in exercising these authorities shall be DHS and ICE policies and procedures, 
including the ICE Use of Force Policy. However, when engaged in immigration enforcement 
activities, no participating BCSO personnel will be expected or required to violate or otherwise 
fail to maintain the BCSO's rules, standards, or policies, or be required to fail to abide by 
restrictions or limitations as may otherwise be imposed by law. If a conflict arises between an 
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order or direction of an ICE supervisory officer or a DHS or ICE policy and the BCSO' s rules, 
standards, or policies, the conflict shall be promptly reported to the SAC and/or the FOD in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, or designees, and the BCSO, or designee, when circumstances safely allow 
the concern to be raised. The SAC and/or the FOD in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and the BCSO shall attempt to resolve the conflict. 
 
XI. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
ICE does not require the BCSO to provide statistical or arrest data above what is entered into 
ENFORCE; however, ICE reserves the right to request the BCSO provide specific tracking data 
and/or any information, documents, or evidence related to the circumstances of a particular 
alien's arrest. ICE may use this data to compare and verify ICE's own data, and to fulfill ICE's 
statistical reporting requirements, or to assess the progress and success of the BCSO's 287(g) 
program. 
 
XII. LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
If any participating BCSO personnel are the subject of a complaint of any sort that may result in 
that individual receiving employer discipline or becoming the subject of a criminal investigation 
or civil lawsuit, the BCSO shall, to the extent allowed by State law, immediately notify the local 
point of contact for the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and the SACIFOD of 
the existence and nature of the complaint. The resolution of the complaint shall also be promptly 
reported to ICE. Complaints regarding the exercise of immigration enforcement authority, as 
specified herein, by participating BCSO personnel shall be handled as described below.  
Except as otherwise noted in this MOA or allowed by Federal law, and to the extent required by 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(7) and (8), the BCSO will be responsible and bear the costs of participating 
BCSO personnel with regard to their property or personal expenses incurred by reason of death, 
injury, or incidents giving rise to liability. 
Participating BCSO personnel will be treated as Federal employees only for purposes of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, and worker's compensation claims, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 8101 et seq., when performing a function on behalf of ICE as authorized by this MOA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1357(g)(7); 28 U.S.C. § 2671. It is the understanding of the parties to this MOA that 
participating BCSO personnel will enjoy the same defenses and immunities for their in-scope 
acts that are available to ICE officers from personal liability arising from tort lawsuits based on 
actions conducted in compliance with this MOA, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(8). 
Participating BCSO personnel named as defendants in litigation arising from activities carried 
out under this MOA may request representation by the U.S. Department of Justice. Such requests 
must be made in writing directed to the Attorney General of the United States, and will be 
handled in coordination with the SAC and/or the FOD in New Orleans, Louisiana. Requests 
should be in the form of a written memorandum prepared by the defendant addressing each and 
every allegation in  the complaint, explaining as well as admitting or denying each allegation 
against the defendant. Requests for representation must be presented to the ICE Office of the 
Chief Counsel at the P.O. Box 1128, Oakdale, Louisiana 71463-1128. Any request for 
representation and related correspondence must be clearly marked "Subject to Attorney-Client 
Privilege." The Office of the Chief Counsel will forward the individual's request, together with a 
memorandum outlining the factual basis underlying the event(s) at issue in the lawsuit, to the 
ICE Headquarters Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, which will forward the request, the 
factual memorandum, and an advisory statement opining whether such representation would be 
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in the interest of the United States, to the Director of the Constitutional and Specialized Torts 
Staff, Civil Division, Department of Justice. ICE will not be liable for defending or indemnifying 
acts of intentional misconduct on the part of participating BCSO personnel.  
 
The BCSO agrees to cooperate with any Federal investigation related to this MOA to the full 
extent of its available powers, including providing access to appropriate databases, personnel, 
and documents. Failure to do so may result in the termination of this MOA. Failure of an officer 
to cooperate in any Federal investigation related to this MOA may result in revocation of such 
individual's authority provided under this MOA. The BCSO agrees to cooperate with Federal 
personnel conducting reviews to ensure compliance with the terms of this MOA and to provide 
access to appropriate databases, personnel, and documents necessary to complete such 
compliance review. It is understood that information provided by any BCSO personnel under 
threat of disciplinary action in an administrative investigation cannot be used against that 
individual in subsequent criminal proceedings, consistent with Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 
493 (1967), and its progeny. 
As the activities of participating BCSO personnel under this MOA are undertaken under Federal 
authority, the participating BCSO personnel will comply with Federal standards and guidelines 
relating to the Supreme Court's decision in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and its 
progeny, which relates to the disclosure of potential impeachment information about possible 
witnesses or affiants in a criminal case or investigation. 
The BCSO and ICE are each responsible for compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as 
applicable, and related system of records notices with regard to data collection and use of 
information under this MOA. The applicable Systems of Record Notice for privacy compliance 
is the ENFORCE Systems of Records Notice, 71 FR 13987, dated March 20, 2006. 
 
XIII. COMPLAINT PROCEDURES 
The complaint reporting procedure for allegations of misconduct by participating BCSO 
personnel, with regard to activities undertaken under the authority of this MOA, is included in 
Appendix B. 
 
XIV. CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 
Participating BCSO personnel are bound by all Federal civil rights laws, regulations, guidance 
relating to non-discrimination, including the U.S. Department of Justice "Guidance Regarding 
the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies" dated June 2003 and Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et. seq., which prohibits discrimination 
based upon race, color, or national origin (including limited English proficiency) in any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
 
XV. INTERPRETATION SERVICES 
Participating BCSO personnel will provide an opportunity for subjects with limited English 
language proficiency to request an interpreter. Qualified foreign language interpreters will be 
provided by the BCSO, as needed. The BCSO will maintain a list of qualified interpreters or 
companies it contracts with to provide such interpreters. Participating law enforcement personnel 
will be instructed on the proper administrative procedures to follow to obtain the services of an 
interpreter. A qualified interpreter means an interpreter who can interpret effectively, accurately, 
and impartially, using any specialized vocabulary. If an interpreter is used when a designated 
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officer is performing functions under this MOA, the interpreter must be identified, by name, in 
records. 
 
XVI. COMMUNICATION 
The ICE SAC and/or the ICE FOD in New Orleans, Louisiana, and the BCSO shall meet at least 
annually, and as needed, to review and assess the immigration enforcement activities conducted 
by the participating BCSO personnel, and to ensure compliance with the terms of this MOA. 
When necessary, ICE and the BCSO may limit the participation of these meetings in regards to 
non-law enforcement personnel. The attendees will meet at locations to be agreed upon by the 
parties, or via teleconference. The participants will be supplied with specific information on case 
reviews, individual participants' evaluations, complaints filed, media coverage, and, to the extent 
practicable, statistical information on immigration enforcement activity in Benton County. An 
initial review meeting will be held no later than nine months after certification of the initial class 
of participating BCSO personnel under Section VIII, above. 
 
XVII. COMMUNITY OUTREACH 
The BCSO may, at its discretion, engage in community outreach with individuals and 
organizations expressing an interest in this MOA. ICE may participate in such outreach upon the 
BCSO's request. Nothing in this MOA shall limit ICE's own community outreach program. 
 
XVIII. RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES 
The BCSO may, at its discretion, communicate the substance of this agreement to organizations 
and groups expressing an interest in the law enforcement activities to be engaged in under this 
MOA. It is the practice of ICE to provide a copy of this MOA, only after it has been signed, to 
requesting media outlets; the BCSO is authorized to do the same. 
The BCSO hereby agrees to coordinate with ICE prior to releasing any information relating to, or 
exchanged under, this MOA, including any SOPs developed for the implementation of this 
MOA. Information obtained or developed as a result of this MOA is under the control of ICE and 
shall be subject to public disclosure only pursuant to the provisions of applicable federal laws, 
regulations, and executive orders. Insofar as any documents created by the BCSO contain 
information developed or obtained as a result of this MOA, such documents shall not be 
considered public records. 
The release of statistical information regarding the 287(g) program must be coordinated with the 
ICE Office of Public Affairs. The BCSO hereby agrees to coordinate with ICE regarding 
information to be released to the media regarding actions taken under this MOA. In the task 
force model setting, all contact with the media involving investigations conducted under this 
MOA by Task Force Officers (TFO) will be done pursuant to ICE policy. The points of contact 
for ICE and the BCSO for this purpose are identified in Appendix C. 
Appendix B to this MOA describes the complaint procedures available to members of the public 
regarding actions taken by participating BCSO personnel pursuant to this agreement. 
 
XIX. MODIFICATIONS TO THIS MOA 
Modifications to this MOA must be proposed in writing and approved and signed by the 
signatories. Modification to Appendix D shall be done in accordance with the procedures 
outlined in the SOP. 
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XX. POINTS OF CONTACT 
ICE and BCSO points of contact for purposes of this MOA are identified in Appendix A. Points 
of contact (PO C) can be updated at any time by providing a revised Appendix A to the other 
party to this MOA. 
 
XXI. DURATION AND TERMINATION OF THIS MOA 
This MOA will remain in effect for three (3) years from the date of signing unless terminated 
earlier by either party. At the expiration of the three year effective period, ICE and the BCSO 
shall review the MOA and modify, extend, or permit the MOA to lapse. During the MOA's 
effective period, either party, upon written notice to the other party, may terminate the MOA at 
any time. A termination notice shall be delivered personally or by certified or registered mail and 
termination shall take effect immediately upon receipt of such notice. 
Either party, upon written or oral notice to the other party, may temporarily suspend activities 
under this MOA when resource constraints or competing priorities necessitate such suspension. 
Notice of termination or suspension by ICE shall be given to the BCSO. 
Notice of termination or suspension by the BCSO shall be given to the SAC and/or the FOD in 
New Orleans, Louisiana. Upon a good faith determination that the BCSO is not fulfilling its 
duties, ICE shall notify the BCSO, in writing, and inform the BCSO that it has 90 days to 
demonstrate a continued need for 287(g) program services. If this continued need is not 
demonstrated by the BCSO, the authorities and resources given to the BCSO pursuant to this 
MOA will be terminated or suspended. Upon a subsequent demonstration of need, all costs to 
reinstate access to such authorities and/or program services will be incurred by the BCSO. 
This MOA does not, is not intended to, shall not be construed to, and may not be relied upon to 
create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any person in any matter, civil 
or criminal. 
 
By signing this MOA, each party represents it is fully authorized to enter into this MOA, accepts 
the terms, responsibilities, obligations, and limitations of this MOA, and agrees to be bound 
thereto to the fullest extent allowed by law. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
POINTS OF CONTACT 
The ICE and BCSO points of contact for purposes of implementation of this MOA are: 
For the BCSO: 
Sheriff Keith Ferguson or Chief Deputy Don Townsend 
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1300 S.W. 14th Street 
Bentonville, AR 72712 
479-271- 
ForICEDRO: 
Assistant Field Office Director 
1250 Poydras Street 
Suite 325 
New Orleans, LA 70113 
504-599 
For ICE 01: 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
1250 Poydras Street 
Suite 2200 
New Orleans, LA 70113 
504-310- 
 
b6 
b6, b7c 
b6, b7c 
b6, b7c 
b6, b7c 
 
APPENDIX B 
COMPLAINT PROCEDURE 
This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is between the US Department of Homeland Security's 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Benton County Sheriff’s Office, (BCSO), 
pursuant to which selected BCSO personnel are authorized to perform immigration enforcement 
duties in specific situations under Federal authority. As such, the training, supervision, and 
performance of participating BCSO personnel pursuant to the MOA, as well as the protections 
for U.S. citizens' and aliens' civil and constitutional rights, are to be monitored. Part of that 
monitoring will be accomplished through these complaint reporting and resolution procedures, 
which the parties to the MOA have agreed to follow. 
The MOA sets forth the process for designation, training, certification, and authorization of 
certain BCSO personnel to perform certain immigration enforcement functions specified herein. 
Complaints filed against those personnel in the course of their non-immigration duties will 
remain the domain of the BCSO and be handled in accordance with the BCSO' s Manual of 
Policy and Procedures, or equivalent rules, regulations, or procedures. 
If any participating BCSO personnel are the subject of a complaint or allegation involving the 
violation of the terms of this MOA or a complaint or allegation of any sort that may result in that 
individual receiving employer discipline or becoming the subject of a criminal investigation or 
civil lawsuit the BCSO shall to the extent allowed by State law immediately notify ICE of the 
existence and nature of the complaint or allegation. The results of any internal investigation or 
inquiry connected to the complaint or allegation and the resolution of the complaint shall also be 
promptly reported to ICE. The ICE notifications should be made to the SAC and the Office of 
Professional Responsibility (OPR) points of contact in New Orleans, Louisiana. Complaints 
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regarding the exercise of immigration enforcement authority by participating BCSO personnel 
shall be handled as described below. 
The BCSO will also handle complaints filed against BCSO personnel who are not designated and 
certified pursuant to this MOA but are acting in immigration functions in violation of this MOA. 
Further, any such complaints regarding non-designated BCSO personnel shall be forwarded to 
the SAC or the FOD in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
In order to simplify the process for the public, complaints against participating BCSO personnel 
relating to their immigration enforcement can be reported in the following manner "Complaint 
and Allegation Reporting Procedures." 
 
1. Complaint and Allegation Reporting Procedures 
Complaint reporting procedures shall be disseminated by the BCSO within facilities under its 
jurisdiction (in English and other languages as appropriate) in order to ensure that individuals are 
aware of the availability of such procedures. Such reporting procedures shall also be included 
within facility manuals for detainees who have been processed under the 287(g) program. Such 
material must include up-to-date contact information necessary to file the complaint. Complaints 
will be accepted from any source (e.g., ICE, BCSO, participating BCSO personnel, inmates, and 
the public). ICE will immediately forward a copy of the complaint to the DRS Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) Review and Compliance. 
Complaints can be reported to Federal authorities as follows: 
A. Telephonically to the DRS Office of the Inspector General (DRS OIG) at the toll free number 
1-800-323-8603, or . 
B. Telephonically to the ICE OPR at the Joint Intake Center (JIC) in 
Washington, D.C., at the toll-free number 1-877-246-8253, email 
Joint.Intake@dhs.gov, or 
C. Via mail as follows: 
2. Review of Complaints 
Department of Homeland Security 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Office of Professional Responsibility 
P.O. Box 14475 
Pennsylvania A venue NW 
Washington D.C. 20044 
 
All complaints or allegations (written or oral) reported to the BCSO directly that involve BCSO 
personnel with ICE delegated authority will be reported to ICE OPR. ICE OPR will verify 
participating personnel status under the MOA with the assistance of the SAC of the ICE Office 
of Investigations in New Orleans, Louisiana. Complaints received by any ICE entity will be 
reported directly to ICE OPR as per existing ICE policies and procedures.    
ICE OPR, as appropriate, will make an initial determination regarding ICE investigative 
jurisdiction and refer the complaint to the appropriate ICE office for action as soon as possible, 
given the nature of the complaint. 
Complaints reported directly to ICE OPR will be shared with the BCSO's Internal Investigations 
Unit when the complaint involves BCSO personnel. Both offices will then coordinate 
appropriate investigative jurisdiction, which may include initiation of a joint investigation to 
resolve the issue(s). 
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3. Complaint and Allegations Resolution Procedures 
Upon receipt of any complaint or allegation, ICE aPR will undertake a complete review of each 
complaint in accordance with existing ICE allegation criteria and reporting requirements. As 
stated above, the ICE aPR will adhere to the reporting requirements as stated above and as they 
relate to the DHS ala and CRCL and/or the DO] CRD. Complaints will be resolved using the 
existing procedures, supplemented as follows: 
A. Referral of Complaints or Allegations to the BCSO' s Internal Investigations 
Unit. 
The ICE OPR will refer complaints, as appropriate, involving BCSO personnel to the BCSO' s 
Internal Investigations Unit for resolution. The facility commander will inform ICE OPR of the 
disposition and resolution of any complaints or allegations against BCSO' s participating 
officers. 
 
B. Interim Action Pending Complaint Resolution 
When participating BCSO personnel are under investigation for any reason that could lead to 
disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal, or are alleged to have violated the terms of this 
MOA, ICE may revoke that individual's authority and have that individual removed from 
participation in the activities covered under the MOA. 
 
C. Time Parameters for Resolution of Complaints or Allegations 
It is expected that any complaint received will be resolved within 90 days of receipt. However, 
this will depend upon the nature and complexity of the substance of the complaint itself. 
 
D. Notification of Resolution ofa Complaint or Allegation 
ICE OPR will coordinate with the BCSO's Internal Investigations Unit to ensure notification as 
appropriate to the ICE SAC in New Orleans, Louisiana" the subject(s) of a complaint, and the 
person filing the complaint regarding the resolution of the complaint. These Complaint 
Reporting and Allegation Procedures are ICE's internal policy and may be supplemented or 
modified by ICE unilaterally. ICE will provide BCSO with written copies of any such 
supplements or modifications. These Complaint Reporting and Allegation Procedures apply to 
ICE and do not restrict or apply to other investigative organizations within the federal 
government. 
 
APPENDIX C 
PUBLIC INFORMATION POINTS OF CONTACT 
Pursuant to Section XVIII of this MOA, the signatories agree to coordinate appropriate release of 
information to the media regarding actions taken under this MOA before any information is 
released. The points of contact for coordinating such activities are: 
For the BCSO: 
Sheriff Keith Ferguson or Chief Deputy Don Townsend 
1300 SW 14th St. 
Bentonville, AR 72712 
479-271-1008 
For ICE: 
Temple Black 
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Public Affairs Officer 
Office of Public Affairs and Internal Communication 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
1250 Poydras Street 
Suite 2200 
New Orleans, LA 70113 
504-310-8887 
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APPENDIX D 
STANDARD, OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) TEMPLATE 
The purpose of this appendix is to establish standard, uniform procedures for the implementation 
and oversight of the 287(g) delegation of authority program within the SAC/FOD area of 
responsibility. This appendix can be modified only in writing and by mutual acceptance of the 
SAC/FOD, the BCSO Chief Deputy, the ICE Office of State and Local Coordination (OSLC) 
and the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA). 
There are two models for the 287(g) program, a Task Force Officer (TFO) model or a Detention 
model. Pursuant to this MOA, BCSO has been delegated authorities under the TFO and 
Detention models as outlined below. 
Prioritization: 
ICE retains sole discretion in determining how it will manage its limited resources and meet its 
mission requirements. To ensure resources are managed effectively, ICE requires the BCSO to 
also manage its resources dedicated to 287(g) authority under the MOA. To that end, the 
following list reflects the categories of aliens that are a priority for arrest and detention with the 
highest priority being Level 1 criminal aliens. Resources should be prioritized to the following 
levels: 
• LJ Level 1 - Aliens who have been convicted of or arrested for major drug offenses 
And/or violent offenses such as murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and kidnapping; 
• Level 2 - Aliens who have been convicted of or arrested for minor drug offenses and/or 
mainly property offenses such as burglary, larceny, fraud, and money laundering; and 
• Level 3 - Aliens who have been convicted of or arrested for other offenses. 
 
Training: 
The 287(g) training program, the Immigration Authority Delegation Program (IADP), will be 
taught by ICE instructors and tailored to the immigration functions to be performed. ICE Office 
of Training and Development (OTD) will proctor examinations during the IADP. The BCSO 
nominee must pass each examination with a minimum score of 70 percent to receive 
certification. If the BCSO nominee fails to attain a 70 percent rating on an examination, the 
BCSO nominee will have one opportunity to remediate the testing material and re-take a similar 
examination. During the entire duration of the IADP, the BCSO nominee will be offered a 
maximum of one remediation examination. Failure to achieve a 70 percent on any two 
examinations (inclusive of any remediation examination), will result in the disqualification of the 
BCSO nominee and their discharge from the IADP. 
 
Training will include, among other topics: (i) discussion of the terms and limitations of this 
MOA; (ii) the scope of immigration officer authority; (iii) relevant immigration law; (iv) the ICE 
Use of Force Policy; (v) civil rights laws; (vi) the U.S. Department of Justice "Guidance 
Regarding the Use Of Race By Federal Law Enforcement Agencies," dated June 2003; (vii) 
public outreach and complaint procedures; (viii) liability issues; (ix) cross-cultural issues; and (x) 
the obligation under Federal law and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to make 
proper notification upon the arrest or detention of a foreign national. 
Approximately one year after the participating BCSO personnel are trained and certified, ICE 
may provide additional updated training on relevant administrative, legal, and operational issues 
related to the performance of immigration officer functions. Local training on relevant issues will 
be provided as needed by ICE supervisors or designated ICE team leaders. An OSLC designated 
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official shall, in consultation with OTD and local ICE officials, review on an annual basis and, if 
needed, refresh training requirements. 
Trained BCSO personnel will receive, as needed, a DHS email account and access to the 
necessary DHS applications. The use of the information technology (IT) infrastructure and the 
DHS/ICE IT security policies are defined in the Interconnection Security Agreement (ISA). The 
ISA is the agreement between ICE Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and BCSO 
Designated Accreditation Authority (DAA). BCSO agrees that each of its sites using ICE 
provided network access or equipment will sign the ISA, which defines the IT policies and rules 
of behavior for each user granted access to the DHS network and applications. Failure to adhere 
to the terms of the ISA could result in the loss of all user privileges. 
 
Data Collection: 
ENFORCE is the primary processing system for alien removals and is the main resource for 
statistical information for the 287(g) program. All ENFORCE entries must be completed in 
accordance with established ICE polices and adhere to OSLC guidance. 
ICE does not require the BCSO to provide statistical or arrest data above what is entered into 
ENFORCE; however, ICE reserves the right to request specific tracking or arrest data be 
maintained and provided for comparison and verification with ICE's own data and statistical 
information. This data may also be used for ICE's statistical reporting requirements or to assess 
the progress and success of the BCSO's 287(g) program. 
The BCSO and ICE are each responsible for compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, as 
applicable, and related system of records notices with regard to data collection and use of 
information under this MOA. The applicable Systems of Record Notice for privacy compliance 
is the ENFORCE Systems of Records Notice, 71 FR 13987, dated March 20, 2006. 
 
TASK FORCE OFFICER (TFO) MODEL: 
Participating BCSO personnel performing immigration-related duties pursuant to this MOA will 
be BCSO officers certified and authorized by ICE, and assigned to task force operations 
supported by ICE. Those participating BCSO personnel will exercise their immigration-related 
authorities during the course of criminal investigations involving aliens encountered within 
Benton County or as directed by the SAC. 
The participating BCSO personnel are authorized to perform the following functions in the 
investigation, detention, and removal of aliens in the United States as allowed for the TFO model 
(INA 287(g)), pursuant to the tiered level of priorities set forth in Appendix D's "Prioritization" 
section: 
• The power and authority to interview any person reasonably believed to be an alien about his 
right to be or remain in the United States and to take into custody for processing an alien 
solely based on an immigration violation (INA §§ 287(a)(1) and (2)) will be delegated only 
on a case-by-case basis. To exercise such authority, a TFO first must obtain approval from an 
ICE supervisor, who will approve the exercise only to further the priorities of removing 
serious criminals, gang members, smugglers, and traffickers and when reasonable suspicion 
exists to believe the alien is or was involved in criminal activity. When an alien is arrested 
for the violation ofa criminal law, a TFO may process that alien for removal subject to ICE 
supervision as outlined in this agreement; 
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• The power and authority to arrest without warrant for felonies which have been committed 
and which are cognizable under any law of the United States regulating the admission, 
exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, if there is reason to believe that the person so 
arrested has committed such felony and if there is likelihood of the person escaping before a 
warrant can be obtained (INA § 287(a)(4) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)(2)). Arrested individuals 
must be presented to a federal magistrate judge or other authorized official without 
unnecessary delay (INA § 287(a)(4); Fed. R. Crim. P. 5). Notification of such arrest must be 
made to ICE within twenty-four (24) hours; 
• The power and authority to arrest for any criminal offense against the United States if the 
offense is committed in the officer's presence pursuant to INA § 287(a)(5)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 
287.5(c)(3); 
• The power and authority to execute search warrants pursuant to INA § 287(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 
287.5(e)(l); 
• The power and authority to serve arrest warrants for immigration violations pursuant to 
INA § 287(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3); 
• The power and authority to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence (INA § 
287(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2)), to complete required criminal alien processing, including 
fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing of aliens, as well as the preparation of affidavits 
and the taking of sworn statements for ICE supervisory review; 
• The power and authority to prepare charging documents (INA § 239, 8 C.F.R. § 239.1; 
INA § 238, 8 C.F.R § 238.1; INA § 241(a)(5), 8 C.F.R § 241.8; INA § 235(b)(1), 8 
C.F.R. § 235.3) including the preparation of a Notice to Appear (NTA) application or other 
charging document, as appropriate, for the signature of an ICE officer for aliens in categories 
established by ICE supervisors; 
• The power and authority to issue immigration detainers (INA § 236, INA § 287, and 8 
C.F.R. § 287.7) and Form 1-213, Record of Deportable/inadmissible Alien, for processing aliens 
in categories established by ICE supervisors; and 
• The power and authority to detain and transport (INA § 287(g)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)(6)) 
arrested aliens subject to removal to ICE-approved detention facilities. 
As noted under Appendix D's "Prioritization" section, ICE requires the BCSO to focus its use of 
the 287(g) program in accord with ICE's priorities. The participating BCSO personnel will 
concentrate their efforts primarily on conducting criminal investigations of federal and state 
felonies that will have maximum impact on human smuggling, human trafficking, egregious 
illegal alien employers and the victimization of illegal aliens. 
 
Supervision: 
A 287(g) delegation of authority task force is designed to proactively respond to, identify, and 
remove criminal aliens that reside within the BCSO's jurisdiction pursuant to the tiered level of 
priorities set forth in Appendix D's "Prioritization" section. The following identifies each entity's 
roles and responsibilities. These roles and responsibilities include, but are not limited to: 
If the BCSO conducts an interview and verifies identity, alienage, and deportability, they must 
contact ICE for arrest approval. No arrest for a violation of Title 8 is to be conducted by a 
BCSO task force officer without prior approval from the ICE supervisor. 
The BCSO is responsible for ensuring proper record checks have been completed, obtaining the 
necessary court/conviction documents, and, upon arrest, ensuring that the alien is processed 
through ENFORCEIIDENT and served with the appropriate charging documents. Prior to the 
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BCSO conducting any enforcement operation that will involve the use of its 287(g) delegation of 
authority, the BCSO must provide the ICE supervisor with a copy of the operations plan, and the 
SACIFOD must concur and approve with the plan prior to it being initiated. The ICE supervisor 
is responsible for requesting alien files, reviewing alien files for completeness, approval of all 
arrests, and TECS checks and input. The SACIFOD office is responsible for providing the 
BCSO with current and updated DRS policies regarding the arrest and processing of illegal 
aliens. 
On a regular basis, the ICE supervisor is responsible for conducting an audit of the 
IDENT/ENFORCE computer system entries and records made by the LEA officers. Upon 
review and auditing of the IDENT/ENFORCE computer system entries and records, if errors are 
found, the ICE supervisor will communicate those errors in a timely manner to the responsible 
official for the BCSO. The ICE supervisor will notify the BCSO of any errors in the system and 
the BCSO is responsible for submitting a plan to ensure that steps are taken to correct, modify, or 
prevent the recurrence of errors that are discovered. ICE will provide the BCSO with guidance 
for presenting any criminal prosecution cases that are referred for Federal prosecution. 
Consistent with applicable standard operating procedures, the creation of an A-file cannot be 
completed until the A-file is signed by the appropriate ICE supervisor. A-files can be maintained 
at a BCSO facility as long as there is an ICE representative assigned to that facility and that 
representative has a work area where documents can be adequately secured. Representatives 
from DHS must be permitted access to the facility where ICE records are maintained.  
 
Nominated Personnel: 
BCSO candidates working with task force operations shall have knowledge of and have enforced 
laws and regulations pertinent to their law enforcement activities and their jurisdictions. The 
applicants should have a minimum of one year of law enforcement experience that includes 
experience in interviewing witnesses, interrogating subjects, providing constitutional rights 
warnings, obtaining statements, and executing search and seizure warrants. An emphasis should 
be placed on officers who have planned, organized, and conducted complex investigations 
relating to violations of criminal and civil law. 
 
DETENTION MODEL: 
Participating BCSO personnel performing immigration-related duties pursuant to this MOA will 
be BCSO officers assigned to detention operations supported by ICE. Those participating BCSO 
personnel will exercise their immigration-related authorities only during the course of their 
normal duties while assigned to BCSO jail/correctional facilities. Participating BCSO personnel 
will identify and remove criminal aliens that reside within the BCSO' s jurisdiction pursuant to 
the tiered level of priorities set forth in Appendix D's "Prioritization" section. The participating 
BCSO personnel are authorized to perform the following functions as allowed by 287(g) of the 
INA for the Detention Model: 
 
• The power and authority to interrogate any person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or 
remain in the United States (INA § 287(a)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(1)) and to process for 
immigration violations any removable alien or those aliens who have been arrested for violating 
a Federal, State, or local offense; 
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• The power and authority to serve warrants of arrest for immigration violations pursuant to INA 
§ 287(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3); 
 
• The power and authority to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence (INA § 
287(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2», to complete required criminal alien processing, including 
fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing of aliens, as well as the preparation of affidavits 
and the taking of sworn statements for ICE supervisory review; 
 
• The power and authority to prepare charging documents (INA § 239, 8 C.F.R. § 239.1; 
INA § 238, 8 C.F.R § 238.1; INA § 241(a)(5), 8 C.F.R § 241.8; INA § 235(b)(1), 8 
C.F.R. § 235.3) including the preparation of a Notice to Appear (NT A) application or other 
charging document, as appropriate, for the signature of an ICE officer for aliens in categories 
established by ICE supervisors; 
 
• The power and authority to issue immigration detainers (INA § 236, INA § 287, and 8 C.F.R. § 
287.7) and 1-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, for processing aliens in categories 
established by ICE supervisors; and 
 
• The power and authority to detain and transport (INA § 287(g)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)(6» 
arrested aliens subject to removal to ICE-approved detention facilities. As noted under Appendix 
D's "Prioritization" section, ICE requires the BCSO to focus its use of the 287(g) program in 
accord with ICE's priorities. 
 
Supervision: 
A 287(g) delegation of authority detention model is designed to identify and remove aliens 
amenable to removal that are incarcerated within the BCSO's detention facilities pursuant to the 
tiered level of priorities set forth in Appendix D's "Prioritization" section. The following 
identifies each entity's roles and responsibilities. These roles and responsibilities include, but are 
not limited to: 
The BCSO shall provide notification to the ICE supervisor of any detainers placed under 287(g) 
authority within 24 hours. 
The BCSO shall coordinate transportation of detainees processed under 287(g) authority in a 
timely manner, in accordance with the MOA and/or IOSA. 
The BCSO is responsible for ensuring proper record checks have been completed, obtaining the 
necessary court/conviction documents, and, upon arrest, ensuring that the alien is processed 
through ENFORCE/IDENT and served with the appropriate charging documents.  
The BCSO must immediately report all encounters of an individual who claims U.S. citizenship 
to the FOD through their chain of command. The FOD shall make the appropriate notification to 
DRO headquarters. 
The ICE supervisor is responsible for requesting alien files, reviewing alien files for 
completeness, approval of all arrests, and TECS checks and input. The FOD office is responsible 
for providing the BCSO with current and updated DRS policies regarding the arrest and 
processing of illegal aliens. 
On a regular basis, the ICE supervisors are responsible for conducting an audit of the 
IDENTIENFORCE computer system entries and records made by the BCSO's officers. Upon 
review and auditing of the IDENTIENFORCE computer system entries and records, if errors are 
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found, the ICE supervisor will communicate those errors in a timely manner to the responsible 
official for BCSO. The ICE supervisor will notify the BCSO of any errors in the system and the 
BCSO is responsible for submitting a plan to ensure that steps are taken to correct, modify, or 
prevent the recurrence of errors that are discovered. 
 
Nominated Personnel: 
All BCSO jail enforcement officer candidates shall have specific experience that should consist 
of having supervised inmates. Candidates must show that they have been trained on and 
concerned with maintaining the security of the facility. Candidates must have enforced rules and 
regulations governing the facility on inmate accountability and conduct. Candidates must also 
show an ability to meet and deal with people of differing backgrounds and behavioral patterns. 
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Chapter 3   
 
The Enforcement of Immigration Policy through the 287(g) Program 
 
This chapter presents a theory which tests arguments about partisan preferences on the 
enforcement of immigration policy. The theory explains why the number of arrests and 
removals of undocumented immigrants across counties participating in the 287(g) program 
increases and decreases. Moreover, it explores all these issues and relationships. In particular, 
it focuses on two fundamental elements: partisanship and social factors. I argue that the 
increase or decrease of arrests and removals depend upon two set of factors that occur 
independent of each other and in combination. First, on the political side of the ledger, the 
president, Congress, state governor, and state legislature represent political parties that uphold 
a set of values, which determine their public policy preferences. Second, a  number of social 
issues—crime, unemployment, foreign-born people settling in traditional and new destination 
communities—are usually attached to the issue of immigrants and immigration policy. Third, 
political actors take into consideration social issues that are of concern to the constituencies 
they represent. I argue that because those socio-economic-demographic (SED) issues are of 
concern to constituencies, political leaders would prefer to enforce the policy either rigorously 
or laxly, depending upon their partisan values. In other words, these SED factors on their own 
have an effect on the number of arrests and removals and when they interact with the partisan 
values of the political parties, the effect of the latter is either amplified or attenuated.  
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 The chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents the theory and 
hypotheses followed by the data, methodology, results, discussion and conclusion sections.  
 
Theory on Immigration Policy Enforcement Discretion 
Law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal level do not exist in a vacuum. They 
are part of a milieu in which a constellation of factors converge, thus influencing their discretion 
in the removal process of undocumented immigrants. At each stage of the removal process, 
LEA deputized officers and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents’ discretion 
is contoured by the influence that state and national political actors exert on them, namely the 
president, state governor, state legislature, and Congress. Those political actors—with their 
own goals and policy preferences and power over local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies—are also influenced by the looming prospect of losing the next election. Thus, 
deputized LEA officers and ICE agents are mindful not only of their principals’ policy 
preferences, but also of the consequences that can befall them if they fail to follow their 
directives.  
The overarching argument in this theory is that political leaders have policy preferences. 
In particular, I argue that Republicans would favor stricter enforcement so we should see an 
increase in the number of arrests and removals. Their preference over stricter enforcement is 
grounded on the value they assign to the rule of law. Because undocumented immigrants 
crossed the border without inspection or overstayed their visas and because they are 
unauthorized workers, then, in general, Republicans would want to enforce the law in a more 
stringent manner. Throughout this theory I hold the argument that Republicans prefer an 
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increase in arrests and removals while Democrats may prefer fewer arrests and removals, but 
not because they do not care about the rule of law, but because, in general, they value the 
integration of immigrants to society. Thus, even when we see an increase in arrests and 
removals under both a Republican and Democratic regime, we should expect to see that the 
increase is less severe under the latter than under the former.  
Political Parties and the Roots of their Policy Preferences 
Each political party has policy preferences grounded in core values. Those values encapsulate a 
vision of what society ought to be. To build the ideal society, they promote policies that align 
with their values. To discern the values of the Republican and Democratic parties, one can take 
a look at their political platforms. The 2016 political platform of the Republican Party puts the 
spotlight on “Renewing American Values” (Republican Platform 2016). In broad terms, the 
platform includes issues of importance such as healthcare, education, traditional marriage, 
reforming the bureaucracy, and safe neighborhoods, among others.  
As the immigrant population grows and spreads throughout the country, the vision of 
the ideal society is disrupted. The arrival of immigrants with particular cultural traditions seem 
to be the culprit of that disruption and a threat to traditional values. A Pew survey (Kohut, 
Doherty, and Dimock 2012), on the question of “the growing number of newcomers threaten 
traditional American values,” found 60 percent of Republicans agreeing with the statement.  A 
more recent survey (Doherty, Tyson and Weisel 2015) found that 63 percent of Republicans 
agreed with the statement that “immigrants burden the country by taking jobs, housing and 
health care.” Thus, because immigrants in general and the undocumented in particular are 
perceived as a fiscal burden and a threat to traditional values, then Republicans may be inclined 
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to support a rigorous enforcement of immigration policy. In fact, in another question of the 
same survey, voters were asked if “giving path to legal status for those who came to the U.S. 
illegally like a reward for doing something wrong,” 58 percent of Republican respondents 
agreed with that statement. Notably, the percent of Republicans agreeing with that statement 
increased nine points in a matter of two years.  
 On the other hand, the 2012 Democratic national platform theme was about “Moving 
America Forward.” To that end, the party set forth an array of issues of priority. They range—
the spectrum of issues that build and strengthen society—from generating jobs, building the 
middle class, deficit reduction, Wall Street reform, protection of rights and freedom, and 
defense, to name a few. On the issue of immigration, it underscores the contribution that all 
generations of immigrants have made to society. Additionally, it promotes a path to citizenship 
for those who are undocumented (Democratic National Platform 2012). Findings from the Pew 
surveys (Kohut, Doherty, and Dimock 2012; Doherty, Tyson and Weisel 2015) confirm this view. 
Fifty-seven percent of Democratic respondents disagree with the statement that posits that 
“newcomers threaten American values; 23 percent agreed with the notion that granting legal 
status to undocumented immigrants is a reward for doing something wrong; and 62 percent of 
Democrats responded that immigrants strengthen the country, while the other 38 percent said 
that they are a fiscal burden. Because the Democratic Party views immigrants as part of the 
community and contribute to the betterment of society in general, Democrats may lean 
towards a lenient enforcement of immigration policy.  
 
  
87 
 
President Partisan Identification 
The president is well positioned to influence public policy. As the leader of his political party, he 
has policy priorities that he would like to see come to fruition. To that end, he uses his 
constitutional powers that may serve as venues to influence the enforcement of immigration 
policy at the local and state level. Among these powers are appointment and budget allocation. 
First, by appointing cabinet leaders, with whom he shares a political ideology, he ensures that 
their actions will be consistent with his policy preferences and goals. Even when these agency 
leaders may not totally agree with the president’s views, they are likely to comply with his 
directives. Agency leaders may be willing to go along for a number of reasons—including fear of 
being removed, loyalty and commitment, and the expectation of receiving support in budgetary 
matters. Even with all the administrative tools at the president’s disposal, he cannot substitute 
the agency’s preferences with his own (Kagan 2001). Nevertheless, he can strongly influence 
the agency’s “ideal point” in the enforcement of public policy (Shipan 2004). After all, the 
design of federal agencies gives the president extensive control (Howell and Lewis 2002).  
Because federal agencies administer the bulk of programs, which are intertwined with state and 
local agencies (Lowry and Potoski 2004), presidential influence may have far-reaching 
ramifications.  
 Second, through his budgetary powers, he may allocate more funds to those federal 
programs that advance his policy priorities and defund those that run counter to his goals. 
Studies on the distribution of federal grants have found that the president directs more funds 
to districts and counties represented by members of his political party (Berry, Burden, and 
Howell 2010). This distribution of federal funds to particular geographical areas do not go 
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unnoticed by constituents who reward the president with their votes (Kriner and Reeves 2012). 
Finally, the results of a study on the connection between political parties and voter turnout on 
funding allocation found that districts with a high Democratic voter turnout receive more 
federal funds (Levitt and Snyder 1995).  
Through the allocation of federal funds, the president can influence local and state LEA 
officers’ discretion in the enforcement of immigration policy. In particular, two streams of 
federal funds, which pertain to immigration policy enforcement and flow to local and state law 
enforcement agencies, can either constrain or expand enforcement activities.  First, the State 
Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) The SCAAP—administered by the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA) with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)—reimburses states and local LEAs a portion of expenses incurred in the 
incarceration of undocumented immigrants who have been convicted of a felony or two 
misdemeanors (U.S. Department of Justice 2016a). Reimbursements are not automatic; rather, 
LEAs have to apply and provide supporting evidence that they, indeed, incarcerated 
undocumented immigrants. Up to 2013, the BJA continued reimbursing LEAs even when the 
DHS could not determine the legal status of the inmate—called the “Unknown.” In Fiscal Year 
2010, reimbursements for the “Unknown” immigrant category amounted to 58 percent of 
program funds (Morse 2013).  
The significance of these funding sources is that depending on the amount allocated to 
the various state and local law enforcement agencies the number of arrests and removals may 
increase or decrease. A study on the adoption of state-level environmental policies that deal 
with hazardous waste sites found that states that received higher levels of funding from the 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were more likely to adopt stricter regulations than 
states that received lower levels of funding (Daley and Garand 2005). Although the federal 
agency, EPA, may have a level of autonomy when it comes to allocating funds, it is ultimately 
responsive to the policy preferences of the president that directly oversees its activities.  
 Another source of funds to local and state LEAs is the Intergovernmental Service 
Agreements (IGSA), administered by the BJA, DOJ and DHS. These agreements provide a quick 
way for ICE to add bed space at city and county jails for a mutually agreed fee. ICE has signed 
these agreements with over 200 city and county LEAs in more than 40 states, where 
approximately 70 percent of the detained population is housed (Pew 2014). Some LEAs 
acknowledge that such agreements generate revenues, create jobs, and keep the local 
economy solvent. For instance, the town of Florence in Pinal County, Arizona has benefited 
greatly from housing undocumented immigrants, with over 40 percent of its funds proceeding 
from federal contracts to house immigrants (Kirkham 2012). It is noteworthy that in Pinal 
County the Latino population dropped 2.73 percent from 1990 to 2010. Another participant in 
the 287(g) Program is the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office in Oklahoma. The County Sheriff and ICE 
signed an agreement to house 190 ICE detainees at the local jail. When those numbers drop, 
the Sheriff requests to ICE to bring in more detainees so that revenues remain stable. While the 
Sheriff could arrest local undocumented immigrants to fill its jail, he is constrained by the 
Obama administration’s changing criteria as to who is removable. The result has been the 
release of some recent arrestees (Canfield 2015), and made the arrest of undocumented 
immigrants less appealing and less profitable. 
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  Two additional federal programs administered by the BJA provide support to state and 
local law enforcement agencies in a number of programs. These are the Justice Assistance 
Grant (JAG) and Technology Innovation for Public Safety (TIPS). Although these two programs 
are not directly related to immigration policy enforcement, they are the main provider of 
federal criminal justice funding to state and local LEAs. While the JAG supports programs 
tackling issues of drug crime, prosecution and court related matters, crime victim and witness 
initiatives, and technology improvement, the TIPS funds assist local and states enforcement 
agencies to improve information sharing and multi-agency cooperation (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2016b).  
Considering that the DOJ administers these funds, one can infer that different 
presidential administrations may set priorities for distribution and direct the federal agency to 
disburse them accordingly. Those priorities would reflect the policy preferences of the political 
party controlling the executive branch of government. It means that when presidents prefer 
rigorous enforcement of a particular policy, they may allocate more funds to the agencies 
charged with their enforcement. Similarly, when presidents favor lax enforcement because too 
many regulations interfere with the market, then they may allocate fewer funds to the agency. 
The significance of these two sources of federal funds in the enforcement of immigration policy 
lies in the prospect of generating revenues to LEAs. Financially strapped cities, counties, and 
states may view incarcerating undocumented immigrants as a lifeboat to solvency. Thus, more 
funding to local agencies may incentivize local and state LEAs to increase the number of arrests 
of undocumented immigrants. From the above discussion, the following hypothesis develops: 
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H1. President Partisan Identification. Local law enforcement agencies will increase 
(decrease) the number of arrests (removals) when the president is Republican 
(Democratic).  
 
State Governor and Discretion 
State governors possess significant power over their states’ affairs. Those powers make them 
influential in the legislative process, budget allocation, and in the appointment of leaders to 
state agencies, among others (Karch 2007).  First, in the area of legislation, state governors may 
exert influence by setting the tone over immigration policy. In particular, they may express 
support for immigration policy reform that deny (or provide) a path to citizenship for 
undocumented immigrants. Moreover, they may express support for or may lead the efforts to 
adopt state-level immigration policies that either restrict or accommodate immigrants in 
general. Additionally, they may criticize the federal government either for lax enforcement that 
burdens the state finances or for aggressive enforcement that breaks families apart. 
 Second, because the governor has the power to set the state’s budget, she can decide 
where to allocate funds. Given that the federal government only provides partial 
reimbursement for state and local LEA participation in the 287(g) Program, the states, often 
times, assume a portion of the expenses associated with running the program. Little research 
has been done on the cost of implementing the program, however, a handful of studies have 
estimated those costs. For example, a study on the costs for the first year of operation in two 
counties in North Carolina, Mecklenburg and Alamance, found their total cost to be 
approximately $5.3 and $4.8 million, respectively (Nguyen and Gill 2010). In the same vein, 
when Gaston County, also in North Carolina, entered into an agreement with ICE, it had to open 
three new positions to handle the additional work, at a steep cost to the county (Caldwell 
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2009). Similarly, an estimate of the cost of implementing the 287(g) Program in Virginia yielded 
comparable results. In October 2007, the Virginia Sheriff’s Association—preparing for possible 
statewide participation in the 287(g) Program—recommended opening new positions to staff 
small and mid-size jails at a cost of $7.5 million. Moreover, it recommended an immigration 
training component for all law enforcement officers working in the jails at an annual cost of 
half-a-million dollars (McCabe 2007).  And in Arizona, the Maricopa County accrued a deficit of 
$1.3 million during the first three months of the 287(g) Program (Shahani 2009). Given this high 
cost, the state governor may decide the amount of funding to be allocated for the program or 
whether participation in the program is in the best interest of the state.  
LEAs can also benefit financially by arresting and detaining undocumented immigrants, 
as the Federal Government reimburses state and local LEAs for holding detainees through an 
Inter-Governmental Service Agreement (IGSA). For instance, under this agreement, ICE 
reimburses the Sheriff’s Office of Frederick County, Maryland $83 per day per detainee, while 
the actual cost of housing and feeding the detainee is $7; the difference is a net profit 
(Examining 287 (G), 2009). Alamance County, North Carolina, in anticipation of signing an MOA 
with ICE, expanded its county jail by adding 240 bed spaces at a cost of $12.2 million (Nguyen 
and Gill 2010). The expansion of the jail was built to federal standards, which meant that the 
county could be reimbursed for the costs of detaining and housing undocumented immigrants 
while awaiting transfer to federal detention centers. The expansion, while costly to the county, 
generated revenues. In September 2012, ICE revoked the 287(g) MOA with Alamance County 
after a two-year investigation into allegations of discrimination against Latinos. Consequently, 
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the daily average number of federal detainees dropped from 100 to 75, reducing revenues 
(Lavender 2014). 
Third, because the governor has the authority to appoint leaders to state agencies, she 
is more likely to appoint those with whom she has an ideological affinity. Thus, by appointing 
the Secretary of the Department of Corrections—a signatory of MOAs representing state 
LEAs—the governor ensures that her policy preferences will be carried out. Although the 
governor, in most instances, does not appoint the county sheriff or the city chief of police, who 
are the signatories of MOAs for local LEAs, she has the authority to appoint these officials to 
prestigious positions such as the Board of State and Community Corrections or to lead the 
Department of Public Safety, ensuring that appointees will advance her preferred policies.  
 At the community level, the city chief of police and the county sheriff have the power to 
appoint as well. For instance, they can appoint law enforcement officers to a higher position or 
to prestigious assignments such as training under ICE to function as ICE agents. Again, these 
two local-level political actors are more likely to assign officers who can fulfill their policy 
enforcement expectations. In that way, LEA deputized officers’ discretion in the arrest and 
removal of undocumented immigrants is influenced by the policy preferences of those who 
appoint them to function as immigration officers. Moreover, the county sheriff and city chief of 
police may aspire to higher office (e.g., Director of Department of Public Safety) or to serve on 
boards (e.g., Department of Law Enforcement). Thus, a good relationship with the state 
governor may be crucial for them to achieve their career goals. It could also be the case that 
they may want to run for state governor or for a congressional seat, thus they may want to be 
seen as tough on crime on the issue of undocumented immigration in their respective 
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jurisdictions. Thus, the influence of local, regional, or state leaders can either facilitate a 
process of immigrant integration to society or facilitate, even encourage, a process of arrests 
and removals (Pastor and Mollenkopf 2012).  
The state governor not only influences others because of her many powers, but also her 
partisan affiliation signals policy implementation preferences. The political rhetoric of national, 
state, and local-level political actors further signals a particular policy enforcement preference 
on how and when immigration policy should be enforced. A close scrutiny of public policy 
implementation gives a glimpse of the effect of partisanship at the ground level.  
Prior studies demonstrate that partisanship influences policy enforcement and 
policymaking. For instance, a study on the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) field 
enforcement found that street-level bureaucrats may be responding to “local politics.” More 
specifically, there were more enforcement actions and more costly penalties in liberal states 
than in conservative ones (Huber 2007, 98), thus confirming the findings of earlier studies—
namely that partisanship and elected officials at the local, state, and federal level influence 
OSHA inspectors in their enforcement activities (Scholz et al., 1991; Scholz 1986). Similarly, a 
study on the implementation of the Social Security Disability program found that street-level 
bureaucrats granted more disability claims when the Democratic Party controls the legislature 
(Keiser 1999). 
Studies on policymaking further confirm the partisan effect. Studies on immigration 
policies at the local level found that the likelihood of proposing and adopting restrictive policies 
was higher in predominant Republican areas than in Democratic ones (Gulasekaram and 
Ramakrishnan 2012; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010), and Republicans are more likely to 
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approach the issue of immigration in a conservative manner (Tichenor 2002; Tolbert and Hero 
1996). Wong (2012), in his study of the 287(g) Program, found evidence that Republican-
majority counties opted to participate in the program. However, Monogan (2013), in his study 
of state-level adoption of immigration policies, did not find an institutional partisan effect. 
From the above discussion, the following hypothesis emerges: 
 
H2.  State Governor Influence. Number of arrests and removals are more likely to be 
higher (lower) when the state governor’s partisan affiliation is Republican (Democrat). 
 
 
Governor-President Partisan Alignment 
A strong relationship between the state governor and the president can be mutually beneficial.  
This relationship is further strengthened when they share a political ideology. Because of their 
shared partisan affiliation, they trust each other, have common views on the role of 
government, and the direction that public policies should take to build the ideal society. To that 
end, they work within the political institutions at the national and state level to support each 
other and grow their political party.  
The benefits that the president and state governor draw from this symbiotic relationship 
are many. Among them is support for career advancement and funding allocation. This strong 
relationship between the president and the state governor. First, governors, like most political 
actors, may aspire to higher office. They may want to run for a congressional seat, be appointed 
to lead a federal agency, and even run for president. In these three areas, the president can 
provide valuable support. Running a presidential campaign is challenging, and governors have 
to perform many tasks. For instance, they have to fundraise, cultivate donors, and give 
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speeches. In running a presidential campaign, the president may be instrumental. Specifically, 
he can use his high-profile position to fundraise, visit the state, give speeches, and endorse the 
governor.  
Second, the president has the power to set the federal budget. As overseer of the 
federal agencies, he can direct funds to states where the governor is of the same political party 
and to programs that reflect his policy preferences. A study on the federal budget allocation 
found that states whose governors share a partisan ideology with the president receive more 
federal funds (Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 2006). Given that approximately twenty-five percent 
of the state budget comes from the federal government (Nugent 2012), the president and 
governor can exert a lot of power over LEAs, all the way down to the street-level bureaucrat. 
Those funds arrive to the state government in the form of block, categorical, or program grants. 
Then, state agencies distribute them to localities. It is at this juncture that decisions are made 
as to which programs to support. More funds arriving at the state department of corrections, 
county sheriff’s offices, and at city police agencies may mean the expansion or narrowing of 
programs. Because participation in the 287(g) Program is costly—running in the millions 
annually—the allocation of funds may determine whether a LEA participates or not and its level 
of enforcement activities.  
An indirect way that the president can influence state and local bureaucratic discretion 
is through federal waivers. These waivers provide states with the flexibility needed to adjust 
federal law to meet states’ needs. In addition, once a waiver is approved, it provides flexibility 
to reallocate federal funds as the governor may consider necessary. In other words, the 
governor has the discretion to allocate more funds to projects that meet her and the 
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president’s policy preferences. To obtain these waivers, state governors file a request with the 
federal agency. In addition, governors, either individually or as part of the National Governors’ 
Association (NGA), may lobby the president to direct the federal agency to streamline the 
process. This was the case in 1993 when the NGA pressured Bill Clinton to direct the 
Department of Health and Human Services to facilitate the process of approving those waivers 
(Nugent 2012). Even when waivers are denied, it signals the state’s policy preferences on the 
issues at hand. For instance, in 2012, the Kansas Secretary of Agriculture requested a federal 
waiver that would allow farmers to hire undocumented immigrants to work in the fields (Hanna 
2012). This action signaled to local and state LEAs the state government’s increased tolerance 
of undocumented immigrants. 
A shared political ideology serves as an impetus for the president and state governors to 
endorse one another’s policy preferences, and use of executive powers. In a similar vein, 
Nugent (2012) argues that waivers are a safeguard to federalism because states are allowed to 
adjust federal policy to meet states’ needs. Nonetheless, in the hands of presidents and 
governors, a waiver can be a tool that shapes federal law, reflecting particular partisan values.  
The underlying assumption is that Republicans favor law and order and playing by the 
rules. In the 2016 Republican platform, the party’s view on law and order is noted. For instance, 
it underscores the importance of “Justice for All,” and to achieve it, a stellar law enforcement is 
needed to serve as role model of “constructive conduct and ethical standards” to keep 
communities safe from predators. In addition, it compares its stance on law and order with that 
of liberals (a group associated with the Democratic Party). In particular, it stresses that “Liberals 
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do not understand this simple axiom: criminals behind bars cannot harm the general public” 
(Republican Platform 2016).  
Additionally, looking toward the near future, the 2016 Republican Platform emphasizes 
two key points: 1) a Republican Administration and Congress “will partner with local 
governments through cooperative enforcement agreements in Section 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act to make communities safer,” and 2) “State efforts to reduce 
illegal immigration must be encouraged….The pending Department of Justice lawsuits against 
Arizona, Alabama, South Carolina, and Utah must be dismissed.” Given that much of the 
rhetoric about crime is aimed at undocumented immigrants and their disrespect for the law by 
crossing the border without authorization or by overstaying their visas, it stands to reason that 
Republicans would prefer to see more arrests and more removals.  
Democrats, on the other hand, present a diametrically opposite stance on the issue of 
immigration and policy enforcement. Specifically, the 2012 Democratic Platform asserts the 
following: 
 
Department of Homeland Security is prioritizing the deportation of criminals 
who endanger communities over the deportation of immigrants who do not pose a 
threat, such as children who came here through no fault of their own and are pursuing 
an education....the Obama’s administration has streamlined the process of legal 
immigration for immediate relatives of U.S. Citizens, supporting family reunification as a 
priority....and immigrant integration. When states sought to interfere with federal 
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immigration law by passing local measures targeting immigrants, this administration 
challenged them in court (Democratic National Platform 2012).  
  
From the above quote, one can easily discern that Democrats prefer a balanced 
enforcement of immigration policy, meaning that they are willing to extend opportunities to 
some immigrants so that they have a path to citizenship while deporting those that are a threat 
to communities and society. 
 
From the above discussion, the following hypothesis develops:  
H3.  Governor-President Partisan Alignment. When the state governor and the president 
belong to the same political party, it is likely that number of arrests and removals will 
increase (decrease) when both are Republicans (Democrats).  
 
 
Socio-Economic and Demographic Factors 
The issue of immigration policy is not only about partisan politics, but also about socio-
economic and demographic factors, including, as discussed below, the unemployment and 
crime rates and the percent change in the Latino population from 1990 to 2010. These issues 
are front and center in debates over immigration policy and undocumented immigration. 
Furthermore, many localities have identified the issues of unemployment, crime, and the influx 
of immigrants into their communities as key factors in their decision to participate in the 287(g) 
Program. Thus, for those reasons, they are part of the theoretical argument.  
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Unemployment  
The argument that immigrants compete for jobs and cause unemployment among native 
workers is probably as old as the history of immigration in the United States. At the turn of the 
20th century, the influx of immigrants arriving from Europe and their impact on the labor 
market and the native worker was of great concern (Hall 1906; Kellor 1915). The debate over 
the effect of both documented and undocumented immigrants on the unemployment rate of 
the native-born is contentious, divisive, and disputed. Yet, these arguments continue and the 
political rhetoric of some elected leaders fan the flames. 
During a congressional hearing on the issue of jobs and immigrants, Elton Galleghy, 
House Representative and Republican from California, remarked that documented workers are 
the “victims of the failed immigration policies.” Lamar Smith, Republican House Representative 
from Texas, echoed the sentiment by noting that during a recent worksite raid in Georgia, ICE 
found over 600 undocumented immigrants working there (Making Immigration Work for 
American Minorities 2011). Two years later, when talking about the issue of immigration 
reform, Lamar Smith stated that the bill would “cost Americans their jobs when they have to 
compete with millions of more [immigrants] for scarce jobs” (Nowrasteh 2013).  
Similarly, on the campaign trail, presidential candidate Donald Trump has criticized any 
proposal to reform immigration policy and warned Republicans that immigrants are “taking 
your jobs” (Blake 2014). Moreover, at a rally in Phoenix, Arizona, Trump stated that immigrants 
are “taking our jobs. They’re taking our manufacturing jobs. They’re taking our money. They’re 
killing us” (Politi 2015). Trump’s views on the issue of jobs closely follows public opinion. A 
public opinion survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 63 percent of 
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Republicans believe that immigrants burden the country by taking jobs from the native-born, 
while only 32 percent of Democrats hold the same belief (Goo 2015). 
 Contemporary debates on undocumented immigration highlight unemployment as one 
reason why the government should take action, even more so during economic downturns 
(Berg 2009). In stark contrast, there are those who argue that immigrants are not causing the 
unemployment rate to spike up (Winegarden and Khor 1991) or that they are displacing native 
workers (Card 1990). Peri’s (2013) study on labor market competition and poverty among the 
native-born, offers new insights to the debate. He found that, essentially, there is no effect of 
immigration on the poverty rate at the national level. At the local level, the effect is negligible. 
Because of the saliency of this issue in debates over immigration policy enforcement and policy 
reform, and because of the persistent belief that immigrants are pushing the native-born to the 
unemployment lines and into poverty, I expect this coefficient to be positive. From the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis emerges: 
 
H4.  Health of the Economy Hypothesis. As the county unemployment rate increases, the 
number of undocumented people arrested and removed increases.  
 
 
Property Crime  
 
A perennial and deeply rooted belief is that immigrants are more prone to commit crimes than 
the native-born—even when evidence points in the opposite direction (Rumbaut 2007; Nguyen 
and Gill 2010). Crimes committed by undocumented immigrants have sparked surges of 
restrictive immigration policies that seek to limit their daily lives and facilitate their removal. In 
fact, it was a crime committed by an undocumented immigrant that prompted a Republican 
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senator from Iowa to craft the 287(g) section of IIRIRA (Tsankov and Martin 2010), leading to 
the development of the 287(g) Program.  
 The issue of illegal immigration, immigrants, and crime tends to be conflated. Conflating 
these issues has lead the public and political leaders to make statements that cement and 
perpetuate the notion that immigrants lean towards criminal enterprise. A study on the 
citizens’ perception of immigrants delve into letters to editor to the Arizona Republic 
Newspaper (Costelloe 2008: 9) and found evidence of that perception in the following quotes: 
It seems to me that Mexico is at the root of a lot of the troubles we here in Arizona are 
having. Crime, drugs, possible terrorist activities.” (letter to the editor February 3rd, 
2005)  
 
…Mexicans did not attack us on 9/11, but they are doing it just as stealthily. Slipping 
across the border…committing heinous crimes, making bail (if they get caught) and 
leaving the country.” (letter to the editor April 5th , 2005)  
 
We need to stop illegal immigration now once and for all so we can…reduce crime and 
make American lives better overall. (letter to the editor January 7th , 2005) 
 
The perception of immigrants’ tendencies toward criminal behavior has a long history. 
California’s Proposition 187, which proposed a series of restrictive state-level immigration 
policies— unequivocally asserts that immigrants are the root cause of crimes in the state. The 
proposition’s opening lines noted the following: 
The People of California…have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by 
the presence of illegal aliens in this state. They have suffered and are suffering personal 
injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state 
(California Proposition 187 1994) 
  
Even President George W. Bush, in his state of the union address in 2006, brought up 
the issue of crime and immigrants when he said that “Illegal immigration puts pressure on 
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public schools and hospitals, it strains state and local budgets and brings crime to our 
communities” (Bush 2006). Former U.S. senator Fred Thompson from Tennessee and 
Republican presidential candidate—in a speech he gave at the Prescott Bush Awards Dinner in 
2007—proclaimed that “Twelve million illegal immigrants later, we are now living in a nation 
that is beset by people who are suicidal maniacs and want to kill countless innocent men, 
women and children around the world” (Sidoti 2007). More recently, another Republican 
presidential candidate, Donald Trump, when announcing his run for the presidency stated:  
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best….They're sending people 
that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're 
bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists (Bump 2015). 
 
Similarly, local political leaders, too, have been vocal about their views on immigrants 
and crime. In a show on National Public Radio, the chairman of the Prince William County, 
Virginia, Board of Supervisors said “…the reality is…that many of the people who enter this 
county illegally are criminals” (Martin 2008).  
Findings from studies on immigration, immigrants, and crime present a different 
perspective. A study of Mecklenburg County, which participates in the 287(g) Program, found 
no evidence that the growth of the immigrant population is associated with increasing crime 
rates. Moreover, the study found that of all the counties in North Carolina, Mecklenburg had 
the most dramatic real decrease in violent crimes since the 1990s, a time of high growth of the 
immigrant population (Nguyen and Gill 2010). Similarly, a study focusing on Miami, El Paso, and 
San Diego, found that, in general, immigration does not increase the crime rate (Lee, Martínez, 
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and Rosenfeld 2005). Despite this evidence, because of the persistence of this argument and 
because of its use in calls for more rigorous enforcement of immigration policy, I expect this 
coefficient to be positive.  
 
H5.  Public Safety Hypothesis. As the state violent crime rate increases, the number of 
undocumented people arrested and removed increases. 
 
 
Latino Population  
 
Since the 1990s, Latino immigrants have been driving the growth of the foreign-born 
population, and increasingly settling in the South and Midwest (Frey 2006; Kandel and 
Cromartie 2004; Lichter and Johnson 2009; Bohn 2009; Singer 2013). These two regions are 
home to the top nine states with the largest immigrant growth. The percent change in the 
immigrant population from 1990 to 2010 ranges from 287% in Alabama to 525% in North 
Carolina. At the county level, the growth has been more dramatic from -2.730 % in Pinal, 
Arizona to 1,780 % in Cabarrus, North Carolina.6  
  The reaction of many states and localities has been an increase in the adoption of 
restrictive policies and a call for stricter enforcement. From a total of 80 MOAs that ICE signed 
with state and local LEAs, 43 are in the South. That is, 54 % of immigration policy enforcement 
efforts through the 287(g) Program are in one of the regions of highest immigrant growth. 
Previous research on the federal program Secure Communities—a data-sharing immigration 
policy enforcement program—shows that ICE activated this program more rapidly in areas 
where a high proportion of the population is of Latino origin (Cox and Miles 2013). Because 
                                                          
6 Author’s calculations. 
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Latinos are the fastest growing population (Brown & Lopez 2013) and because they make up 8.9 
million (or 80%) of all undocumented immigrants (Nwosu et.al. 2014), I expect this coefficient 
to have a positive relationship with the number of arrests and removals. 
 
H6.  Rapid Demographic Shift Hypothesis. The number of people arrested and removed 
increases as the Latino population increases.    
 
 
Interactions  
Party Switch Hypotheses 
 Partisanship alone is just a collection of values or ideals that distinguish one political 
party from the other. Political parties may take positions on issues given their values and may 
respond in different ways, but in the presence of particular pressing social issues, the response 
or reaction may be heightened by a switch. How these partisan values are activated is the focus 
of this section.  More specific, I seek to discern the mediating effect of socio-economic-
demographic factors in activating partisan values and how the political parties respond to those 
factors. The theory assumes that the political parties uphold a set of core values. These values 
may be dormant or active but at a low level and what turns them on or off are socio-economic-
demographic issues, which act as a switch.  Furthermore, in this section, I spell out the Party 
Switch hypotheses, which are central to this study. Before proceeding, I first note that in the 
field of political science, the phrase ‘party switch’ refers to changing one’s political party 
affiliation. In the theory of policy enforcement I set forth in this chapter, party switch takes on a 
different meaning. It refers to societal issues that act as switch activating a set of core values of 
the political parties. To better illustrate the meaning of party switch, I turn to the field of 
genetics. The Human Genome Project provided a snapshot of the genetic makeup of humans. 
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Traditionally, it was believed that of all the genes that make up the human body only one 
percent served a function and the rest were considered ‘junk.’ All that changed when a second 
project provided a high definition picture of the human genome. The Encyclopedia of DNA 
Elements (ENCODE) Project, mapped out all the elements in the genome. A major finding of this 
project is that the 99 percent of DNA considered ‘junk’ is in fact a conglomerate of millions of 
gene switches. In simple terms, these switches are a powerhouse in that they turn other genes 
on and off. Thus, they activate the core one percent of genes to perform particular functions. In 
the same vein, I look at political parties as having a set of core values that are activated by 
conditions in the environment.  
 To understand the approach that political parties take on the issue of immigration policy 
enforcement, I use gene switches as an analogy. First, I posit that political parties’ core values 
are equivalent to the one percent of genes that determine specific characteristics in the human 
body. Thus, I assume that these core values might be law and order, integration, and economic 
stability, to name a few. Just as environmental conditions can alter the activity of gene switches 
so do social issues can activate the core values of the political parties. Because the issue of 
immigration is usually linked to rising crime and unemployment rates, and the influx of the 
foreign-born that might alter society’s cultural landscape, I argue that these same issues turn 
on or off the values of the political parties and trigger a reaction. Thus, the approach they take 
to the enforcement of immigration policy is dictated by the core values they uphold. For 
instance, the core value of law and order may prompt an approach that encourages an increase 
in both the arrest and removal of undocumented immigrants; the core value of integration may 
lead political parties to seek ways to facilitate the incorporation of immigrants to society.  
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Partisanship not only determines the crafting of public policy, but also policy 
preferences along with their implementation and enforcement. When elected political leaders 
approach the issue of immigration policy reform or enforcement, they may consider those 
indicators that contribute to the quality of life of the communities they represent. Because both 
the unemployment and the crime rate are among the top indicators, and because immigrants—
whether documented or undocumented—are usually associated with a decline in the quality of 
life, local, state, and national elected political leaders would square those factors with their 
partisan values, which will guide their approach to immigration policy enforcement. Moreover, I 
argue that both the unemployment and crime rate and the rapid growth of the Latino 
population activate the core values of the political parties and either amplify or attenuate the 
effect of partisanship on the enforcement of immigration policy. Both Republicans and 
Democrats want to enforce immigration policy. They want to protect the jobs of U.S. workers, 
protect communities, and deport those that break the law. The difference between the two 
parties is the rigor with which they enforce the law and the values that drive them. These 
differences are evident in the party platforms (discussed above). From the above discussion, 
three Party Switch hypotheses develop 
 
H7. Governor Partisan Ideology and Economic Health. The effect of a Republican 
governor on the number of arrests and removals increases with the unemployment rate 
while the effect of a Democratic governor either decreases or remains the same.  
  
H8. Governor Partisan Ideology and Public Safety. The effect of a Republican governor 
on the number of arrests and removals increases with the state violent crime rate while 
the effect of a Democratic governor either decreases or remains the same.  
 
H9. Governor Partisan Ideology and Rapid Demographic Growth. The effect of a 
Republican governor on the number of arrests and removals increases with the growth 
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of the Latino population while the effect of a Democratic governor either decreases or 
remains the same.  
 
 
Data 
Since 2002, eighty cities, counties, and state LEAs have entered into a joint MOA with the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Through a series of Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests, I obtained data from ICE on calendar-year arrests and removals for 72 LEAs, 
spanning from 2005 to 2012. For this study, the pertinent data provide the number of 
undocumented people arrested by each participating LEA, and the number of people removed. 
The data contain more detailed information. They include a count of undocumented people 
with whom LEA officers came in contact and criminal offense categories. Specifically, the data 
include removal priorities, reflecting priorities for removal as set forth in the MOAs. Beyond 
those priorities, the data include a number of categories, including: “Traffic-DUI,” “Traffic-
Other,” “No Data,” and “None.” 
The data consist of a combination of LEAs from 12 states, 13 city police agencies, and 47 
county sheriffs’ offices (See Figure 3.1). Because seventy-five percent of MOAs were signed 
with either city or county LEAs, and because these agencies are in closer contact with 
communities where undocumented immigrants reside, then the county is the most appropriate 
unit of analysis. To streamline the data, I drop all arrests and removals actions linked to state 
agencies (See Figure 3.2 and 3.3 for a list of participating state agencies).7 Thus, the data only 
                                                          
7 Eliminating the enforcement actions of state agencies is important because the unit of analysis is the county. 
Moreover, the data for the unemployment rate and the percent change of Latino population are at the county 
level. And keeping the state agencies in the dataset complicates the analysis because I will have to use state-level 
data for those observations.   
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include city and county LEAs. To restructure the data, I combine the enforcement actions of city 
LEAs with those of the counties. More specifically, I identify the counties to where these cities 
belong and add those counties to the dataset. If a city belongs to a county already in the 
dataset, I add the enforcement actions of city LEAs to those of the county. For instance, the City 
of Mesquite and the City of Phoenix are within Maricopa County and because the latter is 
already in the dataset, I combine the enforcement actions of those three LEAs.  
Using publicly available data, I collect information from a wide range of sources. 
Specifically, the county unemployment rate was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.8 I 
use the year-average for each year in the dataset. The state violent crime rate data were 
obtained from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).9 The crime rate is defined as the number of crime events divided by the population size, 
often reported as crimes per 100,000 persons. County-level data to calculate the growth of the 
Latino population from 1990 to 2010 was obtained from the 1990 and 2010 Decennial Census 
from the U.S. Census Bureau.10 Finally, to assemble the dataset, I merged the data from the 
updated ICE reports on the number of arrests and removals with data on political, 
demographic, and socio-economic factors. The result is a dataset made up of 54 counties and a 
total of 432 observations spanning from 2005 to 2012. 
                                                          
8 Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Local Area Unemployment Statistics Map. 
http://data.bls.gov/map/MapToolServlet?survey=la&map=county&seasonal=u 
 
9 Data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The data used to explain the local-level dependent 
variables are at the state level. Crime Statistics. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/crimestats 
10 Social Explorer Dataset (SE), Census 1990, 2000, 2010, Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau 
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I also control for partisan control of the state legislature. Studies, such as Wood (1992)  
have found that state legislature influence the actions of state agencies. I measure it by the 
Percent of seats controlled by the Republican Party. 
 
Dependent Variables  
From the dataset, I identify two dependent variables: arrests and removals. They represent the 
number of undocumented people who were arrested and removed within each county. From 
2006 to 2012, there were 256,330 arrests and 177,251 removals of undocumented people. In 
sheer numbers, the data show large variation across the counties. For instance, while in North 
Carolina, the Sheriffs’ Offices for Guilford and Mecklenburg Counties report 9 and 12,281 
arrests, respectively, in Arizona, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office reports 42,873 arrests. 
There is substantial variation in the number of arrests originating from each county. For 
instance, while the mean number of arrests for the years under study for all of the counties in 
the dataset is 763.07 (s.d. = 1555.52), the Guilford County had far fewer arrests on average 
(mean = 1.50, s.d. = 3.20) and the Maricopa County had far more arrests (mean = 6124.71, s.d. 
= 5172.34). The data on removals present a similar picture. The mean number of removals 
across all participating county LEAs in the dataset is 557.86 (s.d. = 1238.55), the Guilford County 
had fewer removals (mean = 1.00, s.d. = 2) and Los Angeles County had far more removals 
(mean = 2431.28, s.d. = 1077.47).  
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Independent Variables 
To test the political environment hypotheses, I include several explanatory variables. First, to 
capture the partisan identification of the president, I include a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 when the president is Republican and 0 and when is Democratic. It tests the 
President Partisan Identification hypothesis (H1). This variable is used only to run the statistical 
analyses presented in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. This is so, because I later split the dataset in two. 
One dataset encompasses the years when the president is Republican (i.e., 2005-2008) and 
when the president is Democratic (i.e., 2009-2012). By splitting the data, I am able to observe 
the effect of both the political and social factors on the number of arrests and removals under 
different presidential regimes. Second, to capture the state governor’s partisan affiliation, I rely 
on data from the National Governors Association.11 The data include partisan identification, 
beginning and ending dates of each term, and number of terms in office. Republican Governor 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the governor is Republican, and 0 
otherwise. I expect this variable to have a positive relationship with each dependent variable. In 
addition, this variable will be used in the two datasets covering the second term of the Bush 
and the first term of the Obama Administration. It will test the State Governor Influence 
hypothesis (H2). The Republican Governor variable is also used to test the Governor-President 
Partisan Alignment hypothesis (H3), which I present in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. I expect the 
effect of the coefficient of the interaction to be positive. 
A second set of variables is included in the analyses to test the socio-economic-
demographic (SED), which are captured by both the Unemployment and state Property Crime 
                                                          
11 Data available at http://www.nga.org/cms/FormerGovBios 
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rate and the growth of the Latino Population from 1990 to 2010. These data are also used to 
test the Party Switch Hypotheses—a set of three hypotheses focusing on socio-economic-
demographic issues and their relationship with the state governor partisan affiliation. 
First, to test the Health of the Economy hypothesis (H4), I include the average, annual-
county Unemployment rate figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.12 I expect this 
relationship to be positively correlated with the number of arrests and removals. The state 
Property Crime—burglary, motor vehicle theft, and property theft—is the second variable I 
introduce in the analysis, capturing the social conditions in th state. The crime rate is defined as 
the number of crime events divided by the population size, often reported as crimes per 
100,000. The data were obtained from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) compiled by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).13 With the state Property Crime variable, I test the Public 
Safety hypothesis (H5), and expect a positive relationship between Property Crime rate and 
number of Arrests and Removals.14  
Third, Latino Population variable is constructed with data obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.15 It tests the Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H6), which posits that as the Latino 
                                                          
12 Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Local Area Unemployment Statistics Map. 
http://data.bls.gov/map/MapToolServlet?survey=la&map=county&seasonal=u 
 
13 Data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime Statistics. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/crimestats 
14 Ideally, I would use county-level violent crime rate data; unfortunately, the FBI’s county-level violent crime data 
are incomplete. Thus, it is difficult to compile violent crime rates for all the counties in the dataset. It is worth 
noting that the FBI provides data that the states report. Given that the FBI reports do not consistently provide data 
for all or the same counties reported in previous years, the use of the data may lead to erroneous findings. For this 
reason, some scholars advise against their use (Maltz and Targonski 2002).  Nonetheless, these data are widely 
used in scientific research. 
15 Social Explorer Dataset (SE), Census 1990, 2000, 2010, Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau 
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population grows, the number of Arrests and Removals increases. I expect this variable to have 
a positive coefficient under both presidential administrations.  
 I test the set of Party Switch hypotheses by interacting partisanship of the governor and 
each of the SED factors. First, I interact Republican Governor with Unemployment to test the 
Governor Partisanship and Economic Health hypothesis (H7). Second, the interaction between 
Republican Governor and Property Crime tests the Governor Partisanship and Public Safety 
hypothesis (H8). Third, the interaction between Republican Governor and Latino Population 
tests the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9). I expect the 
coefficient of these three interactions to be positive.  
 Table 3.1 presents a list of all the hypotheses just presented, the variables used to test 
them, their expected coefficients, and, in the last column, I note whether the analyses support 
the predictions.  
 
Method 
The goal of this study is to explicate why arrests and removals are higher in some counties and 
not in others. The dependent variables, arrests and removals are a count of undocumented 
people who were arrested and removed from each participating county annually. Because 
these variables are a count of the number of people arrested and removed from the country, 
count models such as the Poisson and negative binomial are appropriate. One stringent 
assumption of the Poisson model is that the variance is equal to the mean of the data. The 
negative binomial, on the other hand, relaxes that assumption.  
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To determine the best model to use, I turn to the data. First, the descriptive statistics of 
the data for all the variables are listed in Table3.2. Of special interest are the dependent 
variables, which show that for both arrests and removals the variance is greater than the mean, 
violating the Poisson distribution assumption. A visual examination of the data further confirms 
the non-normal distribution. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show a high number of zero arrests and 
removals, respectively, causing the distribution to be right-skewed. Specifically, the data show 
that in 2007 several counties reported zero arrests and removals while the four participating 
counties in California (i.e., Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange) reported 12,133 
arrests and 8,949 removals. The clustering of zeros on one end of the spectrum and the few 
larger counts on the other side causes the distribution of the data to be skewed and for the 
mean to be higher than the variance. 
 Second, following the suggestions of Cameron and Trivedi (2010), I estimate both a 
Poisson and a negative binomial models to compare their results. To obtain the estimates for 
arrests and removals, I use the full model (Model 3), which incorporates both partisan, socio-
economic, and demographic variables, using a dataset encompassing all the years under study. 
Starting with the Poisson, I run an auxiliary regression to test whether the coefficient of the 
mean of the outcome variables (µ�) is equal to zero. The result for both arrests (µ�  = 3.01) and 
removals (µ�  = 3.62) exceeds zero. Next, the negative binomial deals with overdispersed data by 
adding an overdispersion parameter (α)—a measure of the variance of heterogeneity (Hilbe 
2011). The estimation results show that this parameter exceeds zero for both arrests (α = 3.63) 
and removals (α = 3.69). That the coefficients of both µ�  and α exceed zero is indicative that the 
data are overdispersed.  
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The Likelihood-Ratio test (LR) is the third test of overdispersion. This test is part of the 
estimation results of the negative binomial regression. It tests the null hypothesis that the 
overdispersion parameter is equal to zero (𝐻𝐻0: α = 0). The values of the LR statistic for arrests 
(𝑋𝑋�2 = 4.7𝑒𝑒 + 05) and removals (𝑋𝑋�2 = 3.5𝑒𝑒 + 05)  allow me to reject the null hypothesis of no 
dispersion. This result indicates that the negative binomial is a better fit for the overdispersed 
data. In a fourth and final test, I use the user-written countfit Stata command (Long and Freese 
2006) to compare the Poisson and negative binomial models using Akaike’s information 
criterion (AIC) and Bayes’ information criterion (BIC). The results indicate that the negative 
binomial is the best model given the overdispersed data on arrests and removals.  
Selecting the right model is important as the presence of overdispersion may lead to 
underestimate the standard errors, producing statistically significant predictors when, in fact, 
they are insignificant. Thus, I use the negative binomial to test all the hypotheses. Because of 
the importance of the standard errors in estimation tests, and because the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity—non-constant variance of the error term—I use robust standard errors, and 
to account for potential autocorrelation, I cluster the data by county.  
 
Results 
In this section, I present in four tables the results of twenty negative binomial regressions. 
More specifically, I specify four models to explore the factors that determine the number of 
arrests and removals across participating LEAs. I begin by using one dataset, spanning from 
2005 to 2012, to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, which I present in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. Then, I 
split the dataset in two—one encompasses the second term of the Bush administration while 
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the second encompasses the first term of the Obama administration—as previously discussed. I 
use these two datasets to test hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, which I present in Table 3.6 and 
Table 3.7.  
Because I specify four models, the structure of the tables vary slightly. Specifically, Table 
3.4 and Table 3.5 present the four model specifications—using the dependent variables Arrests 
and Removals, respectively—with columns one, two, five, and six displaying the results for the 
baseline models and columns three, four, seven, and eight displaying the results for the 
interaction models.  
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 present three model specifications using the dependent 
variables Arrests and Removals, respectively. Their structure is as follows: each table has two 
sections with a total of six columns; the first three columns of each section present the results 
of regressions using the Bush while the next three present results using the Obama 
administration dataset. More specifically, the first two columns in each section present results 
of baseline political and socio-economic-demographic (SED) models while the last column (of 
each section) presents results of the interaction models—political and SED factors.  
To present the results, I will proceed as follows. First, I will present the results of the 
various regressions (Tables 3.4 and 3.5) using the dataset that pools the number of arrests and 
removals from 2005 to 2012. Then, in the subsequent section, I will present the results 
obtained from the two datasets already described above. 
Before proceeding, I present in Table 3.3 a correlation matrix that illustrates the 
pairwise correlation between all the variables in the analyses. The Arrests and Removals 
variables are highly correlated and the Republican Governor and Percent Republican Legislature 
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variables are mildly correlated with each other. However, examining the results of the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), using the user-written diagnostics Stata command collin (Ender 2010), 
does not detect multicollinearity. The values range from -2.25e+15 to 4.39, and the mean value 
is -6.34e+14, which are all below the critical value of 10. One final note on the interpretation of 
coefficients. It is worth noting that because the negative binomial is a non-linear model, 
interpreting the coefficients requires an extra step. To that end, I exponentiate and standardize 
the coefficients using the Stata command listcoef.  
 
Arrests 
Table 3.4 presents the estimation results for Arrests, testing both the baseline and interaction 
models. In Models 1 and 2, I test the baseline models for political environment and socio-
economic-demographic (SED) variables and in Models 3 and 4, I test the interaction models. In 
Model 1, I test two hypotheses: the President Partisan Identification hypothesis (H1) and the 
State Governor Influence hypothesis (H2). Both hypotheses state that there will be more 
Arrests and Removals when the partisan affiliation of the president and the governor, 
independent of each other, is Republican and fewer when Democratic.  
The results in Model 1 do not support the President Partisan Identification hypothesis 
(H1). The Republican President variable is insignificant and negative, against prediction. On the 
other hand, the State Governor Influence hypothesis (H2) finds support. Specifically, the 
number of Arrests increases by a factor of 2.01 and the rate increases by 101%. The control 
variable, Percent Republican Legislature is insignificant and negative, against expectation. Of 
these three political factors, a Republican Governor is a strong predictor of the increase of the 
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number of undocumented immigrants arrested.  Why is there an increase in the number of 
arrests when the governor is Republican, but not when the president is? A possible explanation 
is that governors are better situated—given their proximity to LEA officers—to influence their 
enforcement actions. Additionally, state governors, in general, are closer to and accountable to 
the constituencies that elected them to office. Thus, if and when these constituencies voice 
concerns about the growing undocumented population, state governors may respond by 
instructing or supporting local LEAs immigration enforcement actions. Overall, the model 
demonstrates that when it comes to the arrest of undocumented immigrants, a Republican 
governor has more influencing power over the actions of state and local law enforcement 
agencies than a Republican president and a Republican legislature. 
In Model 2, I test the SED factors, in three hypotheses. Both the Health of the Economy 
hypothesis (H4)—captured by the Unemployment rate of the participating county—and the 
Public Safety hypothesis (H5)—captured by the Property Crime rate—obtain support. The 
Unemployment and Property Crime variables are significant and positive, as predicted. On the 
other hand, the Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H6)—measured by the Latino 
Population—does not attain support. Although the variable is significant, the sign is negative, 
against expectation. By closely examining the results, the nuances of the data emerge. First, for 
a unit change in the Unemployment rate, the rate of Arrests increases by 14%. Put differently, 
for a standard deviation increase (approximately 3 arrests), the expected number of Arrests 
increases by 43%. Second, continuing with the Property Crime rate variable, for every unit 
change, the rate of Arrests increases by 0.1%, and for a standard deviation increase 
(approximately 637 arrests) the number of Arrests increases by 85%. Third, the results show 
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that for one unit change in the Latino Population the rate of Arrests decreases by 0.1%. Put 
another way, for a standard deviation decrease (approximately 418 arrests), the number of 
Arrests decreases by 46% All in all, this model informs us that the increase in the number of 
Arrests has to do with both the Unemployment and Property Crime rates and not with the 
growth of the Latino population.  
Interactions 
Political Factors 
The next two models (i.e., 3 and 4), present statistical analyses of the interaction between 
political actors and SED factors. In Model 3, I test the Governor-President Partisan Alignment 
hypothesis (H3), which states that when both the governor and the president belong to the 
Republican Party, we should see more arrests. In this case I interact the variables Republican 
President with Republican Governor. The evidence supports the hypothesis, as the coefficient of 
the interaction is significant and positive. Of note, the Republican President attains statistical 
significance, but its sign remains negative, against expectation. On the other hand, the 
Republican Governor variable remains positive and significant, as predicted. This result indicates 
that when the governor and the president belong to the Republican Party, the number of 
Arrests increases. Additionally, it may mean that a Republican president may lend support to a 
Republican governor given that both have a similar point of view as it relates to the 
enforcement of immigration policy.  
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Party Switch Hypotheses 
 In Model 4, I test the set of Party Switch hypotheses—Governor Partisanship and Economic 
Health (H7), Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H8), and Governor Partisanship and Rapid 
Demographic Shift (H9)—by interacting their respective measures (i.e., Unemployment, 
Property Crime, and Latino Population) with the Republican Governor variable. Collectively, 
these hypotheses hold that SED factors amplify the effect of a Republican governor on Arrests 
and Removals, while they attenuate the effect of a Democratic governor. The results do not 
provide support to H7, H8, and H9, although the interaction coefficients are statistically 
significant, except the coefficient of the interaction for H9. Additionally, the results show that 
the SED factors have no amplifying effect on the Republican Governor variable, an unexpected 
finding.  
 In sum, the results of the various statistical analyses carried out in Table 3.4 consistently 
indicate that Republican Governor is associated with an increase in the number of 
undocumented immigrants arrested. Further, the SED factors have no amplifying effect on 
Republican Governor; on the contrary, they have an attenuating effect. The overall results may 
suggest that partisan politics drive the number of Arrests.  
Because of the difficulty of interpreting interaction coefficients, I graph the results. The 
next three graphs depict he interaction between Republican Governor and SED factors. Each 
interaction tests one of the Party Switch hypotheses, as presented in Model 4. In particular, I 
graph the interaction between Republican Governor and the Unemployment, which test the 
hypothesis Governor Partisanship and Economic Health (H7), in Model 4 (Figure 3.6). The 
marginal effect of a Republican Governor on the number of Arrests given the Unemployment 
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rate is positive, significant for all values, and decreases as the Unemployment rate increases. 
More specifically, when the Unemployment rate is 2.1, a Republican Governor results in 5 more Arrests 
and when it reaches its maximum value of 15.4, the number of Arrests drops to approximately 3.  
In Figure 3.7, I plot the interaction between the Republican Governor and Property Crime, which 
tests the Governor Partisanship and Public Safety hypothesis (H8). The marginal effect of a Republican 
Governor on the number of Arrests given the Property Crime rate is positive and significant for all values. 
In addition, a Republican Governor results in 3 more Arrests when crime is at its lowest value, and at the 
high end, the value is 0.  
In Figure 3.8, I graph the interaction between the Republican Governor and Latino Population, 
which tests the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9). The marginal effect 
of a Republican Governor on the number of Arrests given the Latino Population is positive, significant for 
lower values up to 1500 percent, and decreases as the values of the Latino Population increases. More 
specifically, a Republican governor results in approximately 6 more arrests, relative to a Democratic 
governor, when Latino population is at its lowest value (-2.73).  As Latino Population increases to its 
highest level (i.e., 1780), a Republican governor produces approximately 5 more arrests (i.e., the 
marginal effect of Republican governor is 5 when Latino Population = 1780); but this effect is not 
significant. 
 
Removals 
In Table 3.5, I test all the hypotheses using Removals as the dependent variable. Models 5 and 6 are 
baseline models for the political and SED factors, respectively. Starting with Model 5, the President 
Partisan Identification hypothesis (H1)—captured by the Republican President— does not receive 
support as its coefficient is insignificant although positive as expected. On the other hand, the State 
Governor Influence hypothesis (H2) finds support to its predictions; the Republican Governor variable is 
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positive and significant. The control variable Percent Republican Legislature is negative, against 
expectation, and insignificant. More specifically, the results show that the number of Arrests increases 
by a rate of 155% when the governor is Republican.  
The results of the SED hypotheses are presented in Model 6. The Health of the Economy (H4) 
and the Public Safety (H5) hypotheses find support in the model. The results show that one unit change 
in the Unemployment rate increases the rate of Removals by a factor of 1.13. Additionally, for a standard 
deviation (approximately 3 removals) increase in the same, the number of Removals increases by 38%. 
Similarly, results on the Property Crime show that the rate of Arrests increases by less than 1%. 
Equivalently, a standard deviation (roughly 628 removals) increase translates into a 112% increase in the 
number of Removals. Lastly, when examining the Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H6)—measured 
by the Latino Population—the data do not provide support to the prediction. Although the coefficient of 
the interaction is significant, the sign is negative. More importantly, the coefficient indicates that the 
rate of Removals decreases by less than 1%. In other words, a standard deviation (420 removals) 
decreases the number of Removals by 50%.  
The overall results in Model 5 and Model 6 point out to the positive effect of Republican 
Governor, Unemployment, and Property Crime on the number of immigrants removed. We should see 
that in states where the governor is Republican the number of Removals increases. In other words, ICE is 
focusing its enforcement activities in states where the governor is Republican. Also, the Unemployment 
and Property Crime drive up the number of Removals, while the growth of the Latino Population 
decreases them.  
 
Interactions 
Models 7 and 8 present the results of interaction models. In Model 7, I test the Governor-President 
Partisan Alignment hypothesis (H3), for which the data provide support. In this model, the main effect of 
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Republican President is negative—indicating a decrease in Removals—and insignificant; once interacted 
with the Republican Governor, the coefficient of the interaction is significant and positive, according to 
prediction. With this result, we can observe the strength of the Republican Governor variable. In other 
words, Republican governors—through a Republican president—may have a great deal of influence on 
ICE’s enforcement activities.   
In Model 8, I present the results of the Party Switch hypotheses. In this model, none of the three 
hypotheses—Governor Partisanship and Economic Health (H7), Governor Partisanship and Public Safety 
(H8), and Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift (H9)—measured by the SED factors: 
Unemployment, Property Crime, and Latino Population, respectively—obtain support, although the 
coefficient for the first two attains significance. The results do not provide support for any of the 
hypotheses, which hold that SED factors amplify the effect of a Republican Governor on Arrests and 
Removals, while they attenuate the effect of a Democratic governor. 
Largely, the results in Table 3.4 are roughly the same as those in Table 3.5. From these analyses, 
two main findings emerge: 1) states with Republican governors are associated with a higher number of 
undocumented immigrants arrested and removed; and 2) SED factors fail to amplify the Republican 
partisanship of the state governor. In fact, they attenuate the effect of a Republican Governor on the 
number of Arrests and Removals. In other words, the interaction of SED factors with a Republican 
Governor predicts fewer Arrests and Removals. 
To facilitate the interpretation of the interactions presented in Model 8, the next three figures 
depict he interaction between Republican Governor and SED factors. Each interaction tests one of the 
Party Switch hypotheses. Specifically, Figure 3.9 illustrates the interaction between Republican Governor 
and Unemployment, which test the hypothesis Governor Partisanship and Economic Health (H7). The 
marginal effect of a Republican Governor on the number of Removals given the Unemployment rate is 
both positive and significant for all values, and decreases as the Unemployment rate increases. More 
  
124 
 
specifically, when the Unemployment rate is 2.1 percent, a Republican Governor results in 5 more 
Removals and when it reaches its maximum value of 15.4 percent, the number of Removals is 3.  
Figure 3.10 depicts the interaction between Republican Governor and Property Crime, testing 
the Governor Partisanship and Public Safety hypothesis (H8). The marginal effect of a Republican 
Governor on the number of Removals given the Property Crime rate is positive, significant for all values 
and decreases as the Property Crime rate increases. More specifically, when the Property Crime rate is at 
1839 events, a Republican Governor results in 3 Removals and when it reaches its maximum value of 
4827 events, the marginal effect is negative and the number of Removals is 0; but this effect is not 
significant.  
Figure 3.11 illustrates the interaction between Republican Governor and Latino Population, 
which tests the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9). The marginal effect 
of a Republican Governor on the number of Removals given the Latino Population is positive, significant 
for lower values up to 1000 percent, and decreases as the values of the Latino Population increases. 
More specifically, a Republican governor results in approximately 5 more Removals, relative to a 
Democratic governor, when Latino population is at its lowest value (-2.73).  As Latino 
Population increases to its highest level (i.e., 1780), a Republican governor produces approximately 4 
fewer Removals (i.e., the marginal effect of Republican Governor is 4 when Latino Population = 1780); 
but this effect is not significant. 
 
Presidential Regimes 
As previously noted, I split the dataset in two. One dataset encompasses the years of the second term of 
the Bush administration while the second one includes the years of the first term of the Obama 
administration. By splitting the dataset, I am allowed to observe the effect that both political and socio-
economic-demographic factors have on immigration policy enforcement actions—Arrests and Removals. 
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Given that the two presidential regimes represent two different political parties—Republican and 
Democratic—then, I expect the effect of those factors to vary.  
The next two tables (Tables 3.6 and 3.7) present the results from statistical tests using two 
datasets. I start by presenting the results of Table 6 which uses Arrests as the dependent variable. In this 
table, the first three columns display results obtained using the dataset encompassing the second term 
of the Bush administration while the next three columns focus on the years spanning the first term of 
the Obama administration. Table 3.7 presents the results of statistical tests using Removals as the 
dependent variable and its structure mirrors that of Table 3.6.  
Arrests 
In Table 3.6, the State Governor Influence hypothesis (H2) finds support in both Model 9 and Model 
12—the political environment. The results show that the Republican Governor variable is significant and 
positive under both presidential regimes. It means that when the governor is Republican, the rate of 
Arrests increases by 342% during the Bush administration (Model 9), and by 103% during the Obama 
administration (Model 12). The results in both models meet the prediction—more Arrests under the 
Bush administration and fewer under the Obama. Although the number of Arrests increases under both 
presidential administrations, the rate at which they increase is lower under the Obama than under the 
Bush administration. The control variable Percent Republican Legislature does not attain significance in 
either Model 9 or Model 12. Additionally, its sign is positive in Model 9, during the Bush administration, 
as expected, while in Model 12, during the Obama administration, the sign is negative, against 
prediction.  
In Models 10 and 13, I test the SED hypotheses—the Health of the Economy (H4), the Public 
Safety (H5), and the Rapid Demographic Shift (H6)—measured by the Unemployment, the Property 
Crime, and the Latino Population, respectively. First, the Health of the Economy (H4) hypothesis obtains 
support in both Model 10 and Model 13. The Unemployment variable is positive and significant, as 
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predicted. More specifically, in Model 10, the number of Arrests increases by a factor of 1.48, or a rate 
of 48%. Additionally, one standard deviation increase in the Unemployment (approximately 1 
percentage point) increases the number of arrests by 72%. In contrast, in Model 13—during the Obama 
administration—the number of Arrests increases by a factor of 1.15 or a rate of 15%. Moreover, one 
standard deviation increase in the Unemployment (roughly 2.3 percentage points) increases the number 
of Arrests by 36%. The results indicate that the number of undocumented immigrants arrested is higher 
under the Bush than under the Obama administration. Specifically, by looking at the rate at which the 
Arrests occur, one can observe that the rate of Arrests during the Bush administration is twice the rate 
of Arrests under the Obama. The results are as expected: more Arrests under the Bush administration 
and fewer under the Obama.  
Next, the Public Safety (H5) hypothesis obtains support in both Model 10 and Model 13. 
Specifically, the Property Crime is positive and significant in both models, as predicted. Although the rate 
at which Arrests increases is the same (0.1%)—under both presidential administrations, the effect of the 
Property Crime differs when we move one standard deviation from the mean. In Model 10, an increase 
in one standard deviation in the Property Crime (approximately 693 events) increases the number of 
Arrests by 72%. On the other hand, in Model 13, one standard deviation in the Property Crime 
(approximately 581 events) increases the number of Arrests by 76%. The results indicate that, during the 
Obama administration, fewer Property Crime events increase the percentage of Arrests of 
undocumented immigrants, in comparison to the Bush administration.  
Finally, the Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H6) does not obtain support in Model 10, but it 
does in Model 13. In the former, the Latino Population variable is significant and negative, as expected, 
while in the latter, it is negative, against prediction, and significant. Additionally, a one standard 
deviation in the Latino Population (roughly 431 and 414 percentage points) decreases the number of 
Arrests by 51% in Model 10 and by 42% in Model 13. This is an interesting result in light of the fact that 
  
127 
 
the growth of the Latino population triggers fewer Arrests during the Bush administration than during 
the Obama.  
Overall, the results from both Model 10 and Model 13 indicate that during the Bush 
administration (in comparison to the Obama administration), the Unemployment has a stronger effect 
on the number of Arrests; the Property Crime has a slightly weaker effect; and the Latino Population, 
too, has a stronger effect on the number of Arrests.  
Interactions 
In Models 11 and 14, I test the Party Switch hypotheses—Governor Partisanship and Economic Health 
(H7), Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H8), and Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic 
Shift (H9)—measured by the SED factors: Unemployment, Property Crime, and Latino Population, 
respectively, along with the political factor: Republican Governor. First, in Model 11, the evidence does 
not provide support to H7. Specifically, the coefficient of the interaction between the Republican 
Governor and the Unemployment is insignificant and negative, against prediction. On the other hand, in 
Model 14, the coefficient is positive and significant, according to expectation, providing support to H7.   
Second, in Model 11, the coefficient of the interaction between Republican Governor and Property 
Crime, which tests H8, is significant and negative, against prediction, whereas in Model 14, the 
coefficient is also negative but insignificant. Third, in Model 11, the coefficient of the interaction 
between the Republican Governor and the Latino Population is significant and positive, as predicted, 
whereas in Model 14, the coefficient is negative, according to expectation, but insignificant. 
Overall, the results show that the Governor Partisanship and Economic Health (H7) hypothesis 
does not attain support in Model 11, but attains it in Model 14. The Governor Partisanship and Public 
Safety (H8) hypothesis does not attain support in any model, but it is significant in Model 11. Finally, the 
Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9) attains support in Model 11, but 
not in Model 14. Given the results, one can see that during the Bush administration, the Property Crime 
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does not predict an increase in the number of Arrests, on the contrary, it predicts fewer. And, the 
growth of the Latino Population is a strong predictor of an increased number of Arrests. On the other 
hand, during the Obama administration, only the Unemployment is a strong predictor of an increase in 
the number of Arrests.  
Because it is difficult to gauge the effect of the conditioning variable by just looking at the 
interaction coefficients, I plot the results. Specifically, I plot the interaction between Republican 
Governor (y-axis) and Unemployment (x-axis), which test the hypothesis Governor Partisanship and 
Economic Health (H7), in both Model 11 (Figure 3.12) and Model 14 (Figure 3.15).  
In Figure 3.12, the marginal effect of a Republican Governor is significant and positive and as the 
Unemployment rate increases, the effect decreases. Moreover, because the marginal effect exceeds 
zero, as indicated by the lower bound of the confidence interval (dashed lines), the effect is positive for 
all the values of the Unemployment. Substantively, the graph shows that in terms of enforcement 
actions, a Republican Governor results in 13 more Arrests, relative to a Democratic governor, when 
Unemployment is at its lowest value (2.1 percent). As the Unemployment increases to its highest level 
(8.6 percent), a Republican Governor produces approximately 12 Arrests. Additionally, because the 
marginal effect exceeds zero, as indicated by the lower bound of the confidence interval (dashed lines), 
the effect is positive for all the values of the Unemployment. In contrast, Figure 3.15 (Model 14) shows 
that the marginal effect of Republican Governor is significant and positive for all values of the 
Unemployment. Additionally, the effect of a Republican Governor increases as the Unemployment rate 
increases. Substantively, it means that a Republican Governor results in approximately between 6 and 7 
Arrests when the Unemployment is 4.6 percent. As the Unemployment increases to its highest level (15.4 
percent), a Republican Governor produces approximately between 8 and 9 Arrests.  
Next, I plot the results of the interaction between Republican Governor and Property Crime, 
which tests the hypothesis Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H7), in both Model 11 (Figure 3.13) 
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and Model 14 (Figure 3.16). In Figure 3.13 (Model 11), the marginal effect of a Republican Governor 
turns from positive to negative when the Property Crime reaches approximately 3700 events. Moreover, 
it is positive for lower values of the Property Crime up to 3357 events, which occur in approximately 64 
observations (30% of the data).  
To get a clearer picture of the significance of this relationship, I turn to the data. Of those 64 
observations, 24 (38%) represent counties in the East, 20 (31%) in the South, and 20 (31%) in the West 
and Southwest regions. In terms of enforcement actions, the figure shows that a Republican Governor, 
relative to a Democratic governor, results in 7 Arrests when the value of the Property Crime is roughly 
1800 events. As the Property Crime increases to its highest level (4500 events), a Republican Governor 
produces 3 fewer Arrests; but the effect is insignificant. The results indicate that the enforcement of 
immigration policy, and Arrests in particular, is not driven by high rates of the Property Crime.  
In Figure 3.16, I plot the results of the interaction between Republican Governor and Property 
Crime, which tests the hypothesis Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H7), in Model 14. The 
marginal effect of a Republican Governor on the number of Arrests is positive for all values of the 
Property Crime. Moreover, the effect decreases as the number of Property Crime events increases. 
Specifically, the figure shows that a Republican Governor, relative to a Democratic governor, results in 3 
more Arrests when the number of criminal events is roughly 2047, and when it reaches 3064 events, A 
Republican Governor results in 2 fewer Arrests. All in all, the result of this interaction indicate that the 
marginal effect of Republican Governor on Arrests given the Property Crime is stronger during the Bush 
than during the Obama administration.  
Figure 3.14 depicts the interaction between Republican Governor and Latino Population, which 
test the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9), in Model 11. The marginal 
effect of Republican Governor is significant and positive for all values of the Latino Population. 
Specifically, a Republican governor results in approximately 14 more Arrests, relative to a Democratic 
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governor, when Latino population is at its lowest value (-2.73).  As Latino Population increases to its 
highest level (i.e., 1780), a Republican governor produces approximately 21 more Arrests. 
  
In stark contrast, Figure 3.17 illustrates the interaction between Republican Governor with 
Latino Population, which tests the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9), 
in Model 14. The marginal effect of the Republican Governor is positive for all values of the Latino 
Population and decreases as the Latino Population grows. Specifically, a Republican governor results in 
approximately 6 more Arrests, relative to a Democratic governor, when Latino population is at its lowest 
value (-2.73).  As Latino Population increases to its highest level (i.e., 1780), a Republican governor 
produces approximately 5 fewer Arrests. 
Overall, the results do not comport according to the theoretical predictions, with the exception 
of the Latino Population, under both presidential administrations, and the Unemployment when Obama 
is president. These two factors provide support to two of the Party Switch hypotheses, and only under 
certain conditions—namely the partisan affiliation of the president. 
 
Removals 
In this section, I present results of statistical tests using Removals as the dependent variable in Table 3.7. 
In this table, the first three columns (Models 15, 16, and 17) cover the years of the second term of the 
Bush administration and the next three columns (Models 18, 19, and 20) span the years of the first term 
of the Obama administration.  
In Model 15 and Model 18, I test the State Governor Influence hypothesis (H2) that holds that 
the number of Removals are more likely to be higher when the governor is Republican and lower when 
the governor is Democratic. The results show that the Republican Governor variable is significant and 
positive under both models, meeting the prediction. More specifically, the results show that the effect 
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of a Republican Governor on the rate of Removals is greater when the president is Bush (324%) than 
when the president is Obama (59%). The control variable Percent Republican Legislature does not attain 
significance in either Model 15 or Model 18. Additionally, its sign is positive in Model 15, during the Bush 
administration, as expected; in Model 18, during the Obama administration, the sign is negative, against 
prediction. 
In Model 16 and Model 19, I test the SED hypotheses—the Health of the Economy (H4), the 
Public Safety (H5), and the Rapid Demographic Shift (H6) hypotheses—measured by the Unemployment, 
the Property Crime, and the Latino Population, respectively. First, the Health of the Economy (H4) 
hypothesis does not obtain support in Model 16, but it does in Model 19. The coefficient of the 
Unemployment variable is insignificant and negative, against prediction, in Model 16 while positive and 
significant in Model 19, according to expectation. More specifically, in Model 19, the number of 
Removals increases by a factor of 1.19, or a rate of 19%. Additionally, one standard deviation increase in 
the Unemployment (approximately 2 percentage points) increases the number of Removals by 47%.  
Next, the Public Safety (H5) hypothesis obtains support in both Model 16 and Model 19. 
Specifically, the Property Crime is positive and significant in both models, as predicted. Although the rate 
at which Removals increase under both presidential administrations is 0.1 percent, the effect of the 
Property Crime differs when we move one standard deviation from the mean. In Model 16, an increase 
in one standard deviation in the Property Crime (approximately 681 events) increases the number of 
Removals by 88%. On the other hand, in Model 19 one standard deviation in the Property Crime 
(approximately 581 events) increases the number of Removals by 91%. The results indicate that, during 
the Obama administration, fewer crime events increase the percentage of Removals of undocumented 
immigrants, in comparison to the Bush administration. 
Finally, the Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H6) obtains support in Model 19, but not in 
Model 16. In the former, the Latino Population variable is significant and negative, as expected, while in 
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the latter is negative, against prediction, and significant. Additionally, in Model 16 a one standard 
deviation in the Latino Population (roughly 440 percent) decreases the number of Removals by 54 
percent. In contrast, in Model 19 one standard deviation from the mean (approximately 414) decreases 
the number of Removals by 46 percent. This is an interesting result in light of the fact that the growth of 
the Latino population triggers fewer Removals during the Bush administration than during the Obama.  
Overall, the results from Model 16 and Model 19 show that during the Bush administration (in 
comparison to the Obama), the Unemployment has a stronger effect on the number of Removals, 
although it decreases as the Unemployment rate increases; the Property Crime has a slightly weaker 
effect; and the Latino Population, too, has a weaker effect on the number of Removals.  
Interactions 
In Models 17 and 20, I test the Party Switch hypotheses—Governor Partisanship and Economic 
Health (H7), Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H8), and Governor Partisanship and Rapid 
Demographic Shift (H9)—measured by the SED factors: Unemployment, Property Crime, and Latino 
Population, respectively. First, in Model 17, the coefficient of the interaction between the Republican 
Governor and the Unemployment, which test H7, is insignificant and negative, against prediction, 
whereas in Model 20, the coefficient is positive and significant, according to expectation. In other words, 
the data does not provide support to H7 in Model 17, but it does in Model 20.  
Second, in Model 17, the coefficient of the interaction between the Republican Governor and 
the Property Crime is significant and negative, against prediction, whereas in Model 20, although the 
coefficient is negative, as predicted, it is insignificant. The evidence does not provide support to H7 in 
Model 17, but it does in Model 20. Third, in Model 17, the coefficient of the interaction between the 
Republican Governor and the Latino Population is significant and positive, as predicted, whereas in 
Model 20, the coefficient is negative, according to expectation, but insignificant. 
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 Because interpreting the coefficient of the interactions poses challenges, I plot the results. 
Specifically, I plot the interaction between Republican Governor (y-axis) and Unemployment (x-axis), 
which test the hypothesis Governor Partisanship and Economic Health (H7), in both Model 17 (Figure 
3.18) and Model 20 (Figure 3.21). 
In Figure 3.18 (Model 17) the marginal effect of a Republican Governor is significant and positive 
for all values of the Unemployment. In addition, as the Unemployment rate increases, the marginal 
effect decreases. Moreover, the graph shows that, in terms of enforcement actions, cwhen the 
Unemployment is approximately 2.1 percent. As Unemployment increases to its highest level (8.6 
percent), a Republican Governor produces 11 fewer Removals. In contrast, Figure 3.21 (Model 20) shows 
that the marginal effect of a Republican Governor is significant and positive for all values of the 
Unemployment. Specifically, when the Unemployment is 4.6 percent, a Republican Governor results in 6 
Removals. As Unemployment increases to its highest level (15.4 percent), a Republican Governor results 
in 8 more Removals. Although the marginal effect of a Republican Governor decreases during the Bush 
administration, the number of Removals is higher at lower values of the Unemployment rate, in 
comparison to the Obama administration.  
Next, I plot the results of the interaction between Republican Governor and Property Crime, 
which tests the hypothesis Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H7), in both Model 17 (Figure 3.19) 
and Model 20 (Figure 3.22). In Figure 3.19 (Model 17), the marginal effect of a Republican Governor on 
the number of Removals is positive and significant. Specifically, when Property Crime is at 2000 events, a 
Republican Governor results in 6 more Removals. As Property Crime increases to its highest level (4500 
events), a Republican Governor results in 4 fewer Removals. 
Similarly, Figure 3.22 
, during the Obama administration, shows that the marginal effect of a Republican Governor and 
the number of Removals given the Property Crime is significant and positive for all values. Specifically, 
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when Property Crime is at 2000 events, a Republican Governor results in 3 more Removals. As Property 
Crime increases to its highest level (4000 events), a Republican Governor results in 1 fewer Removal. 
Finally, Figure 3.20 depicts the interaction between Republican Governor and Latino Population, 
which test the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9), in Model 17. The 
marginal effect of Republican Governor is significant and positive for all values of the Latino Population. 
Specifically, a Republican governor results in approximately 14 more Removals, relative to a Democratic 
governor, when Latino population is at its lowest value (-2.73).  As Latino Population increases to its 
highest level (i.e., 1780), a Republican governor produces approximately 20 more Removals. 
In stark contrast, Figure 3.23 illustrates the interaction between Republican Governor and Latino 
Population, which tests the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H9), in 
Model 20. The marginal effect of Republican Governor is significant and positive for all values of the 
Latino Population. Specifically, a Republican governor results in approximately 5 more Removals, relative 
to a Democratic governor, when Latino population is at its lowest value (-2.73).  As Latino 
Population increases to its highest level (i.e., 1780), a Republican governor produces approximately 4 
fewer Removals. 
All in all, the results demonstrate that the marginal effect of a Republican Governor is stronger, 
resulting in significantly more Removals, when the president is Bush than when is Obama. This strong 
effect can be seen in the interactions between the Republican Governor and Unemployment, Property 
Crime, and Latino Population.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Studies on immigration policy and its enforcement have been, for the most part, absent in the 
political science literature. In the last five years, a number of studies have explored various 
factors determining state-level immigration policies and state and local governments’ decisions 
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to collaborate with the federal government in the enforcement of immigration policy. Yet, no 
study has explored the factors that determine the number of people arrested and removed 
from the country through the 287(g) Program. This is an important program as it brings out 
issues of racial profiling, civil rights protections and violations, states’ rights, and federal 
jurisdiction in the enforcement of immigration policy.  
 This study enhances our understanding of the forces that shape immigration policy 
enforcement in the U.S. federal system in a number of ways. First, the findings show that 
partisanship influences enforcement outcomes, but not always and only under certain 
conditions. For the most part, these results are in line with previous studies—focusing on 
various public policies—that found that depending on the partisanship of the president and 
state governor enforcement outcomes either increased or decreased. Because LEA officers and 
ICE agents work under the oversight of the County Sheriff—influenced by the state governor—
and the president, respectively, they respond to their policy preferences and enforce 
accordingly. 
 More specifically and surprisingly, I find that the main effects of both political and 
socio-economic-demographic variables display the same sign under both administrations. 
However, when comparing the rate and percent by which arrests and removals increase or 
decrease, in some cases, there is a stark difference as to how the variables behave under each 
administration. For instance, when the governor is Republican under the Bush administration, 
the rate of Arrests increases by 304%, whereas under the Obama administration, the rate 
increases by 100%. Similarly, when the governor is Republican and Bush is the president, the 
rate of Removals increases by 284%, and by 94% when Obama is the president.    
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Third, and most interestingly, the conditional effect of Republican partisanship, under 
the Bush regime, is attenuated by the SED factors, a totally unexpected result, except for the 
Percent Change Latino Population, which amplifies the effect. Although these same factors 
attenuate the effect of a Republican governor during the Obama administration, with the 
exception of the Unemployment which amplifies the effect, these results are in line with my 
argument that partisanship determines enforcement actions. More specifically, because Obama 
is Democratic, I expect that the number of removals will decrease, regardless of the 
partisanship of the governor. This is to be expected because the president has more influence 
on the discretionary enforcement actions of the DHS and ICE agents, who ultimately determine 
the number of people removed from the country.  
Overall, this study demonstrates that during the Bush administration the growth of the 
Latino population was a strong predictor of the number of undocumented people arrested and 
removed from the country. The other SED factors—unemployment and crime rates—had no 
positive effect on enforcement actions despite the political rhetoric over these two issues, 
which are of concern to constituencies. In stark contrast, during the Obama administration, the 
unemployment rate is the strong predictor of arrests and removals while the crime rate and the 
growth of the Latino population had an attenuating effect. What can explain this difference 
between the two presidential administrations? In search of a potential explanation, I turn to the 
issue of values. We can see that under the Bush administration is not about law and order or 
about fair competition. Perhaps the issue at stake here is cultural threat. More specifically, 
oftentimes people (mis)perceive immigrants as reluctant to assimilate, embrace holidays and 
traditions, speak English, and play by the rules, to name a few. The introduction of a new 
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culture with its particular traditions may be diametrically opposite to long-established 
traditions in the new country. But because all cultures are intrinsically linked to racial and 
ethnic groups, the situation can easily and quickly degenerate into racial tensions.   
While this study focuses exclusively on immigration policy enforcement, the same 
arguments apply to other public policies. Given that constituencies, based upon particular social 
issues, side with one political party or the other, then other public policies can be studied in the 
same manner, exploring the effect of partisanship given the particular areas of concern of the 
same. For instance, environmental policy is a salient issue, which brings environmentalists, 
businesses, and regular people to advocate or lobby for one side or the other, considered to be 
an issue of the Democratic Party. Thus, one can explore enforcement actions under both the 
Republican and Democratic regimes, exploring potential moderating effects.  
Although this study furthers our understanding of immigration policy enforcement, it 
has its limitations. First, given that the focus is on the 287(g) Program, the number of 
participating counties is a fraction of all the counties in the U.S. Thus, it is difficult to know 
whether the same patterns and differences of enforcement uncovered in this study apply to 
other localities. Second, I do not control for the undocumented population as a large portion is 
already included in the growth of the Latino population. Neither do I control for the total 
population because it dilutes the impact that immigration policy enforcement has on the 
undocumented population in each state. Third, because undocumented immigrants gravitate to 
localities where jobs are available, controlling for dependence on immigrant labor can 
potentially provide different results. Fourth, the property crime rate dataset used is at the state 
  
138 
 
level instead of county level. Thus, I may not be getting an accurate mediating effect of this 
social factor.  
The findings of this study give us a glimpse of the forces shaping enforcement at the 
local level through the 287(g) Program. Future research could explore the factors that shape 
enforcement through the various federal immigration enforcement programs that are not in 
collaboration with state and local law enforcement agencies. Further, future studies could focus 
on any potential mediating effects of social, economic, and political factors on the president 
partisan affiliation. Because policy enforcement does not occur in a vacuum, researchers could 
delve into the role of divided government at the national and state level to determine the 
degree to which they can contour the enforcement of immigration policy. Lastly, it would be 
worthwhile to include a measure of cultural threat to the socio-economic-demographic factors 
and test its mediating effect on partisanship.  
In conclusion, the findings in this study indicate that partisanship alone does not explain 
enforcement actions. Additional conditions in the environment have to be present to activate 
the core values of the political parties. Even then, some conditions may have a stronger effect 
than others, as the results of this study demonstrate.  
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Table 3-1. Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Variable Name Coeff. Results 
H1. President Partisan Identification 
Hypothesis. Local law enforcement agencies 
will increase (decrease) the number of arrests 
(removals) when the president is Republican 
(Democratic).  
Republican 
President 
+ (-) Model 1—no support  
Model 5—no support 
 
 
H2.  State Governor Influence Hypothesis. 
Number of arrests and removals are more 
likely to be higher (lower) when the state 
governor’s partisan affiliation is Republican 
(Democratic). 
Republican 
Governor 
+ (-) Model 1—support  
Model 5—support 
Model 9—support  
Model 12—support  
 
 
H3.  Governor-President Partisan Alignment 
Hypothesis. When the state governor and the 
president belong to the same political party, it 
is likely that number of arrests and removals 
will increase (decrease) when both are 
Republicans (Democrats).  
Republican 
President x  
Republican 
Governor 
+ Model 3—support  
Model 7—support  
 
 
H4.  Health of the Economy Hypothesis. As the 
county unemployment rate increases, the 
number of undocumented people arrested and 
removed increases.  
Unemployment  + Model 2—support  
Model 6—support  
Model 10—support  
Model 13—support  
Model 16—no support  
Model 19—support  
 
H5.  Public Safety Hypothesis. As the state 
property crime rate increases, the number of 
undocumented people arrested and removed 
increases. 
Property Crime  + Model 2—support  
Model 6—support  
Model 10—support  
Model 13—support  
Model 16—support  
Model 19—support  
 
H6.  Rapid Demographic Shift Hypothesis. The 
number of people arrested and removed 
increases as the Latino population increases.    
Latino 
Population 
+ Model 2—no support  
Model 6—no support  
Model 10—no support  
Model 13—support  
Model 16—no support  
Model 19—support  
 
H7. Governor Partisanship and Economic 
Health Hypothesis. The effect of a Republican 
governor on the number of arrests and 
removals increases with the unemployment 
rate while the effect of a Democratic governor 
either decreases or remains the same.  
Republican 
Governor x  
Unemployment  
+ Model 4—no support  
Model 8—no support  
Model 11—no support  
Model 14—support  
Model 17—no support  
Model 20—support  
 
Grinter Graphs 
4a & 4b—no support 
6a—no support 
6b—support 
9a—no support 
9b--support 
H8. Governor Partisanship and Public Safety 
Hypothesis. The effect of a Republican 
governor on the number of arrests and 
removals increases with the state property 
crime rate while the effect of a Democratic 
governor either decreases or remains the 
same.  
Republican 
Governor x   
Property Crime  
+ Model 4—no support 
Model 8—no support  
Model 11—no support  
Model 14—no support  
Model 17—no support  
Model 20—no support  
 
Grinter Graphs 
5a & 5b—no support 
7a—no support 
7b—no support 
10a—no support 
10b—no support 
H9. Governor Partisanship and Rapid 
Demographic Growth Hypothesis. The effect 
of a Republican governor on the number of 
arrests and removals increases with the growth 
of the Latino population while the effect of a 
Democratic governor either decreases or 
remains the same.  
Republican 
Governor x   
Latino 
Population 
+ Model 4—no support 
Model 8—no support  
Model 11—support  
Model 14—no support  
Model 17—support  
Model 20—support 
 
Grinter Graphs 
5c & 5c—no support 
8a—support 
8b—support 
11a—support 
11b—support 
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Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
Years 2005 - 2012      
Dependent Variables 
Arrests 
Removals 
 
763.07 
557.86 
 
155.52 
1238.55 
 
0 
0 
 
13674 
12555 
 
305 
295 
Independent Variables      
Political Environment 
Republican Governor 
 
.55 
 
 
.49 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
432 
 
Demographic, Socio-Economic 
             Unemployment  
             Property Crime  
             Latino Population  
 
6.74 
3412.43 
445.80 
 
2.85 
696.46 
417.86 
 
2.1 
1838.9 
-2.730 
 
15.4 
4826.9 
1780 
 
432 
432 
432 
The Bush Administration 2005 - 2008      
Dependent Variables 
Arrests 
Removals 
 
764.35 
689.81 
 
1772.12 
1623.01 
 
0 
0 
 
13674 
12555 
 
90 
80 
Independent Variables      
Political Environment 
Republican Governor 
Percent Republican Legislature 
 
.52 
48.79 
 
.50 
13.51 
 
0 
10.5 
 
1 
74.03 
 
216 
216 
Demographic, Socio-Economic 
Unemployment  
Property Crime  
             Latino Population  
 
4.55 
3638.87 
445.80 
 
1.18 
728.94 
418.35 
 
2.1 
1838.9 
-2.730 
 
8.6 
4826.9 
1780 
 
216 
216 
216 
The Obama Administration 2009 - 
2012 
     
Dependent Variables 
Arrests 
Removals 
 
762.56 
508.76 
 
1459.86 
1061.19 
 
0 
0 
 
11807 
8585 
 
215 
215 
Independent Variables      
Political Environment 
Republican Governor 
Percent Republican Legislature
  
 
. 62 
53.88 
 
.48 
14.28 
 
0 
10.5 
 
1 
81.73 
 
216 
216 
 
Demographic, Socio-Economic 
             Unemployment  
             Property Crime  
             Latino Population  
 
8.94 
3186 
445.80 
 
2.29 
581.36 
418.35 
 
4.4 
2047.3 
-2.730 
 
15.4 
4015.3 
1780 
 
216 
216 
216 
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Table 3-3 Correlations among Political Environment, Demographic, and Socio-Economic Variables 
 
 Arrests Removals Republican 
Governor 
Percent 
Republican 
Legislature 
Unemplymt Property 
Crime 
Latino Population 
Arrests 1.0000       
Removals 0.99 1.0000      
Republican 
Governor 
0.29 0.27 1.0000     
Percent 
Republican 
Legislature 
0.06 0.07 0.29 1.0000    
Unemployment 
 
0.15 0.13 0.33 -0.03 1.0000   
Property Crime 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.35 
 
0.29 1.0000  
Latino 
Population 
-0.21 -0.19 -0.41 -0.04 -0.02 0.40 1.0000 
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Table 3-4. Negative Binomial Models of County Arrests, 2005-2012 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Variables 
Political 
Environment 
SED Interaction 
Pol. Env. 
Interactions  
Pol. Env. x  SED 
     
Republican President -0.115 0.267 -0.542* 0.190 
 (0.263) (0.258) (0.325) (0.320) 
     
Republican Governor 0.945***  0.676** 5.776*** 
 (0.199)  (0.233) (1.592) 
     
Republican  President x 
Republican  Governor 
  0.833* 
(0.487) 
 
     
Unemployment  0.158***  0.243*** 
  (0.037)  (0.054) 
     
Property Crime  0.001***  0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Latino Population  -0.001***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Republican Governor x 
Unemployment 
   -0.178** 
(0.060) 
     
Republican Governor x 
Property Crime 
   -0.001** 
(0.000) 
     
Republican Governor x 
Latino Population 
   -0.000 
(0.001) 
     
Percent Republican Legislature -0.011 
(0.009) 
 -0.009 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
     
Constant 6.641*** 2.766** 6.649*** -0.518 
 (0.470) (0.783) (0.455) (1.414) 
     
Lnalpha 1.317*** 1.266*** 1.310*** 1.228*** 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.072) (0.076) 
     
Observations 305 305 305 305 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-5 Negative Binomial Models of County Removals, 2005-2012 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Variables 
Political Environment SED Interaction 
Pol. Env. 
Interactions  
Pol. Env. x  SED 
     
Republican President 0.206 0.659** -0.214 0.504 
 (0.278) (0.256) (0.334) (0.335) 
     
Republican Governor 0.934***  0.702** 5.444*** 
 (0.209)  (0.245) (1.613) 
     
Republican  President x 
Republican  Governor 
  0.799* 
(0.513) 
 
     
Unemployment  0.188***  0.246*** 
  (0.037)  (0.056) 
     
Property Crime  0.001***  0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Latino Population  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Republican Governor x 
Unemployment 
   -0.145** 
(0.061) 
     
Republican Governor x 
Property Crime 
   -0.001** 
(0.000) 
     
Republican Governor x 
Latino Population 
   -0.000 
(0.001) 
     
Percent Republican Legislature -0.011 
(0.009) 
 -0.009 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
     
Constant 6.216*** 1.605** 6.253*** -1.466 
 (0.486) (0.775) (0.473) (1.496) 
     
Lnalpha 1.335*** 1.257*** 1.328*** 1.222*** 
 (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.082) 
     
Observations 295 295 295 295 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-6 Negative Binomial Models of County Arrests, 2005-2012 
 Bush Obama 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Pol. Env. SED Interactions 
Pol. Env.  x 
SED 
Pol. Env. SED Interactions 
Pol. Env.  x 
SED 
Republican 
Governor 
1.395**  13.872** 0.695*  5.597** 
 (0.484)  (4.660) (0.320)  (2.001) 
       
Unemployment  0.391*** 0.027  0.136* 0.033* 
  (0.103) (0.114)  (0.071) (0.087) 
       
Property Crime  0.001* 0.002**  0.001** 0.002** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Latino Population  -0.002*** -0.004***  -0.001** -0.002** 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Republican 
Governor x 
Unemployment 
  -0.164 
(0.154) 
  0.221** 
(0.083) 
       
Republican 
Governor x  
Property Crime 
  -0.003** 
(0.001) 
  -0.001 
(0.000) 
       
Republican 
Governor x Latino 
Population 
  0.003** 
(0.001) 
  -0.000 
(0.000) 
       
Percent Republican 
Legislature 
0.003 
(0.027) 
 0.095*** 
(0.029) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
 -0.010 
(0.022) 
       
Constant 4.562*** 2.431 -5.182** 7.121*** 2.716 -0.855 
 (0.608) (1.525) (3.092) (0.872) (1.665) (2.714) 
       
Ln alpha 1.517*** 1.498*** 1.336*** 1.239*** 1.144*** 1.111*** 
 (0.133) (0.146) (0.142) (0.152) (0.160) (0.166) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3-7. Negative Binomial Models of County Removals, 2005-2012 
 Bush Obama 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 Pol. Env. SED Interactions 
Pol. Env.  x SED 
Pol. Env. SED Interactions 
Pol. Env.  x 
SED 
Republican 
Governor 
1.344**  13.323*** 0.660*  4.498** 
 (0.483)  (3.822) (0.397)  (2.225) 
       
Unemployment  0.372*** 0.081  0.171** 0.604** 
  (0.106) (0.122)  (0.071) (0.094) 
       
Property Crime  0.001* 0.002**  0.001** 0.002** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Latino Population  -0.002*** -0.004**  -0.001*** -0.002** 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Republican 
Governor x 
Unemployment 
  -0.243 
(0.162) 
  0.205** 
(0.087) 
       
       
Republican 
Governor x  
Property Crime 
  -0.003** 
(0.001) 
  -0.001 
(0.001) 
       
Republican 
Governor x Latino 
Population 
  0.003* 
(0.002) 
  -0.000 
(0.001) 
       
Percent 
Republican 
Legislature 
0.018 
(0.029) 
 0.100*** 
(0.026) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
 -0.013 
(0.024) 
       
Constant 4.809*** 1.905 -6.218** 6.898*** 1.544 -1.423 
 (1.391) (1.627) (2.637) (0.890) (1.672) (2.975) 
       
Ln alpha 1.452*** 1.421*** 1.244*** 1.307*** 3.269*** 1.157*** 
 (0.149) (0.170) (0.164) (0.162) (0.548) (0.174) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3-1. Participating Counties and Percent Change in the Latino Population 1990-2010 
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Figure 3-2  State Governments Participating in the 287(g) Program 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Participating States and Latino Population 
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Figure 3-4. Distribution of Number of Arrests 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Distribution of Number of Removals 
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Figure 3-6 Republican Governor x Unemployment 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Republican Governor x Property Crime 
 
 
Figure 3-8  Republican Governor x Latino Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-9 . Republican Governor x Unemployment 
 
 
Figure 3-10 Republican Governor x Property Crime 
 
 
Figure 3-11 Republican Governor x Latino Population
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The Bush Administration 2005 – 2008 
 
 
Figure 3-12 Republican Governor x Unemployment 
 
 
Figure 3-13 Republican Governor x Prop. Crime 
 
 
Figure 3-14 Republican Governor x Latino Population. 
 
 
The Obama Administration 2009 - 2012 
 
 
Figure 3-15 Republican Governor x Unemployment 
 
 
Figure 3-16 Republican Governor x Prop. Crime 
 
 
Figure 3-17 Republican Governor x Latino Population 
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 The Bush Administration 2005 – 2008 
 
 
Figure 3-18 Republican Governor x Unemployment 
 
 
Figure 3-19 Republican Governor x Property. Crime 
 
Figure 3-20 Republican Governor x Latino Pop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Obama Administration 2009 - 2012 
 
 
Figure 3-21 Republican Governor x Unemployment 
 
 
Figure 3-22 Republican Governor x Prop. Crime 
 
Figure 3-23 Republican Governor x Latino Pop. 
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Chapter 4  
 
State-Level Immigration Policies 
 
The dispersion of immigrants to new destination states—located in the Midwest and the 
South—started in the mid-1980s right after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 (Vásquez 2010; Fortuny, Chaudry, and Jargowsky 2010). Since then, the immigrant 
population has grown dramatically in those regions of the country. With this population 
growth, states and localities confront the rising costs of educating immigrant children, and 
provision of medical care, to name a few. This situation combined with the inaction of Congress 
to pass a comprehensive immigration reform law has spurred the states to adopt state-level 
immigration policies. While some states adopt restrictive immigration policies, which seek to 
discourage immigrants from settling in those states, others adopt accommodating ones that 
facilitate the integration of new immigrants into society.  
 Among the restrictive laws are those that make it a felony to transport undocumented 
immigrants (i.e., Oklahoma HB 1804); forbid local governments from adopting sanctuary 
policies (i.e., Tennessee H-1354); and instruct public schools to determine the immigration 
status of children and submit an annual report to the board of education (i.e., Alabama H-56). 
On the other hand, state laws that facilitate the settlement of immigrants are those that forbid 
landlords from asking about an immigrant immigration status (e.g., California AB 976); allow 
undocumented immigrants to use identification cards for driving but not for other purposes 
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(i.e., Utah SB 227); and reduce the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor from one year to 364 
days because a one-year sentence may be cause for a legal immigrant to be deported (e.g., 
Washington S5168).  
Scholars have developed a number of theories focusing on various aspects of the 
immigration debate. This variation in state-level immigration policies has been the subject of 
study by scholars of state politics. One strand of research emphasizes state characteristics—
economic, political, and demographic. These studies have focused on the effect of public 
opinion (Monogan 2013; 2008); ideology and electoral concerns (Zingher 2014); campaign 
contributions to politicians from the industrial sector (Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty 
2011), growth of the Latino population (Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013), and Latino 
population growth along with economic insecurity (Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez 2015). A 
second strand of studies has explored specific state legislation and its effect on immigrants. For 
instance, in-state tuition (Reich and Barth 2010), welfare benefits (Hero and Preuhs 2007), 
Medicaid coverage (Zhu and Xu 2015), and the role of social trust in providing access to welfare 
programs (Butz and Kehrberg 2015).  
Third, a strand of qualitative studies has looked at specific states and the factors that led 
the legislatures to adopt certain immigration policies. These include, the factors that influenced 
the state legislature to adopt exclusionary policies in Georgia (Sabia 2010), determinants of the 
adoption of restrictive and accommodating policies in Colorado (Berardi 2014), and factors that 
reversed the focus from accommodating to restrictive policies in Oklahoma (Turner and Sharry 
2012). A last strand of inquiry looks at precursors of state involvement in immigration policy. In 
these studies, scholars investigate the pressuring factors—fiscal, ethnic contact, and ethnic 
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threat—that led state legislatures to adopt state-level immigration policies (Boushey and 
Luedtke 2011) and how negative national rhetoric combined with rapid demographic changes 
incite states to pursue restrictive immigration policies (Hopkins 2010). One final study (Newton 
and Adams 2009) stands on its own as it explores the creative ways in which state legislatures 
toughen up and broaden current state laws to restrict immigrants without infringing upon 
federal jurisdiction. 
In the crafting of laws, partisanship matters. Both Democrats and Republicans have 
particular values that would lead them to adopt particular state-level immigration policies. 
Because Republicans are considered to value law and order, they would favor restrictive 
policies that seek to curb the flow of illegal immigration into their states. Democrats, on the 
other hand, value societal integration; thus they would favor more accommodating policies that 
facilitate the settlement of immigrants. Beyond the values and policy preferences of the 
political parties, socio-economic-demographic (SED) issues would have an effect on the type of 
public policy the states adopt. More specifically, in debates over immigration policy, a number 
of social issues emerge: the unemployment and crime rates, and the rapidly changing 
demographics. These are three conditions that would have an effect on the decision of elected 
political leaders as to the type of policies they adopt.  
This study contributes to the growing body of literature on state policy making in three 
ways. First, it posits that partisan values direct the actions of political leaders in the crafting of 
state-level immigration policy. Second, it explores how re-election and party survival goals may 
undermine partisan values. Third, it provides a glimpse of the difficulties that political leaders 
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face when deciding the type of state-level immigration policy that will best serve the values of 
the political party to which they belong and assure its survival.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
When state political leaders craft public policy, they take into consideration an array of factors. 
They are mindful of the districts and constituencies they represent. In particular, they take into 
account their policy preferences, their concerns over the economy, and other social issues. 
Often times, constituencies have diametrically opposite policy preferences and concerns, 
leaving legislators and the governor in a difficult position. Elected leaders know that public 
policies that negatively affect the state economy would have dire consequences for the political 
party they represent, their political fortunes, and constituencies. Therefore, they have to weigh 
all the factors and decide which policy would better serve the state economy, constituencies, 
and are in-line with their political ideology. I now turn to these factors. 
 
 
Political considerations: Partisan Control of State Governor Office and State Legislature 
State governors are key players in the adoption of state laws. Their position affords them the 
power to sign bills into laws or veto them. The decision to sign or to veto hinges on a couple of 
interrelated considerations: partisanship and electoral prospects. First, the political ideology of 
key state leaders determines particular policy preferences. A number of studies have shown 
that partisanship, in particular Republican, is a strong predictor of the adoption of restrictive 
immigration policies. As it relates to immigration and immigrants, research has shown that 
cities, counties, and states that adopted the largest number of restrictive policies were also the 
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places where the overwhelming majority of registered voters were Republican, with the 
strongest partisan effect at the state level (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2012). 
Second, the health of the economy is linked to the electability of state governors. State 
industries not only contribute to the health of the state economy, but they also impact the 
political fortunes of elected political leaders. Studies on the effect of states economic 
conditions on state leaders’ re-election campaigns shed light on this relationship. Howell and 
Vaderleeuw (1990) found that in Louisiana, state residents held the state governor accountable 
for the state economy. A previous study found that it was not the state economy but the 
national economy that had a negative effect on election results of state governors (Chubb 
1988). Stein (1990) adds another layer to the economic effect on state governor elections. He 
found that when voters perceived that their state governors were exclusively responsible for 
the state economy, they voted against the incumbent gubernatorial candidate. Moreover, 
when these governors belonged to the Republican Party, they were penalized even more than 
when they belonged to the Democratic Party. Similarly, another study found that voters hold 
governors accountable for increasing taxes and the state economy (Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 
1995). Overall, a weak economy has a negative effect on the re-election of state governors.  
Because politicians are re-election seekers (Mayhew 1974), and because the health of 
the state economy is a key determinant not only of their approval ratings, but also of their 
likelihood to succeed in re-election, they may decide to side with the key state industries that 
substantially contribute to the state economy. Moreover, these key industries’ stability and 
economic success depend on the labor of immigrant workers. Thus state governments may 
decide to adopt accommodating immigration policies that do not disturb the flow and 
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availability of workers to fill vacancies and sustain production. Finally, because elected leaders 
want to be re-elected, they would allocate available monies toward state infrastructure (e.g., 
roads, highways), pet projects, education, health care, and other programs of interest to state 
residents. These funding allocation and investments would provide them with the opportunity 
to claim credit and get the approval of voters.  
Republican governors, as leaders of their political party in the state, would ensure that 
the values of the party are reflected in public policy. They will favor restrictive immigration 
policies for a number of reasons. First, the influx of immigrants to their states represents a fiscal 
burden; the government has to provide for healthcare, welfare, and education services, and 
costs associated with incarceration. Second, the unauthorized presence of immigrants goes 
against the beliefs of Republican governors that people have to follow the rule of law. 
Democratic governors, on the other hand, will favor accommodating immigration policies for an 
array of reasons. First, Democrats encourage the integration of all people into society and 
immigrants are no exception. Second, oftentimes they emphasize the benefits and 
contributions of immigrants to society. From the above discussion, the following hypothesis 
develops: 
 
H1. Governor Partisan Identification. When the state governor is Republican 
(Democratic), the state has a predisposition to adopt restrictive (accommodating) 
immigration policies. 
 
 
 State legislators, as members of a legislative body and representatives of their districts, 
decide the type of immigration policy that best fits the needs of the state. Republican state 
legislators will privilege restrictive policies for several reasons. First, they represent constituents 
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with whom they are ideologically aligned. Because immigrants live in communities, constituents 
may be pressuring their elected leaders to deal with the issue. Second, the arrival of immigrants 
puts pressure on communities that have to provide all sorts of services to immigrants and their 
U.S.-born children.  
 
H2. Partisan Control of State Legislature. When the state legislature is controlled by the 
Republican Party (Democratic), the state has a predisposition to adopt restrictive 
(accommodating) immigration policies. 
 
 
Citizen Ideology 
When state political leaders craft and introduce bill proposals, they consider constituents’ 
partisan ideology. Constituents, for their part, may be pressuring their state representatives by 
calling the district office, writing them letters, and letting them know of their support for or 
opposition to state-level restrictive immigration policies. Studies on immigration policy 
enforcement (Chand and Schreckhise 2015; Lewis, Provine, Varsanyi, and Decker 2012), state-
level immigration policies (Monogan 2013), and the interconnection of race/ethnicity, 
immigration, and welfare benefits (Hero and Preuhs 2007) found that public sentiment predicts 
an increase in the number of deportations, the adoption of accommodating state-level 
immigration policies, and the breadth of welfare benefits, respectively. Because the ideology of 
the constituency is of great importance to elected representatives, I expect this coefficient to 
be positive. The following hypothesis summarizes this discussion: 
 
H3. Constituents’ Policy Preferences Hypothesis. As state residents’ views become more 
conservative (liberal), there is a strong likelihood that the state would have the 
predisposition to adopt restrictive (accommodating) immigration policies.  
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Interaction 
Governor and Legislature 
H4. Partisan Control of State Government Hypothesis. When the state government is 
controlled by the Republican Party (Democratic), there is a strong likelihood that the 
state would have the predisposition to adopt restrictive (accommodating) immigration 
policies. 
 
 
Economic considerations: Industries dependence on immigrant labor 
It is well known that the stability and prosperity of certain key industries depend on immigrant 
labor. Without immigrants, key state industries such as agriculture, meatpacking, 
manufacturing, construction, and hospitality would barely survive. A number of reasons can be 
cited to explain this dependence. To begin with, as industrial Chief Executive Officers often 
argue, the type of jobs offered in such industries do not appeal to U.S.-born workers; the 
industries would therefore face a labor shortage if they did not resort to immigrant workers to 
fill their vacancies. Next, to deliver services, maintain production, meet consumers’ demands, 
and remain profitable, such industries have to rely on a stable workforce. Lacking the necessary 
workers, these industries would likely need to scale back production, reduce services or 
collapse. None of these outcomes would be desirable for industries that aim to grow and 
maximize return on their investment.  
Financially stable industries are the building blocks of a healthy state economy. Not only 
do they generate revenues for the state coffers, but they also support other sectors of the 
economy that would otherwise be unable to maintain similar levels of production and service 
delivery. For instance, if farmers had to scale back their production, other industries (e.g., 
trucking, pesticide formulating, and manufacturers of produce packing materials) would 
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immediately be affected. Each industry’s gross domestic product (GDP)—the sum of workers’ 
wages and salaries, as well as business investment income and taxes—contributes to the 
overall GDP of the state, and thereby contributes to the robustness of the state economy. 
Therefore, key industries that create jobs and generate substantial revenues for state 
governments are more likely to have a stronger influence on political leaders in the area of 
legislation and lobby state government for the adoption of accommodating state-level policies 
that would not negatively interfere with the flow of labor. The above discussion is summarized 
in the following hypothesis:  
 
H5. Labor Dependence. States whose key industries depend on immigrant workers are 
less likely to adopt restrictive immigration policies and more likely to adopt 
accommodating ones.  
 
 
Socio-Economic-Demographic Hypotheses  
To understand the influence of partisanship on the predisposition of states to adopt either 
restrictive or accommodating state-level immigration policies, it is important to understand the 
effect that socio-economic and demographic factors have on partisanship. Because political 
parties uphold different core values that guide them in the crafting and adoption of public 
policies, they might respond differently to the same set of social issues of concern to their 
constituencies. Thus, I interact partisanship with the poverty and crime rate and the percent 
growth of the Latino population.  
Oftentimes, industries with a high dependence on immigrant labor and low-skill labor 
(e.g., agriculture, meat processing, carpet manufacturing) are located in rural areas or small 
towns, where rents are low. It is common for elected leaders to lure companies to establish 
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operations in these rural zones and small towns. In the last twenty years, several companies 
have relocated to the South, where there is plenty of land, available low-skill labor, and labor 
laws are unfriendly to organized labor. The goal of these leaders may be twofold. First, 
companies generate jobs that would be of benefit to the local population. Second, companies 
generate sales taxes that help pay for social service provision, schools, and law enforcement, to 
name a few. However, it is in these towns where a great number of people may be living in 
poverty (Vásquez 2010; Harlan 2015). And, the arrival of immigrants to work for those 
companies creates job competition with local residents, exacerbating the problem of poverty. 
This situation may motivate state governments to adopt restrictive policies.  
 
H6. Health of the Economy Hypothesis. When more state residents live in poverty, the 
states are more likely to adopt restrictive policies. 
 
 
Throughout history, the arrival of immigrants has been equated with an increase in the crime 
rate (Hall 1906). The belief that immigrants are prone to criminal behavior has withstood the 
passage of time. Crimes committed by immigrants are amplified in the media and exploited by 
incumbents and candidates alike, especially during election season. Because, for the most part, 
the media has taken the issue of crime and immigrants as inseparable, reports on crimes 
associated with immigrants would reflect that view. How the media focuses and presents the 
issues play a key role on how the public and political leaders come to understand them (Iyengar 
2010). Because elected leaders are busy individuals, who cannot investigate the veracity of 
every single media report, they may rely, to a certain degree, on those reports and formulate 
public policies to tackle those social issues.  
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H7. Public Safety Hypothesis. As the state property crime rate increases, states are more 
likely to adopt restrictive policies. 
 
A booming economy in the South and other parts of the country, has attracted 
immigrants to the area. The rapid growth of the immigrant population has been fueled by key 
industries’ need for low-skill labor. To meet demand, these industries have recruited 
immigrants from other states, even from Mexico and Central America. Hopkins (2010) found 
that the rapid growth of the immigrant population is a key factor in provoking localities to 
adopt restrictive policies. The influx of immigrants into communities raises concerns that range 
the spectrum from overcrowded housing and public schools, fiscal burden, increased crime and 
unemployment in the area, cultural differences to an overall deterioration of the quality of life. 
To appease the concerns of constituents and to mitigate the impact that a fast growth of the 
immigrant population has in communities where they settle, state elected political leaders may 
opt for adopting state-level immigration policies that limit opportunities such as obtaining jobs 
and receiving social benefits. 
 
H8. Rapid Demographic Shift Hypothesis. The likelihood of a state adopting restrictive 
immigration policies increases as the percent of the Latino population increases.  
 
 
 
Interactions 
 
Party Switch Hypotheses 
Partisanship alone is just a collection of values or ideals that distinguish one political party from 
the other. Political parties may take positions on issues given their values and may respond in 
different ways, but in the presence of particular pressing social issues, the response or reaction 
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may be heightened by a switch. How these partisan values are activated is the focus of this 
section.  More specific, I seek to discern the mediating effect of socio-economic-demographic 
factors in activating partisan values and how the political parties respond to those factors. The 
theory (explained in greater detail in Chapter 3) assumes that the political parties uphold a set 
of core values. These values may be dormant or active but at a low level and what turns them 
on or off are socio-economic-demographic issues.   
 From the above discussion, three Party Switch hypotheses arise: 
H9. Governor Partisanship and Labor Dependence Hypothesis. The effect of a Republican 
governor on the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive immigration policies increases 
when key state industries depend on immigrant workers. 
 
H10. Governor Partisanship and Economic Health. The effect of a Republican governor 
on the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive immigration policies increases with the 
unemployment rate.  
  
H11. Governor Partisanship and Public Safety. The effect of a Republican governor on 
the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive immigration policies increases with the 
violent crime rate. 
 
H12. Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Growth. The effect of a Republican 
governor on the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive immigration policies increases 
with the growth of the Latino population.  
 
 
 
Data 
The data from this chapter come from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 
which provides summaries of 1,709 state-level immigration policies across the 50 states, 
spanning from 2005 to 2012. NCSL is a bipartisan organization committed to supporting and 
strengthening state legislatures so they can speak with a unified voice. The organization 
provides research support in several public policy issues, including immigration. Since 2005, 
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NCSL has been both tracking and monitoring state-and-federal-level immigration policies. 
Moreover, it separates these state-level immigration policies into 13 categories, such as 
education, health benefits, trafficking, education, and others.  
 To code these laws, I follow Monogan’s (2013) coding scheme, which consists of two 
steps. First, he categorizes them according to the tone “welcoming” or “hostile” towards 
immigrants. Second, they are further classified for their scope of action. To that end, he 
constructs a four-point scale: (1) symbolic, (2) affecting a small group of immigrants, (3) 
affecting many immigrants in a substantial way and (4) directly affecting immigrants’ ability to 
reside in a state.  
 I use this coding as a point of departure and recode these same policies. More 
specifically, first, I read the NCSL summaries and categorized the laws in terms of restrictive 
(hindering people’s ability to settle in or remain in the state) and accommodating (facilitating 
the integration of both documented and undocumented immigrants into society). Second, I 
reduce Monogan’s four-point scale to a two-point scale. Thus, I eliminate all those policies that 
are “symbolic” (i.e., resolutions) and those that “affect a small group of immigrants.” An 
example of those policies removed from the dataset is a 2008 Michigan Resolution (HR 382) 
commemorating May 28th, 2008 as “Border Patrol Agents Day.” Because this law is symbolic 
and does not affect immigrants’ ability to put roots in the state, I removed it from the dataset. 
 Because state governments’ decision to adopt restrictive state-level policies is chiefly to 
encourage the departure of undocumented immigrants and to prevent others from settling in 
the state, then the policies that matter are those that actually close a loophole in local laws or 
fill the void where no laws existed before, ensuring the creation of an environment with few or 
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no opportunities for immigrants to build their lives. Thus, policies that honor border patrol 
agents have no negative impact in the lives of immigrants and do not prevent them from 
setting roots in the community, although they may create an unfriendly environment. On the 
other hand, the policies that affect a small group of immigrants, do not have a major impact on 
the lives of immigrants. More specifically, accommodating policies that honor the contribution 
of immigrants to society do not provide a particular and tangible benefit to immigrants, 
although it creates a friendly environment that may open up opportunities for them. In other 
words, immigration policies that are inconsequential to the lives of immigrants—at least on 
face value—do not necessarily determine whether people settle in the states or move on. As 
long as immigrants can get a job, rent a house, and their children can get an education, and the 
risk of being arrested by immigration agents is low, they will set roots in communities.  
After removing all the laws that are “symbolic” and those that affect a small group of 
immigrants, I code the scope of all the restrictive and accommodating laws already identified 
on a two-point scale: (1) large number of immigrants and (1.5) a substantial number of 
immigrants. The reasoning behind this coding scheme is simple. Consider a state policy that 
allows local governments to develop sanctuary policies. These policies will benefit every single 
undocumented person, as they ensure that the undocumented will not be turned in to the U.S. 
Immigration Customs Enforcement to be deported, provided they have no felony convictions. 
This type of policy is coded as 1.5 as they advantage (almost) every single undocumented 
immigrant. In contrast, a policy that allows undocumented students to pay in-state tuition 
when attending college, it only benefits a small number of individuals, given the requirements 
embedded in the law. This type policy is coded as 1.  
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An example of an accommodating law with a value of 1 is a 2005 law passed by the 
Colorado legislature (HB 1086) which reinstated Social Security Insurance and Medicaid benefits 
for some legal immigrants. Another example of an accommodating law with the value of 1.5 is a 
2005 law passed by the Illinois legislature (SB 1623) that allows state agencies to use consular 
documents as a form of identification, under certain conditions. Examples of restrictive laws 
include a 2008 South Carolina law (HB 4400) which prohibits undocumented immigrants from 
attending a public institution of higher learning (coded as 1). Similarly, a 2009 Georgia law (S 
20), which forbids local governments from adopting sanctuary policies, is coded as 1.5. The final 
dataset contains 559 state-level immigration laws, 182 accommodating and 377 restrictive.  
The distribution of both accommodating and restrictive immigration laws across the 
states presents an interesting picture. Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 depict the distribution, of the 
adoption of both accommodating and restrictive policies and a comparison between the two. In 
Figure 4.1, we see how the states range in terms of the number of accommodating laws 
adopted. Specifically, the number of laws adopted range from zero in nine states—Alabama, 
Arkansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Nevada, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming—to 28 laws adopted in California, closely followed by Illinois, with 18 laws. Figure 4.2 
shows how the states range according to the number of restrictive immigration laws adopted. 
Seven states—Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, and 
Wisconsin—adopted only one restrictive law, while Arizona adopted 35, followed by South 
Carolina with 25 laws. As one can see, those states that have not adopted accommodating 
policies or have adopted only one restrictive policy are non-traditional destination states, with 
the exception of New Jersey. In Figure 4.3, we see how the number of accommodating laws 
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adopted stack up to the number of restrictive ones. This visual depiction gives a richer view of 
the tendencies of the states for adopting either restrictive or accommodating immigration 
policies. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the predisposition of states to adopt either restrictive or 
accommodating state-level immigration policies. To construct the dependent variable I 
followed a number of steps. First, I added all the accommodating laws—by state and by year—
coded as 1. Then, I added all the accommodating laws coded as 1.5. Once the additions were 
completed, I proceeded to multiply those laws by their corresponding values (i.e., 1 and 1.5). 
The results of the multiplications for each group is added and that became the numerator. I 
followed the same steps for restrictive policies and that became the denominator. Second, I 
calculate the ratio of accommodating to restrictive policies by dividing the results of the 
multiplication and additions (as described in the previous step) of accommodating laws with 
the results of restrictive laws. Third, I take the natural log of the ratio of accommodating to 
restrictive policies that I just obtained, and the resulting score becomes the predisposition 
score, which is the dependent variable. Additionally, positive scores indicate the predisposition 
of states to adopt state-level accommodating policies whereas negative scores indicate the 
predisposition to adopt restrictive policies.16 The following formula (Monogan 2013) is used to 
calculate the predisposition of states to adopt one type of policy over another:  
                                                          
16 Examples of calculations performed to obtain a predisposition score. Consider the state of Arizona that adopted 
five accommodating laws coded as 1 and one law coded as 1.5. Also, it has ten restrictive laws coded as 1 and 25 
laws coded as 1.5. To obtain the ratio, I do the following: 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (5∗1)+(1∗1.5)+1(10∗1)+(25∗1.5)+1 =  0.15 & 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 =  −1.86 =
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𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃 = log �Σ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃  𝑥𝑥  𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 + 1
Σ Restrictive Laws  x  value + 1 � 
 
 
 Positive values indicate a state’s predisposition to adopt accommodating policies, while 
negative values indicate a predisposition to adopt restrictive ones. When the log of the ratio is 
0, the state is neutral, meaning that the ratio of accommodating to restrictive laws is one. 
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the predisposition scores across the states. The 
predisposition score spans from -3.58 in South Carolina to 1.99 in California. Geographically, 
only nine states—located in the West (i.e., California and Washington), Midwest (i.e., Illinois), 
and Northeast (i.e., New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Connecticut, Delaware, and Vermont) 
have the predisposition of adopting accommodating laws, while the rest adopt restrictive ones, 
with two states staying neutral (i.e., Kentucky and Wisconsin). On the other hand, the top nine 
states with the highest predisposition to adopt restrictive policies are in the South (i.e., South 
Carolina, Arkansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Georgia, and West Virginia), Midwest (i.e., Indiana), 
and Southwest (i.e., Arizona).  
 
Independent Variables 
A number of predictors will be used to test the model’s hypotheses. First, H1 is about 
governor partisanship; therefore, I create a variable, Republican Governor, which is equal to 1 if 
                                                          
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃. Also, consider the state of California that has adopted 20 accommodating policies coded as 1 and 
8 policies coded as 1.5. For restrictive policies, two are coded as 1 and 1 is coded as 1.5. Thus, the equation is as 
follows: 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (20∗1)+(8∗1.5)+1(2∗1)+(1∗1.5)+1 =  7.33 & 𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 =  1.99 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃. 
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governor is Republican and 0 if Democratic.17 Second, H2 is about partisan control of the 
legislature so I include a variable, Republican Legislature, which takes the value of 1 if the 
Republicans control the legislature and 0 otherwise. Third, to test H3 which is about the views 
of constituents, I include a variable, Citizen Ideology.  I use Berry et al.’s (1998) updated version 
of citizen ideology scores, which capture the ideological leanings of a state. Berry et al. estimate 
these scores by using interest group ratings of congressional representatives, the district’s 
incumbent and challenger ideology scores, and election results’ ideological scores. Then, all 
those scores are averaged and the result is a citizen ideology score at the state level. Higher 
scores of the citizen ideology scale indicate liberal views, hence I expect to find a positive 
coefficient; lower scores indicate conservative ideological leanings, thus I anticipate a negative 
coefficient, indicating a propensity to adopt restrictive policies.  
Because immigration policy is not just about partisan politics and preferences, but also 
about socio-economic-demographic (SED) concerns, I include a number of variables. First, I 
include two variables, GDP Agriculture and GDP Manufacturing, which test H5.These  are 
continuous variables. The data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which 
provides data on all the industries in the states. The agricultural and manufacturing industries 
are known for their dependence on immigrant labor (Passel 2006). I expect their coefficients to 
be positive, indicating the willingness of states to accommodate immigrants. Second, I include a 
variable, Poverty, which explores another economic aspect of immigration policy. The Poverty 
data were obtained from U.S. Census Bureau.18 This variable tests the Health of the Economy 
                                                          
17 I coded the governor of Rhode Island, an Independent, as Democratic because he left the Republican Party in 
2007 and later declared his party affiliation Democratic. 
18 Social Explorer Dataset (SE), Census 1990, 2000, 2010, Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau 
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hypothesis (H6). I expect the coefficient to be negative, indicating a predisposition of states to 
adopt restrictive policies. Third, H7 explores concerns over crime thus I include a variable, 
Property Crime. The data were obtained from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) compiled by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).19 I expect a negative coefficient, showing a predisposition 
to adopt restrictive immigration policies. The final variable, Latino Population, is constructed 
with data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.20 It tests the Rapid Demographic Shift 
hypothesis (H8), which posits that as the Latino population grows, the states would have the 
predisposition to adopt restrictive policies. I expect this coefficient to be negative. 
 
Interactions  
I test the set of Party Switch hypotheses by interacting partisanship of the governor and each of 
the SED factors. First, to test the Governor Partisanship and Labor Dependence hypothesis (H9). 
I interact Republican Governor with GDP Agriculture and GDP Manufacturing Unemployment. 
Second, by interacting the Unemployment with the Republican Governor, I test the Governor 
Partisanship and Economic Health hypothesis (H10). Third, the interaction between Republican 
Governor and Property Crime test the Governor Partisanship and Public Safety hypothesis 
(H11). Fourth, the interaction between Republican Governor and Latino Population test the 
Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H12). I expect the coefficient 
of these five interactions to be positive.  
 
                                                          
19 Data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime Statistics. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/crimestats 
20 Social Explorer Dataset (SE), Census 1990, 2000, 2010, Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau 
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 Control Variable 
Legislative Professionalism                                          
Highly professionalized legislatures are better suited to deal with legislation. This is so for a 
number of reasons. First, they have more staff who can monitor and track legislation, gather 
information on policy issues, and make recommendations to state legislators. Consider 
proposals to adopt restrictive immigration policies. Legislators may have their staff do a study 
on the fiscal and economic impacts to determine whether to proceed with a bill proposal or to 
support it. If similar policies passed in other states, the staff can investigate whether there have 
been any problems with its implementation, any negative unintended consequences, legal 
issues, and, more importantly, the impact on the health of the state economy.  
 Second, because legislators are better remunerated, working in the legislature is a full-
time job. This allows them to spend more time studying the issues, meet with groups on both 
sides of the immigration debate, consult with legislators from other states, and meet with 
constituents in their district to gauge their support or opposition for an immigration policy that 
either would restrict or accommodate immigrants, including the undocumented. The time they 
invest learning the advantages and disadvantages of adopting any law would give them the 
facts needed to make informed decisions. I expect the coefficient to be positive. 
 Table 4.1 presents a list of all the hypotheses just presented, the variables used to test 
them, their expected coefficients, and, in the last column, I note whether the analyses support 
the predictions.  
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Methodology 
I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to test the theoretical model of states’ predisposition to 
adopt either restrictive or accommodating immigration policies. Because the data do not 
violate the OLS assumptions and the dependent variable is continuous, I chose OLS. Figure 4.5 
illustrates the distribution of the dependent variable, predisposition, which follows a normal 
distribution. The descriptive statistics of the data for all the variables are listed in Table 4.2. 
Prior to estimating the model, I ran several diagnostic tests. First, I plotted the observed values 
(on the Y-axis) and the predicted values (on the X-axis). Figure 4.6 shows the linear relationship 
between the observed and predicted values, indicating that the model is predicting the 
predisposition of states’ immigration policies. Second, to be certain that all the variables 
needed are included in the model, I test for omitted variables using the Stata command linktest. 
This is a test of the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables. Given that the 
predicted values (Y-hat as an independent variable) is not statistically significant (p=.603), I 
failed to reject the null hypothesis and concluded that the model is correctly specified.  
 Third, to test whether the residuals are homoscedastic, I plot the residuals versus the 
predicted values (Y-hat). Figure 4.7 shows that the residuals are heteroskedastic. The presence 
of heteroskedasticity in the model would lead to the wrong estimation of the standard errors 
for the coefficients and therefore their t- and p-values, indicating statistical significance when, 
in fact, they are insignificant. To adjust the model to account for heteroskedasticity, I use robust 
standard errors.  Fourth, an examination of the results of the variance inflation factor (VIF) does 
not detect multicollinearity. The values range from 1.17 to 7.68, and the mean is .324.  A 
correlation matrix illustrates the pairwise correlation between all the variables in the analyses is 
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presented in Table 4.3. Fifth, I test for the normality of the residuals by using two graphs that 
illustrate their distribution (see Figure 4.8 and 4.9). The results show a distribution not quite 
normal, which indicate that I may need to reassess the model.   
 
Results  
Table 4.4 shows the results of OLS models that test the theoretical arguments of the political 
environment using NCSL data. Model 1 presents the results of the baseline models focusing on 
institutional political actors. The results provide support to all three political hypotheses: The 
Governor Partisan Identification (H1), Partisan Control of State Legislature (H2), and 
Constituents’ Policy Preferences (H3). This last hypothesis obtains support in all the three 
models (Models 1, 3, and 4). In Model 1 the Republican Governor, which tests H1, is negative 
and significant, as predicted, indicating that states where the governor Republican have the 
propensity to adopt restrictive policies. Substantively, the results show that the state’s 
propensity score decreases 0.125 points. The coefficient of Republican Legislature, which tests 
H2, is significant and negative, as expected. The results indicate that when the legislature is 
controlled by Republicans, its propensity score decreases 0.719 points. To test the Constituents’ 
Policy Preferences hypothesis (H3), I use Citizen Ideology. The coefficient is significant and 
positive, as predicted. The result indicates that states where people hold more liberal views 
tend to adopt accommodating immigration policies. Specifically, it shows that a state’s 
propensity to accommodate increases by 0.019 points. I find a significant and positive effect for 
the control variable, Legislative Professionalism, indicating that states with highly 
professionalized legislatures tend to adopt policies that accommodate immigrants. Overall, the 
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model shows that when either the governorship or state legislature are controlled by the 
Republican Party, a state would have the propensity to adopt restrictive immigration policies. 
Also, states, whose citizens hold liberal views, are more likely to adopt accommodating policies.  
Model 2 presents the results of the baseline model socio-economic-demographic (SED). 
In this model, I test four hypotheses, of which three obtain support to their predictions. First, I 
use two variables— GDP Agriculture and GDP Manufacturing—to test the Labor Dependence 
hypothesis (H5), which holds that states whose key industries depend on immigrant labor 
would have the propensity to adopt accommodating immigration policies. The results show 
that the two measures attain statistical significance and are positive, as predicted. Thus, a state 
whose key industry is agriculture will see its predisposition score increase by 0.210 points, and 
when the industry is manufacturing the predisposition score increases 0.291 points. Second, 
the Poverty coefficient that captures the Health of the Economy hypothesis (H6) is significant 
and negative, according to prediction. The result indicates that one percent increase in Poverty 
leads to a 0.131 decrease in the propensity score, indicating that states tend to adopt 
restrictive immigration policies as the rate of people living in poverty increases.  
The third hypothesis I test from the SED model is the Public Safety (H7), which holds 
that as the Property Crime increases, a state propensity score decreases, meaning that it would 
tend to adopt restrictive policies. Although the sign of the coefficient is negative, it does not 
attain statistical significance, failing to support H7. Fourth, I test the Rapid Demographic Shift 
hypothesis (H8), which predicts that as the population of Latino immigrants increase, a state is 
likely to adopt restrictive immigration policies. I test this hypothesis using the Latino 
Population, whose coefficient is significant and negative, as predicted. The result indicates that 
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one percent increase in Latino Population leads to a decrease of 0.001 in the propensity score, 
suggesting that a state becomes more restrictionist. In this test, H8 attains support. Largely, the 
model specification yields the results expected, with the exception of the Property Crime factor.  
Interactions 
In Model 3, I test the Partisan Control of State Government hypothesis (H4). I expect that when 
both the legislature and the governorship are controlled by the Republican Party, the 
predisposition of the state would be to adopt restrictive immigration policies. To test this 
hypothesis, I interact Republican Governor with Republican Legislature. The result does not 
provide support to H4. Specifically, the sign of the coefficient is positive, against prediction. 
Thus, instead of adopting restrictive policies, a Republican-controlled state government has the 
propensity to adopt accommodating policies, a puzzling result. The Citizen Ideology and the 
control variable, Legislative Professionalism maintain their positive direction and significance.  
In Model 5, I test the Party Switch hypotheses, which collectively hold that social, 
economic, and demographic factors either attenuate or amplify the effect of the partisanship of 
the state governor on the state’s propensity score. First, I test the Governor Partisanship and 
Labor Dependence hypothesis (H9), using the GDP Agriculture and GDP Manufacturing. The 
interaction between Republican Governor and GDP Agriculture is significant and positive, as 
expected and lending support to H9.  Then, I test H9, but this times using the GDP 
Manufacturing variable. The interaction between Republican Governor and GDP Manufacturing 
yields an unexpected result, the coefficient of the interaction is significant and negative, against 
prediction. The result indicates that in states where the key industry is the manufacturing of 
goods and the governor is Republican, it is likely that the state would have the propensity to 
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adopt restrictive immigration policies. What may explain that H9 does not attain support and 
that its predictive power points in the opposite direction? One plausible explanation is that 
manufacturing jobs are one step above agricultural jobs, which tend to be hazardous, back-
breaking, and overtime pay starts after 10 hours of work per day. Thus, manufacturing jobs are 
more appealing to local residents and the influx of immigrants—especially Latinos—compete 
with them for those jobs. Thus, to curb this job competition and give local residents the 
opportunity to work in manufacturing companies, state governments may opt to adopt 
restrictive immigration policies.  
Next, I test the Governor Partisanship and Health of the Economy hypothesis (H10) by 
interacting Republican Governor with Poverty. The results do not lend support to the hypothesis 
as the coefficient is insignificant and positive, against prediction. Third, the Republican 
Governor Partisanship and Public Safety hypothesis (H11), captured by the interaction between 
Republican Governor and Property Crime, obtains support. The coefficient is significant and 
negative, comporting with the prediction. Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction between 
Republican Governor and Latino Population, which test the Governor Partisanship and Rapid 
Demographic Shift hypothesis (12), lends support to the prediction. The overall results of this 
model suggest that in states where the governor is Republican and the key industry is 
agriculture, the state would adopt accommodating policies, but it will adopt restrictive policies 
when the key industry is manufacturing. Additionally, states that have experienced a rapid 
growth of the Latino population would tend to adopt restrictive policies. Similarly, states that 
experience an increase in property crime would have the propensity to be restrictionist.  
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 To give a closer examination to the results of the interactions, I plot them. I examine 
whether the   Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H9), in Model 4, attains significance. 
Figure 4.10 depicts the marginal effect of a Republican Governor on the state propensity score 
given the GDP Agriculture. The figure tell us that the marginal effect is positive and increases as 
the values of the GDP Agriculture increase. Additionally, it reveals that the effect is insignificant 
for values below 0.79, which occur in 369 observations (92% of the data), and it is significant for 
values of 0.82 and higher, which account for 31 observations (8% of the data). Turning to the 
data, I find that eight states (i.e., California, Florida, Texas Illinois Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
and Washington), whose key industry is agriculture, have the propensity to adopt 
accommodating immigration policies. The first four states have been traditional destination for 
immigrants, while the other four have become new destination states in the last three decades. 
Next, I examine H9 but using the GDP Manufacturing to see if it has any statistical significance 
that would lend support to H9. Figure 4.11 illustrates the interaction between Republican 
Governor and GDP Manufacturing and shows that the marginal effect is positive for values up 
to -0.003. Additionally, the marginal effects turns negative when the GDP Manufacturing 
reaches the value of 2.59, which accounts for 16 observations (4% of the data) in two states, 
California and Texas. Moreover, the effect decreases as the values of the GDP Manufacturing 
increase.  
Figure 4.12 illustrates the marginal effect of a Republican Governor and Poverty. This 
interaction tests the Governor Partisanship and Public Safety hypothesis (H10), in Model 4. The 
figure shows that the marginal effect is positive, significant for all values of Poverty, and 
increases as the values increase. Specifically, when Poverty is at its lowest value (8.3 percent), 
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the propensity score of a state increases by 0.7 and when it reaches its maximum value (22.4 
percent), the predisposition score increases by 1.1 points. The evidence does not lend support 
to H10, although the effect is significant for all values. 
I plot the results of the interaction between Republican Governor and Property Crime, 
which tests the hypothesis Governor Partisanship and Public Safety (H11), in Model 4 (Figure 
4.13). The figure that the marginal effect of a Republican Governor is positive for values up to 
1995.8 events of the Property Crime, which accounts for 24 observations (6% of the data), and 
turns negative for values of 2000.3 and higher, without attaining significance. The last figure 
(Figure 4.14) depicts the interaction of a Republican Governor and Latino Population, which 
tests the Governor Partisanship and Rapid Demographic Shift hypothesis (H12). The marginal 
effect of a Republican Governor is positive for values of the Latino Population of up to 653 
percent (90 % of the data), then it turns negative. Additionally, the marginal effect decreases as 
the Latino Population increases and it does not attain significance, thus not providing support 
to H12.   
 What can be gleaned from these results? We can glean from these results that the state 
governor is a key player in the adoption of immigration policies and the tone they take. 
Additionally, the results demonstrate that social issues—such as crime and the growth of the 
Latino population—do matter and have an effect when it comes to a state’s decision to adopt 
restrictive immigration policies.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
The adoption of state-level accommodating and restrictive immigration policies is nothing new. 
Throughout the history of immigration in the United States, every wave of immigrants has 
prompted state governments to adopt both restrictive and accommodating policies.  
The results of the statistical analyses presented in this chapter provide support for both 
the political and socio-economic-demographic models. As predicted, Republican control of both 
the governorship and state legislature predict the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive 
immigration policies. An interesting finding is that a Democratic-controlled legislature also 
predicts the adoption of restrictive policies. Perhaps an explanation for this finding is that a 
Republican governor may threaten to veto a proposed law that seeks to accommodate 
immigrants. The veto is a powerful tool that governors may use to shape the legislative agenda 
and public policies. For instance, the Republican-controlled state legislature of Arizona twice 
passed a restrictive immigration policy granting powers to law enforcement officers to inquire 
about immigration status of those they stop. However, a Democratic governor vetoed the 
legislation. It was not until a Republican governor was elected that the bill proposal became 
law.  
Results obtained from tests of the SED model (Model 2) confirm the theoretical 
predictions that economic concerns, for which political leaders are held accountable to the 
electorate, do indeed predict which way the state would lean on the adoption of immigration 
policies. Of all the SED factors, only the Property Crime fails to predict the adoption of 
restrictive policies. The Political Environment Interaction model (Model 3) does not provide 
strong support for all the theoretical predictions. While a Republican controlled state legislature 
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does predict the passage of restrictive policies, Republican control of both the governorship and 
legislature does not predict the propensity of a state to favor restrictionist policies. This is an 
interesting finding, given that partisan control of government privileges particular policies that 
align with the values of the political party. Additionally, it is much easier to craft and adopt 
legislation when one political party controls both chambers of the legislature and the 
governorship.  
The political environment and SED interactions models demonstrate that social issues of 
concern to constituencies do have an effect on a Republican state governor, but not always and 
only under certain conditions. Because both accommodating and restrictive policies seek to 
deal with an immigrant population, then it stands to reason that the swift growth of this 
population may prompt state governments to design public policies to limit opportunities to 
settle. Additionally, because each wave of immigrants raises the fear of an increase in the crime 
rate, one would expect that states with higher rates of Property Crime would seek to curb the 
influx of immigrants. Lastly, because economic opportunities have been a magnet for most 
immigrants, their presence puts them in direct competition with the U.S.-born and other legal 
immigrants. This competition is more relevant when jobs are scarce and the working conditions 
and benefits are slightly better than in other industries. For that reason, it stands to reason that 
states whose key industries involve goods manufacturing may tend to favor restrictive policies 
that would eliminate or lessen the labor market competition between immigrants and local 
residents.  
To conclude, given that the issue of immigration is volatile and contentious with people 
on both sides of the issue advocating or lobbying for a policy that would favor one group at the 
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expense of the other, future studies could delve into the influence that organized groups exert 
on elected political leaders, who care about their political careers and are mindful of the 
consequences of taking sides or supporting the wrong policy. Therefore, they have to weigh in 
all the factors and calculate the cost and benefits of favoring either restrictive or 
accommodating immigration policies. While this study focuses on social issues and their 
influence on political leaders, it would be worthwhile to explore the influencing effect of well-
organized political groups on these same leaders.  
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Figure 4-1 Adoption of State-level Accommodating Immigration Policies 
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Figure 4-2 Adoption of State-level Restrictive Immigration Policies 
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Figure 4-3 Adoption of State-level Accommodating and Restrictive Immigration Policies 
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Figure 4-4  Distribution of Predisposition Scores across the States 
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Figure 4-5 Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
 
 
Figure 4-6 Residuals versus Predicted Values    
 
  
Figure 4-7 Normality in the Residuals 
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Figure 4-8 Observed versus Predicted Values    
 
  
Figure 4-9 Normality in the Residuals 
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Figure 4-10 Republican Governor x GDP Agriculture  
 
 
 
Figure 4-11 Republican Governor x GDP Manufacturing   
 
  
Figure 4-12 Republican Governor x Poverty 
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Figure 4-13 Republican Governor x Property Crime   
 
  
Figure 4-14 Republican Governor x Latino Population 
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Table 4-1 Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Variable Name Coeff. Results 
H1. Governor Partisan Identification Hypothesis. 
When the state governor is Republican 
(Democratic), the state has a predisposition to 
adopt restrictive (accommodating) immigration 
policies. 
Republican Governor + (-) Support hypothesis 
H2. Partisan Control of State Legislature. When the 
state legislature is controlled by the Republican 
Party (Democratic), the state has a predisposition to 
adopt restrictive (accommodating) immigration 
policies. 
Percent Republican 
Legislature 
+ (-) Support hypothesis 
H3. Constituents’ Policy Preferences Hypothesis. As 
state residents’ views become more conservative 
(liberal), there is a strong likelihood that the state 
would have the predisposition to adopt restrictive 
(accommodating) immigration policies.  
Citizen Ideology + Support hypothesis 
H4. Partisan Control of State Government 
Hypothesis. When the state government is 
controlled by the Republican Party (Democratic), 
there is a likelihood that the state would have the 
predisposition to adopt restrictive (accommodating) 
immigration policies. 
Republican Governor x  
Republican Legislature 
+ Support hypothesis 
H5. Labor Dependence Hypothesis. States whose 
key industries depend on immigrant workers are 
less likely to adopt restrictive immigration policies 
and more likely to adopt accommodating ones.  
GDP Agriculture 
GDP Manufacturing  
+ Support hypothesis 
H6. Health of the Economy Hypothesis. When more 
state residents live in poverty, the states are more 
likely to adopt restrictive policies. 
Poverty  + Support hypothesis 
H7. Public Safety Hypothesis. As the state property 
crime rate increases, states are more likely to adopt 
restrictive policies. 
Property Crime + No Support hypothesis 
H8.  Rapid Demographic Shift Hypothesis. The 
likelihood of a state adopting restrictive 
immigration policies increases as the Latino 
population grows. 
Latino Population + Support hypothesis 
H9. Governor Partisanship and Labor Dependence 
Hypothesis. The effect of a Republican governor on 
the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive 
immigration policies increases when key state 
industries depend on immigrant workers. 
Republican Governor x  
GDP Agriculture  
Republican Governor x  
GDP Manufacturing  
+ Support hypothesis 
Figure 10a—support 
Figure 10b—support 
H10. Governor Partisanship and Economic Health 
Hypothesis. The effect of a Republican governor on 
the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive 
immigration policies increases with the poverty 
rate.  
Republican Governor x  
Poverty  
+ Support hypothesis 
Figure 10c—support 
H11. Governor Partisanship and Public Safety 
Hypothesis. The effect of a Republican governor on 
the propensity of a state to adopt restrictive 
immigration policies increases with the property 
crime 
Republican Governor x   
Property Crime  
+ Support hypothesis 
Figure 10d—support 
H12. Governor Partisanship and Rapid 
Demographic Growth Hypothesis. The effect of a 
Republican governor on the propensity of a state to 
adopt restrictive immigration policies increases with 
the growth of the Latino population.  
Republican Governor x   
Latino Population 
+ Support hypothesis 
Figure 10e—support 
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Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs. 
Years 2005 - 2012      
Dependent Variable 
Predisposition 
 
-.75     
 
1.08     
 
-3.58       
 
1.96 
 
400 
Independent Variables      
Political Environment      
Republican Governor .47 .5 0 1 400 
Republican Legislature .47     .49         0 1 392 
Citizen Ideology 53.3 15.8 13.4 93.2 400 
Socio-Economic- Demographic      
GDP_Agriculture -1.47e-09 1    -.70 6.6 400 
GDP_Manufacturing -3.00e-10 1  -.83 4.9 400 
Poverty  14.6     3.0         8.3 22.4 400 
Property Crime  3042.5     697.2       1619.6 4893 400 
Latino Population  280.8 209.6 48.4    942.8 400 
Control Variable      
Legislative Professionalism .18 .11 .02 .62 400 
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Table 4-3 Pairwise correlations 
 Predisposition State Gov. State 
Legislature 
Citizen 
Ideology 
2010 
GDP 
Agriculture 
GDP Mftg. Legislative 
Prof. 
Poverty 
Rate 
2010 
Violent 
Crime 
Rate 
%Δ Latino 
Population 
1990-2010 
           
Predisposition 1.0000          
Republican Governor -0.1917 1.0000         
Republican Legislature 0.2427 -0.2144 1.0000        
Citizen Ideology 0.4006 -0.2059 0.5079 1.0000       
GDP Agriculture 0.3687 0.0980 0.0377 -0.0707 1.0000      
GDP Manufacturing 0.3831 0.0615 0.0091 -0.0113 0.7795 1.0000     
Property Crime  -0.0019 0.0635 -0.0097 -0.0902 0.0885 0.1821 0.3216 1.0000   
Latino Population -0.4554 0.0674 -0.0573 -0.3408 -0.0645 -0.0745 0.4049   0.2308 1.0000  
Legislative Professionalism 0.5604 -0.0800 0.1854 0.3010 0.5646 0.6466 -0.0741 0.1970 -0.3200   1.0000 
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Table 4-4 Analysis of State-level Immigration Policies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Political 
Environment 
SED Political 
Environment 
Interaction 
Political Environment 
SED 
Interactions 
Republican Governor -0.125**  -0.299** 0.594 
 (0.084)  (0.131) (0.411) 
     
Republican Legislature -0.719*** 
(0.206) 
 -0.831** 
(0.277) 
-0.871*** 
(0.255) 
     
Citizen Ideology 0.019***  0.019*** 0.009** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Republican Governor x 
Republican Legislature  
  0.354* 
(0.170) 
 
     
GDP  0.210***  0.115 
Agriculture  (0.046)  (0.073) 
GDP     
Manufacturing  0.291***  0.371*** 
  (0.067)  (0.091) 
Poverty   -0.131***  -0.122*** 
  (0.018)  (0.024) 
Property Crime   -0.001  0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Latino Population   -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Republican Governor x 
Republican Legislature  
  0.354* 
(0.170) 
 
     
Republican Governor x     0.156* 
GDP_Agriculture    (0.100) 
Republican Governor x      -0.315** 
GDP_Manufacturing    (0.104) 
Republican Governor x     0.025 
Poverty     (0.029) 
Republican Governor x     -0.002** 
Property Crime     (0.000) 
Republican Governor x     -0.001** 
Latino Population 
 
   (0.000) 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
4.291*** 
(0.295) 
 4.329*** 
(0.303) 
1.439*** 
(0.428) 
Constant -1.932*** 1.817*** -1.951*** 0.913* 
 (0.254) (0.254) (0.319) (0.466) 
R-squared 0.393 0.522 0.445 0.639 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 5  
 
 Immigration Policy Advocacy 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The decision to migrate to the United States is a complicated one. Whether people leave their 
countries for political, economic, religious, or any other reason, the jolt of uprooting oneself 
and arriving in a country where one cannot speak the language, everything is unfamiliar, and 
everything else is uncertain—it is akin to walking on a wire, without a safety net. Modern-day 
immigrants, like those who arrived a century ago, are looking for opportunities that might 
afford them a better life and a brighter future. Those arriving from Latin America and Asia find a 
safety net in non-profit organizations, just as their counterparts arriving from Europe found 
support in settlement houses and through the Charity Organization Services. In this chapter, I 
draw from findings from empirical analyses on immigration policy enforcement and state-level 
immigration policies to highlight the various paths that immigrant advocates can take in their 
advocacy efforts.  
 
Non-profit Sector 
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The non-profit sector plays a key social role in the United States, providing a safety net 
for the benefit of the public. This sector consists of an array of organizations—private, self-
governing, voluntary, distributing, and of public benefit--serving different needs, but 
remaining—on the whole—private, self-governing, and oriented towards the public benefit. 
The issues they tackle include environmental protection, affordable housing, funding for 
diabetes research, prison reform, public school funding, and immigration policy reform, to 
name a few. Such organizations emerge to address unmet public needs that neither the market 
nor the government fulfill. 
Nonprofits vary widely. They serve particular communities and focus on specific social 
and political issues, function in determined ways, and fund their operations through an array of 
means. All of them have a particular vision and mission that dictates and defines the services 
they provide, which are circumscribed by the funds they receive and the conditions required by 
the foundations who provide them. Additionally, at times, these organizations receive funds 
which are part of federal block grants. These grants set limits as to whom nonprofits can 
provide services. It means that undocumented immigrants cannot access their programs or 
services. Other than that, they provide services to any individual in need regardless of 
immigration status.  
 
Growth of the Immigrant Population  
Since the late 1980s, the foreign-born population has been growing at a fast pace. In 
particular, the decade of the 1990s saw the largest wave of immigrants arriving from Latin 
America and Asia. A number of circumstances may explain the events that caused these waves 
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of immigrants. First, in 1965, at the height of the civil rights movement, Congress passed the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act, which abolished national-origin quotas, that 
overwhelmingly favored people from northern and western Europe. The new law gave an equal 
opportunity to anyone who wanted to come to the U.S. and favored family reunification 
(Gjelten 2015). Second, in the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America was swept by political upheaval, 
revolutions and counter-revolutions, as well as rampant violence at the hands of U.S.-backed 
military governments. The political upheaval forced thousands of people to leave their 
countries and migrate to the U.S.. Third, in 1994, President Clinton signed the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—proposed by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s—which 
eliminated tariffs on goods and services between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
NAFTA was intended to provide an economic boom to the region by creating 200,000 jobs for 
U.S. workers, offering affordable goods, increasing U.S. exports, and reducing undocumented 
immigration (Wilson 1993). However, instead of curbing the tide of undocumented immigration 
to the U.S., it had the opposite effect. NAFTA had a negative impact on the Mexican economy 
and displaced Mexican farmers by flooding the market with an over surplus of U.S. agricultural 
products. The impact generated a “tsunami” of unemployed Mexican peasants and other low-
skill workers who were willing to migrate to the U.S. and work in any industry.  
Immigrants from Latin America and Asia, who have traditionally settled on the West 
Coast, changed their settlement patterns. In part, this shift has been in response to job 
availability and recruitment efforts of manufacturing plants demand for and dependence on 
immigrant labor. Over time, new waves of immigrants have been settling in other regions of the 
country—namely the South and the Midwest. These two regions, unaccustomed to immigrants, 
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have had to grapple with the arrival of people who do not speak English, have different cultural 
traditions, and require varying needs of services. For the most part, states in these regions have 
reacted by adopting restrictive state-level immigration policies to discourage them from settling 
there. In contrast, traditional destination states have responded to this same growth of the 
immigrant populations by adopting accommodating policies that seek to integrate them into 
society. 
The arrival of large numbers of immigrants in a relatively short period of time placed a 
great deal of stress on receiving communities and non-profit organizations. Because immigrants 
left their native countries for a wide variety of reasons, the needs they presented were also 
different. Thus, non-profit organizations had to tailor their services to meet the needs of the 
newly-arrived immigrants. The challenge was even more acute in states that experienced a 
rapid growth of the immigrant population.  
Non-profit organizations have played a key role in helping both documented and 
undocumented immigrants settle. These organizations, when anchored in communities, are 
usually known as community-based organizations (CBO). When confronted with a growing 
immigrant population, CBOs may tailor services to address the needs of immigrants. 
Oftentimes, established CBOs cannot address all the needs of immigrants and, as a result, new 
CBOs are created. For instance, over forty years ago, a group of Cuban exiles set up the 
Committee of the Spanish Speaking Community of Virginia, a CBO that sought to address the 
unmet needs of the Cuban population. As this population set roots and a new wave of 
immigrants arrived in the area, the CBO evolved to meet the emerging needs, and evolved into 
what became known as the “Hispanic Committee of Virginia”.  
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Local events and demographic changes have also prompted responses from CBOs. After 
the Mount Pleasant riots of 1991, the Latin Economic Development Corporation was created to 
increase economic opportunities for Latinos and other immigrants in the area of Washington. 
When a door-to-door survey revealed that close to 90 percent of Hispanic households lacked 
health insurance, the Montgomery County Language Minority Health Project launched Proyecto 
Salud in 1994. Other CBOs, which focus exclusively on the well-being of immigrants, such as the 
Arlington Free Clinic, Asian American LEAD, and Centro Familia also got their start in the 1990s. 
These examples highlight how nonprofits have changed with regional demographics and 
community needs. Some have evolved from all-volunteer groups to professional organizations. 
Others started as solidarity associations that grew into social service agencies. Some CBOs 
zeroed in on a particular service area, while others broadened their scope, trying a more 
holistic approach to meeting the many needs and problems of immigrant communities. 
 
Services 
Regardless of how these CBOs emerge, they provide a range of services to immigrants. These 
services will generally include translation of documents, job referrals, emergency food support, 
and emergency funds for particular needs such as housing, to name a few. A particular need of 
immigrants is access to legal services. To that end, some CBOs have immigration attorneys and 
paralegals on staff to attend to those particular cases. While these attorneys may not always be 
able to litigate a case, they at least offer counsel to immigrants free of charge. In addition, 
paralegals assist immigrants completing immigration forms such as application for 
naturalization, work permits, and since it was made possible, for the Deferred Action for 
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Childhood Arrivals (DACA). For instance, organizations such as the Catholic Legal Immigration 
Network Inc. (CLIN), with legal clinics across the United States, offers community events of one- 
and two-day workshops in which professionals and trained volunteers assist the undocumented 
youth complete their applications for Deferred Action.  Additionally, CLIN offers toolkits and 
provides assistance to CBOs that want to organize their own workshops.  
Another important need of immigrants is access to healthcare. Because of the passage 
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 
documented immigrants no longer qualify to receive federal welfare benefits for the first five 
years of residence. However, states could provide those same benefits provided that they use 
state funds. Whether state governments provide access to emergency medical care or not, 
many CBOs provide limited healthcare services, and in some instances community clinics are 
set up to address the health concerns of the immigrant communities. In these clinics, 
immigration status is not a barrier as they seek to serve the immigrant population. The funds 
that support these clinics may come from foundations, private donors, and proceeds from 
fundraising events. 
In addition to such services, CBOs develop programs to facilitate immigrants’ integration 
to society. Integration is a multidimensional, long, and arduous process that may take years to 
achieve. In that process, CBOs play a pivotal role by offering night classes to learn English, basic 
literacy, financial literacy, and computing classes. Other programs may focus on leadership 
development and capacity building. These programs seek to increase not only the economic 
opportunities of immigrants, but also increase their civic participation, with the goal of pursuing 
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public policies that address community, local, regional, and state issues that improve the 
quality of life.  
 
Policy Advocacy 
Beyond providing services for immigrants, some non-profits develop advocacy programs that 
focus on various aspects of the lives of immigrants. For instance, some legal aid societies devote 
a portion of their budget to advocate for immigrants’ rights in the workplace. They represent 
low-income immigrants in court proceedings, administrative hearings, and counsel them about 
federal and state law as it relates to their wages and right to be paid for performed work. They 
file class action lawsuits to recover unpaid wages or to seek relief for discrimination in the 
workplace. Additionally, they provide information on what undocumented immigrants need to 
do if arrested during an immigration raid or if agents from the U.S. Immigration Customs 
Enforcement knock on their doors, or stop them in the street or any other public area.  
Specifically, immigrants are advised to tell the truth, not to carry false documents with them, 
not to sign any documents, and to call an immigration attorney. 
 Besides advocating for the rights of immigrants in the workplace, some immigrant 
groups tackle the issue of state- and federal-level immigration policy. To that end, they press 
elected political leaders to take steps to support legislation favorable to immigrants or to 
decline to collaborate with the federal government in the enforcement of immigration policy. In 
the current political climate, in which both the Republican and Democratic Party cannot find a 
common ground as to how best to deal with the issue of immigration, immigrant advocates 
turn to their elected political leaders. In general, immigrant advocates regard elected leaders 
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who belong to the Democratic Party as their natural allies. However, when these leaders’ 
stance on immigration legislation or enforcement fails their expectation, immigrant advocates 
question their traditional party loyalties. To understand these seemingly conflicting political 
stances, it is important to look at the social and political environment in which these elected 
political leaders exist.  To that end, I draw from findings of the statistical analyses from Chapter 
3 (“Immigration Policy Enforcement”) and Chapter 4 (“State-level Immigration Policies”) to 
present a more nuanced picture of how the environment plays a key role on the issue of 
immigration policy and its enforcement. This picture of the political and socio-economic-
demographic environment may provide another angle from which immigrant advocates gain 
new perspective on how to proceed with their advocacy activities. These results provide 
information about the political and social conditions that would either increase or decrease the 
number of undocumented people arrested and removed. This information may be of help to 
non-profit organizations that advocate for a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants 
and for those that advocate for keeping immigrant families together.  
 
Shades of Gray 
Consider results obtained from empirical analyses of a state’s tendency to adopt either 
restrictive or accommodating immigration policies. The results of the analyses provide an 
interesting picture of the nuances of partisanship. Nine states out of fifty have the tendency to 
pursue policies that are accommodating, two remain neutral, and the rest tend toward 
restrictionist policies. From 2005 to 2012, in most of the states considered, the governor was a 
Democrat, which correlates with a more pro-immigrant policy stance. In this respect, California 
is a bit of an exception in that it had a Republican governor for six years and yet adopted more 
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accommodating immigration policies than any other state.  Massachusetts, which is considered 
a liberal state, seems to show more clearly the way political partisanship tends to influence the 
shaping of immigration policy. The results show that, for the time period studied, it tended 
towards more restrictive immigration policies when the governor was Republican. What is of 
note is that Massachusetts’ residents were nevertheless on average more liberal in their 
political views than were residents of California.  
However a further aspect to this picture emerges in the analysis of Delaware, Oregon 
and Connecticut. For instance, for the eight years of the this study period where Delaware had 
a Democratic governor, it passed more accommodating immigration policies than Oregon, long 
considered a liberal state and whose governor was a Democrat for the same length of time. 
Though both states were under Democratic leadership, a difference arises in the fact that that 
the Delaware residents themselves hold more liberal views than Oregonians. In other words, 
the viewpoints held by residents in some cases effects a clear influence at the government 
level. Further, from the analyses, it emerges that Connecticut, with a Republican governor, 
tends to accommodate immigrants, while Oregon, with a Democratic governor, tends to restrict 
them. In this case, too, residents of Connecticut are more liberal in their views than are 
residents of Oregon.  
When turning the focus to traditional “destination states” (states typically favored for 
immigration settlement), this same aspect influencing the adoption of immigration policy 
resurfaces. Consider Texas, Florida, and New Jersey whose governors are Republican. While 
Texas and Florida tend to adopt restrictionist policies, New Jersey adopted accommodating 
immigration policies, even surpassing states such as New York and Illinois in its pro-immigrant 
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directives. Given that New York and Illinois both constitute traditional destination states, this 
shows how views held by residents can in some cases trump the general tendency of 
destination states to behave more accommodatingly than non-destination states. In fact, New 
Jersey is among the three states that adopted the most accommodating immigration policies, 
the other two being California and Maryland. One difference between Texas and Florida, in 
comparison to New Jersey, is that on average residents of the latter hold more liberal views 
than those of the former. All these examples underscore the fact that Democrats are not the 
only allies of immigrant advocates and, similarly, that traditional states do not always offer the 
most fertile ground when it comes to accommodating immigrants. All in all, there is plenty of 
room to advocate for the adoption of immigration policies that would further immigrants 
integration to society, even in non-traditional states, or in states where the governor is 
Republican.  
Although there are opportunities to advocate for immigrants in nontraditional 
destination states, immigrant advocates may want to consider that their advocacy efforts may 
not yield any desired results. Specifically, the Southern region of the country—a new 
destination for immigrants—may not be as receptive to immigrant advocates as others regions 
in the country. The U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement has focused its enforcement efforts 
on that particular region. Fifty-eight percent of all state and local law enforcement agencies 
participating in the 287(g) Program are located in the South, where the rate of arrests and 
removals is the highest. It is also the region where the foreign born population has grown 
dramatically. For instance, by focusing on Southern states, one can better appreciate the 
growth of the foreign-born population and of the Latino population in particular. Specifically, 
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the percent change in the foreign-born from 1990 to 2010 ranges from 287% in Alabama to 
525% in North Carolina. The Latino population growth ranges from 285% in Oklahoma to 943% 
in North Carolina. Again, by looking at the growth of the Latino population and focusing on its 
growth at the county level, where the 287(g) Program is active in all regions, one can see that 
the growth has been more dramatic, ranging from -2.73 percent in Pinal, Arizona to 1,780% in 
Cabarrus, North Carolina.  
The growth of the foreign-born and Latino population in the South coincides with the 
propensity of states in the region to adopt restrictive immigration policies. In fact, Southern 
states lead the way in terms of adopting the most restrictionist policies in the U.S., with the 
exception of Arizona in the Southwest. Thus, immigrant advocates may have an uphill battle in 
the South when advocating for the rights of immigrants or the expansion of services and public 
policies that would facilitate their integration into society.  
 
The State Governor 
Governors as key political leaders exert a great deal of influence in the affairs of the state. 
Because of their many powers and influence over state and local agencies, state governors can 
make formidable allies and the one that most policy advocates approach (Karch 2007). Their 
influence over state agencies reverberates to the local level. Specifically, when it comes to the 
issue of immigration policy enforcement, the state governor can play an instrumental role in 
both encouraging and discouraging the arrests of undocumented people. Results from 
statistical analyses demonstrate that during the Bush administration, Republican governors had 
a stronger influence on immigration policy enforcement actions.  
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In Table 5.1, I compare the effect of a Republican governor on the number of 
undocumented immigrants arrested and deported under two presidential administrations—the 
Bush and Obama.  Specifically, the unemployment, which is an issue constantly mentioned in 
debates over immigration policy, presents interesting results. During the Bush administration, 
looking at the unemployment rate from its lowest to its maximum value, we can observe that 
the number of arrests decreased from 12 to 11. In comparison with the number of 
undocumented people arrested during the Obama administration, we see that, moving from 
the lowest to the maximum value of the unemployment rate, the number of arrests increases 
from 7 to 9. To say that unemployment does not have the same importance under the Bush 
administration is misleading. More specifically, even when the number of arrests is decreasing, 
in comparison to the Obama administration when the arrests are increasing, the number of 
arrests is much higher at both the lowest and highest value of the unemployment rate 
For local nonprofits that seek to stem the tide of arrests they need to consider not just 
the political party to which the governor belongs, but also the current presidential regime. This 
is important given that immigration enforcement is the sole jurisdiction of the federal 
government. Although local law enforcement officers may have ample discretion to arrest 
anyone, and undocumented immigrants in particular, they may be constrained by the 
enforcement policy preferences of the president. The comparison I just presented of number of 
arrests under both presidential regimes demonstrates the difference in policy preferences. 
More specifically, there is a difference in the rigor with which immigration policy is enforced at 
the local level.   
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Because the states do not have the authority, means, and know-how to remove anyone 
from the country, they have to transfer the immigrants they arrest to ICE, which, in turn, 
transfers them to the Enforcement Removals Operation (ERO) office. Thus, if ICE declines to 
take custody of undocumented immigrants, the local law enforcement agency incurs costs of 
housing them. Consequently, enforcement officers may no longer find arresting large numbers 
of undocumented immigrants cost effective. This is another opportunity that opens up for 
immigrant advocates who wish to see a decrease in the number of undocumented immigrants 
arrested by the local law enforcement agency.  
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Table 5-1 Arrests and Removals and Republican Governor 
SED Factors Arrests Removals Arrests Removals 
 Bush Administration Obama 
Administration 
Bush Administration Obama 
Administration 
Unemployment 
 
Decrease from 12 to 11 Increase from 7 to 9 Decrease from 12 to 11 Increase from 6 to 8 
Property Crime 
 
Decrease from 7 to 3 Decrease from 3 to 2 Decrease from 6 to 0 Decrease from 3 to 1 
Latino Population 
 
Increase from 14 to 21 Decrease from 6 to 5 Increase from 14 to 20 Decrease from 5 to 4 
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Chapter 6  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the last decade, immigration policy enforcement has been a prominent and thorny 
issue in political debates at the local, state, and federal level. The failure of Congress to pass a 
comprehensive immigration reform policy in 2006 and 2007 has spurred states to adopt state-
level immigration policies that aim to deal with immigrants in general and undocumented ones 
in particular. In this dissertation, I focus on the two most pressing issues confronting the 
federal, state, and local governments: the enforcement of immigration policy and states 
adoption of state-level immigration policies that seek either to restrict or accommodate both 
documented and undocumented immigrants. In Chapter 2, I set the underpinnings of a theory 
of enforcement, which I presented in Chapter 3. I started by introducing the 287(g)—an 
immigration policy enforcement program. Through the passage of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, which led to the creation of the 
287(g) program, Congress authorizes U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—the 
main investigative branch of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS [then the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Services])—to delegate authority to state, tribal, and local law 
enforcement agencies (LEA) in the enforcement of immigration policy.  
More importantly, in this chapter, I delineated the nature of the relationship between 
the federal government and county governments participating in the 287(g) program. I focused 
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on how the program works and the overlap of authority between the federal and local law 
enforcement agencies. In particular, I paid attention to how the program is administered under 
two presidential administrations: The Bush and the Obama. The significance of this comparison 
is that we can appreciate the differences between the two political parties and their policy 
preferences on immigration policy enforcement. For instance, one can observe this difference 
in the memorandum of agreement that ICE entered with county governments under both 
administrations. More specifically, under the Bush administration, ICE did not set priorities for 
removal. It meant that local law enforcement agencies had the discretion to decide who would 
be removed from the country. In other words, anyone who was arrested and found to be 
undocumented was a candidate for removal. In stark contrast, under the Obama 
administration, ICE set standards and priorities for removals—targeting undocumented 
immigrants with criminal records. Thus, even when the local law enforcement agency arrests 
many undocumented immigrants, ICE makes the final decision as to who is to be removed and 
the number of removals per year.  
In Chapter 3, I set forth theory a partisan preference of immigration policy enforcement. 
I considered the effect of socio-economic-demographic (SED) issues—unemployment, crime, 
and growth of the Latino population—and the partisan identification of the state governor and 
their effect on the number of undocumented immigrants arrested and removed. To assess this 
relationship between SED and political factors, I, first evaluated baseline models of SED factors 
and then of political factors on arrests and removals. On their own, these political and social 
factors are nothing new in political science. In this study, however, I brought them together and 
interacted them to highlight the activating effect that social factors have on political actors 
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given their partisanship. More specifically, the theory I present here is one that takes into 
consideration the core values of the political parties and how social factors in the environment 
activate them resulting in a particular response, approach, or action. In the case of immigration 
policy, and in particular on the matter of enforcement, social issues may determine the rigor 
with which enforcement activities are carried out. The results of the analyses show that, 
indeed, social issues, have an activating effect. Of note is the effect of the unemployment rate, 
which during the Obama administration had an amplifying effect on a Republican governor, but 
not during the Bush administration. On the other hand, the growth of the Latino population 
from 1990 to 2010 had an amplifying effect during the Bush administration but not during the 
Obama administration. And the crime rate had an attenuating effect under both 
administrations.  
The adoption of state-level accommodating and restrictive immigration policies is 
nothing new. Throughout the history of immigration in the United States, every wave of 
immigrants has provoked state governments to adopt both restrictive and accommodating 
policies. With the growth of the foreign-born population and the undocumented as well, many 
state governments have decried the inadequacy of immigration policy enforcement. 
Additionally, they are unsatisfied with Congress inability at passing a comprehensive 
immigration reform bill, with both the Republican and Democratic parties unable to get all their 
members behind a unified vision of immigration reform. In the face of these failures, some 
states have reacted by adopting state-level immigration policies to stem the tide of 
undocumented immigrants. On the other hand, a number of states have adopted policies that 
seek to protect them and provide services that facilitate their integration into society.  
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In Chapter 4, I turned the focus to state governments’ adoption of state-level 
immigration policies. In this chapter, I modified the partisan preferences theory, and replace 
the unemployment rate with the poverty rate and added an important economic factor: key 
state industries dependence on immigrant labor—agricultural and manufacturing. To test the 
theory, I use data from the National Conference of State Legislatures, which provides 
summaries of state-level immigration laws. These laws address issues of education, healthcare, 
and welfare benefits, to name a few. The results show that higher levels of poverty rate 
increase the propensity of a state to adopt accommodating immigration policies instead of 
increasing the likelihood that states would adopt restrictive ones. Moreover, the economic 
factors—the contribution of the agricultural and manufacturing industries to the state GDP—
are insignificant. The results are puzzling as none of the socio-economic-demographic factors 
predict restrictive policies, as expected. The literature on political science links the importance 
of a healthy state economy with the political fortunes of elected political actors. Thus, it is 
expected that they will do anything within their power to ensure that the state economy 
remains robust. In general, they may provide tax incentives for industries to relocate to their 
states. In the particular case of immigration, they may facilitate the flow of immigrant labor by 
accommodating the needs of the immigrant population.  
The results may indicate that when it comes to the issue of immigration, political leaders 
may be influenced by factors other than the state economy. This finding contributes to our 
understanding of the multiple dimensions of economic factors influencing the policy agenda of 
elected leaders. Given that immigrants are viewed as job competitors, who depress wages and 
displace the local workforce, state leaders may be more amenable to restrict the flow of 
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immigrants to protect the economic well-being of residents. Future research could explore this 
factor. 
In Chapter 5, the focus turned to policy advocacy. In particular, the discussion centered 
on how policy advocates could use the findings from analyses on immigration policy 
enforcement and the adoption of state-level immigration policies to devise strategies to 
advocate for immigrants. It provides an alternative view on partisanship. More specifically, it 
highlights the nuances between the political parties and why immigrant advocates should seek 
to advocate for immigrant rights not only to Democratic governors, but also to Republicans.  
  
Limitations 
Most studies have a number of limitations, and this one is no exception. The limitations give us 
pause to interpret and apply the findings cautiously. Additionally, they also provide pathways to 
future research. In the study on immigration policy enforcement through the lens of the 287(g) 
program, a number of limitations occur. First, participation in the program is not automatic; 
state or local law enforcement agencies apply to the U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). ICE, on the other hand, makes a decision as to which enforcement agency is accepted to 
participate in the program. An interest to participate underscores the willingness of law 
enforcement agencies to arrest and remove undocumented immigrants. Thus, this study 
provides information on the enforcement action of a selected group of law enforcement 
agencies. Additionally, because only a fraction of county law enforcement agencies participate 
in the program, I cannot make generalizations that the political process is the same across all 
localities and states. Second, the crime data are at the state level instead of county level, which 
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would be more appropriate given that the unit of analysis is the county. This dataset poses a 
problem as it may not be capturing the actual situation in the participating counties. A 
replication of this study could benefit from using county level data.  
 
Next Steps for Future Research 
This research has centered on two dimensions of immigration policy: enforcement and state-
level immigration policy adoption. These two studies can serve as point of departure for future 
research. First, because the political science literature does not have one single study on 
immigration policy enforcement, it would be worthwhile to expand this study to include either 
all counties or all states. To that end, experts and scholars could focus their efforts on studying 
another federal program in which local and state law enforcement agencies collaborate with 
the federal government in the enforcement of immigration policy. In particular, the Secure 
Communities—a data-sharing program—is a good candidate for future study because every 
single law enforcement agency at the town, city, county, and state level participate in the 
program. It means that any officer who stops an individual could inquire about that person’s 
immigration status. Because participation in this program was voluntary (and later made 
mandatory), it could be studied by focusing on the time that each locality joined the program. It 
would be worthwhile to apply the same theory I use in this study to see if the results hold when 
there is a larger number of participating law enforcement agencies.  
Second, because the issue of immigration is salient, a study that focuses on the role of 
interest groups could yield different and interesting results. More specifically, a study that 
includes groups such as the business sector and immigrant advocates for immigrants as well as 
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advocates for immigration control would be valuable This study could provide insights on the 
political forces pressuring and influencing state political leaders’ decision to collaborate with 
the federal government in the enforcement of immigration policy and the adoption of state-
level immigration policies. This would be an interesting study because, for the most part, the 
groups just noted have diametrically opposing needs and interests. Additionally, they provide 
electoral or financial support to political leaders election and re-election campaigns.  
Third, a study on unaccompanied immigrant children would give another dimension of 
state politics and state courts. Specifically, undocumented children, with no parents and no 
legal guardian, are the responsibility of the Health and Human Services Agency while they await 
a resolution to their immigration cases. To stabilize their immigration status, children must 
petition the state juvenile court for the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status visa. If the status is 
granted, children can apply for lawful permanent residency. A quick check on the number of 
petitions granted across the states suggest that it varies considerably, with Georgia granting 
fewer than any other state. This study could explore the state political environment along with 
the state’s propensity to adopt either restrictive or accommodating immigration policies to 
determine if they have any influence on the state courts decision.  
Finally, a study of the relationship between the federal agency, ICE, and the immigration court 
could provide interesting insights on the autonomy of the agency. Specifically, immigration law 
provides that ICE agents screen immigrants for potential relief and refer them to the 
immigration court. Additionally, since 2003, with the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, the power of the agency has increased in terms of carrying out administrative 
removals. With this increased power, the agency could well be overlooking immigration law 
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and removing immigrants without providing a meaningful screening of their particular 
situations. Thus, it would be interesting to see potential changes in the rate of cases referred to 
the immigration court. Additionally, the strategies that the federal agency uses to circumvent 
political control and maintain its autonomy would deepen our understanding of immigration 
policy enforcement and the surrounding political environment that may determine the rigor of 
enforcement actions.   
